大乘起信論廣釋卷第三．四．五 4.134

4.134

論。以不解故至還作眾生　釋曰。此正明執相也。謂眾生有始者。此起有始見也。謂聞依藏有生死故。則謂真先而其妄後。故起眾生有始之見。如外道執從初自性而生大等始有眾生。以見始等者。此起有終見也。謂聞藏有涅槃故。疑如來藏本無滅處而起諸染得有眾生。縱得涅槃雖無惑染。何不新起作眾生耶。既執涅槃有其終盡。却成眾生有始之義。如外道執眾生終盡還歸自性亦得涅槃後從寂起還作眾生。

[Treatise:] Because they do not understand, [they say that sentient beings have a beginning … and] become sentient beings again—
[Commentary:] "Explication": This directly explains the characteristic of attachment. Stating that sentient beings have a beginning: this is the arising of the view of having a beginning. That is, hearing that saṃsāra exists dependent on the garbha, they say that the real comes first and the delusive comes after; thus they give rise to the view that sentient beings have a beginning. This is like the heterodox view clinging to the notion that from the primordial prakṛti, mahat and so forth arise, and only then do sentient beings begin to exist. "Seeing that there is a beginning...", and so forth: this is the arising of the view of having an end. That is, hearing that the garbha has nirvāṇa, they wonder: "If the tathāgatagarbha originally had no cessation, yet gave rise to defilements so that sentient beings came to exist, then even if one attains nirvāṇa and is without afflictions and defilements, why should one not arise anew and become a sentient being?" Since they cling to nirvāṇa having an ending, it conversely forms the meaning that sentient beings have a beginning. This is like the heterodox view clinging to the idea that when sentient beings reach an end, they return to prakṛti and also attain nirvāṇa, but later arise from quiescence and become sentient beings again.