大乘起信論廣釋卷第三．四．五 4.39

4.39

論。妄心熏習至速趣涅槃故　釋曰。次下廣釋。於中有二。先明妄心熏。後顯真如熏。此初也。此中有義。真熏無明依二妄心起能熏智故說妄熏義有二種。非謂二妄即能熏真。以是無明之所起故。但作智依資能熏智說此能熏非即熏也。如依業識而見佛身以依轉識說為境界。豈即業轉能見證耶。但見等依故作是說。彼既許然。此亦應爾。謂由真如熏無明故。令依事識發厭求智。依於業識發唯識智。返熏真如趣無上覺非謂無明所起二妄即能熏真趣菩提等。有義二妄即能。以是真如所熏起故。與無明熏義相敵對。所起妄心用各別故。彼無明妄却熏無明。何不此妄却熏真性。不爾真熏不異無明。所起二妄不熏真故。熏二妄作用應無。以許不能返熏真故。若智資依為別用者。應無明妄亦作資依。彼既不然。此云何爾。說依業識見佛等者。理實如是。然非此倒業轉皆妄可相依生。智依妄生理不齊故。真熏事識自起厭求。何要別起能熏之智。設爾二智從何而生。若唯從真不應名妄。既稱妄。智與此何殊。是故前說深為不可故。此二妄即能熏真。與厭求智更無別體。由此智妄應作四句。有妄非智。謂彼無明所熏起者。即智非妄謂出無明真如照用有亦妄亦智。謂即真如所熏起者。有非妄非智。謂真如門所顯理性故。真熏妄即是能熏。與無明妄其體各別。若作此釋。稍親妙旨。有義。此說理亦未然。與前後文相乖越故。前後皆說唯一事識。不許別有兩事識故。若許爾者。本識應然。則一眾生有兩體故。無明事識應無真如。真如別熏起厭求故。不爾真如應有兩種。熏不熏處各差別故。故前所說理必不成。由此但是無明熏真所起事識能厭求等。離此無別厭求之智及真如熏所起事識。謂此事識舉體即真。無明若厚。真熏無力。無明若薄。而起求何要別有真熏事識。由此亦有智妄四句。謂以真熏有力無力相對而成如理應思。總說雖然別分別者。謂凡夫等真熏力微而其妄心煩惱性重。雖復真熏起厭求心而本事識未遠離故。故就本名名事識熏習。以是真如所熏力故。厭無明動欣涅槃淨。却熏真如增其勢力。令凡夫等起隨事行。由此故言隨力所能也。以此識有麁煩惱故。於法執相猶未覺故。能熏之力猶淺薄故。與所熏真疎且遠故。不能速□向涅槃道故。漸趣向無上菩提故。依凡夫厭求之心說為分別事識熏習。若諸菩薩真熏力勝。雖有妄心契順真理了知諸法。唯識量故不見動靜。更何欣厭。離前事識執之相。於本識相猶未離故。故就本名名意熏習。此能深契真如理故。却熏真如增其智力。令諸菩薩發勇猛心起隨順行離二取相斷法我執向本心源。無明之力極輕薄故。所起妄心極微劣故。成能熏智深厚徹故。與所熏真親且近故。故能速證大般涅槃故。依菩薩名意熏習。

[Treatise:] Perfuming by the deluded mind [...] because they quickly proceed toward nirvāṇa. / [Commentary:] Next below is the extensive explanation. In this there are two parts: first explaining perfuming by the deluded mind, and later revealing perfuming by tathatā. This is the first. In this there is an opinion: Tathatā perfumes avidyā, and relying on the two deluded minds, it produces the perfuming cognition; hence it is said that the meaning of deluded perfuming has two kinds. It does not mean that the two deluded [minds] can themselves perfume the true. Since they are produced by avidyā, they merely serve as the basis for cognition, assisting the perfuming cognition, and on this account it is said that they can perfume, not that they directly perfume. Just as relying on the karmic consciousness one sees the Buddha's body, and relying on the evolving consciousness it is spoken of as an object—could it be that the karmic and evolving [consciousnesses] themselves can see and realize? It is only spoken of in this way because they are the basis for seeing, etc. Since that is admitted, this should also be so. That is to say, because tathatā perfumes avidyā, it causes one to produce the cognition of revulsion and seeking based on phenomenal consciousness, and to produce the cognition of consciousness-only based on karmic consciousness, which inversely perfumes tathatā to proceed toward unexcelled awakening; it does not mean that the two deluded [minds] produced by avidyā can themselves perfume the true and proceed toward bodhi and so forth. There is [another] opinion: The two deluded [minds] can themselves [perfume], because they are produced through the perfuming of tathatā; they stand in direct opposition to the perfuming of avidyā, and the activities of the deluded minds produced are distinct. If that avidyā delusion can in turn perfume avidyā, why can this delusion not in turn perfume the true nature? Otherwise, the perfuming of the true would not differ from avidyā, because the two deluded [minds] produced would not perfume the true. The function of perfuming the two deluded [minds] would be non-existent, since it is admitted that they cannot inversely perfume the true. If cognition's assisting basis were a separate function, then the avidyā delusion should also serve as an assisting basis. Since that is not so, why should this be so? As for saying that relying on the karmic consciousness one sees the Buddha, etc.: in principle it is indeed so. However, it is not the case here that inverted karma and manifestation, being both deluded, can arise in mutual dependence. Cognition arising depending on delusion is fundamentally not parallel. When the true perfumes phenomenal consciousness, it naturally produces revulsion and seeking; why must it separately give rise to a perfuming cognition? If so, from where do the two cognitions arise? If they arise solely from the true, they should not be called delusion. Since they are termed delusion, how does cognition differ from this? Therefore, the previous explanation is deeply untenable. Thus, these two deluded [minds] can themselves perfume the true, having no distinct substance from the cognition of revulsion and seeking. Hence, regarding cognition and delusion, a tetralemma should be formulated: 1. There is delusion that is not cognition, namely that which is produced by the perfuming of avidyā. 2. There is cognition that is not delusion, namely the illuminating activity of tathatā emerging from avidyā. 3. There is that which is both delusion and cognition, namely that which is produced by the perfuming of tathatā. 4. There is that which is neither delusion nor cognition, namely the rational nature revealed by the gate of tathatā. Therefore, the delusion perfumed by the true is precisely the active perfumer, having a distinct substance from the delusion of avidyā. If interpreted in this way, it is somewhat closer to the wondrous meaning. There is [yet another] opinion: This explanation is also not correct in principle, because it contradicts the preceding and subsequent texts. The preceding and subsequent texts all state that there is only one phenomenal consciousness, not permitting two separate phenomenal consciousnesses. If that were permitted, the fundamental consciousness would also be like this, and thus one sentient being would have two substances. The phenomenal consciousness of avidyā would lack tathatā, because tathatā would separately perfume and give rise to revulsion and seeking. Otherwise, there would have to be two kinds of tathatā, because the places of being perfumed and not being perfumed would differ. Therefore, what was previously said is necessarily unestablished in principle. Because of this, it is simply the phenomenal consciousness produced by avidyā perfuming the true that can revile and seek, etc.; apart from this, there is no separate cognition of revulsion and seeking or phenomenal consciousness produced by the perfuming of tathatā. That is to say, the phenomenal consciousness in its entirety is precisely the true. If avidyā is thick, the perfuming of the true lacks power; if avidyā is thin, then it gives rise to seeking—why must there separately be a phenomenal consciousness perfumed by the true? Because of this, there is also a tetralemma of cognition and delusion: formed by the opposition between whether the perfuming of the true has power or lacks power, as should be reflected upon in accordance with reason. Although spoken of generally in this way, to distinguish them specifically: for ordinary beings and the like, the power of the perfuming of the true is weak, while the afflictive nature of their deluded mind is heavy. Even though, through the perfuming of the true, they produce a mind of revulsion and seeking, they have not yet departed from the original phenomenal consciousness; therefore, following its original name, it is called the perfuming of phenomenal consciousness. Because it has the power of being perfumed by tathatā, it reviles the movement of avidyā and rejoices in the purity of nirvāṇa, inversely perfuming tathatā to increase its strength and causing ordinary beings and the like to give rise to practices conforming with phenomenal affairs; therefore it is said "according to the capacity of their power". Because this consciousness has coarse afflictions, has not yet awakened to the marks of attachment to dharmas, its active perfuming power is still shallow and weak, and it is distant and estranged from the true that is perfumed, it cannot swiftly proceed toward the path of nirvāṇa, but gradually proceeds toward unexcelled bodhi; thus, based on the mind of revulsion and seeking in ordinary beings, it is spoken of as the perfuming of the discriminative phenomenal consciousness. In bodhisattvas, the power of the perfuming of the true is superior; although they have a deluded mind, they accord with the true principle and completely understand that all dharmas are merely of the measure of consciousness, thus seeing neither movement nor stillness—what further longing or revulsion could there be? Having separated from the marks of grasping of the preceding phenomenal consciousness, but not yet having departed from the marks of the fundamental consciousness, following its original name it is called the perfuming of the manas. Because this can deeply accord with the principle of tathatā, it inversely perfumes tathatā to increase its cognitive power, causing bodhisattvas to arouse a vigorous mind, initiate conforming practices, separate from the marks of the two graspers, sever the attachment to dharma-self, and proceed toward the fundamental source of the mind. Because the power of avidyā is extremely light and thin, the deluded mind produced is extremely subtle and weak, the active perfuming cognition accomplished is deeply profound and thorough, and it is intimate and close to the true that is perfumed, they can swiftly realize great parinirvāṇa; therefore, based on bodhisattvas, it is called the perfuming of the manas.