大乘起信論廣釋卷第三．四．五 3.31

3.31

[Treatise:] Sentient beings are also like this: [they go astray relying on awakening; if they were separated from the nature of awakening, there would be no non-awakening.] [Commentary:] This is the application of the simile to the dharma. Original awakening and tathatā are like the true direction; fundamental non-awakening is like the mind that can be deluded; the active thoughts of karma and so forth are like the erroneous directions. Just as apart from true east there is no separate erroneous west, it says: "if they were separated from the nature of awakening, there would be no non-awakening." Question: Does the substance of this original awakening itself become non-awakened, or is there a separate avidyā called non-awakening? In this, the first opinion holds: There is no separate non-awakening; the substance of awakening itself being deluded is spoken of as non-awakening. How could there be a separate avidyā distinct from original awakening? Just as sleeping and waking have no difference in essential nature: if they mutually negated each other, there would constantly be neither waking nor sleeping; because they are not separate, waking and sleeping arise alternately. If they were each separate, then in a single person there would be both sleeping and waking at once, which does not accord with correct reasoning. The natures of awakening and non-awakening should be known to be likewise. If awakening and non-awakening were devoid of mutual nature, there would neither be the arising of delusion nor the return from delusion. Because awakening and non-awakening have no difference in substance, one is deluded by oneself and transmigrates, and awakens by oneself and returns to the source. If they were each separate, then a single sentient being would be half-deluded and half-awakened, which does not accord with reason. Because they are not separate, the treatise says that "thoughts have no self-characteristic and are not separated from original awakening." For this reason, the sūtra says that darkness and light unite. A second opinion holds: This explanation deeply contradicts reason. The names of awakening would mutually be lost; the arising of defilement and return to the source would be indeterminate; the natures of awakening and non-awakening are each distinct, just as suffering and pleasure are not identical in nature. If avidyā were severed, awakening would then be severed; it speaks of the active nature conditioned by avidyā, and that cause and condition share the same substance is unheard of in reason; the substance of awakening would then have to be capable of moving by itself; the similes of wind and ocean water would not match. Therefore, the preceding explanation definitely cannot be established. One should speak of two meanings: their substances are not one. Severing avidyā reveals the dharmakāya; the naturally pure mind is moved by avidyā, and that which moves and that which is moved are not one in substance; perfuming fragrance or foulness and the dharmas that are perfumed—the perfumer and the perfumed—are also not one; truth and delusion are originally neither defiled nor pure by nature, but become defiled or pure due to distinct conditioning perfumings. Because they are not separated, it is said that it "is not separated from awakening"; it is not that awakening and non-awakening are definitely of one single substance. Hence the treatise below says: "If within the substance of the tathāgatagarbha there were false dharmas, causing one who realizes them to permanently cease delusion, there would be no such thing." This is because the new sūtra speaks of the simile of a lamp destroying darkness. A third opinion holds: Neither of the two explanations can be established, because positing definite oneness or definite difference is the view of non-Buddhists. Avidyā is neither destructible nor indestructible, because it is neither one with nor different from original awakening. In the similes cited here—the characteristics of water and the characteristics of wind, or the subtle dust following transformations—they are neither one nor different. Grasping either extreme will meet with refutation. Only by combining the two explanations is the meaning complete. The previously cited texts rely on one aspect; therefore, awakening and non-awakening are neither one nor different.