大乘起信論廣釋卷第三．四．五 3.73

3.73

[Treatise:] This consciousness relies on views [and craving...] because of the meaning of increasing. [Commentary:] This clarifies the basis of the consciousness. "Views" refers to the five views, which are all the discriminative afflictions that initiate karma abandoned on the path of seeing. Among the delusions that initiate karma, views are the strongest; mentioning these also subsumes discriminative greed and the like—namely, the ground of abiding in the single locus of views among the five abidings. "Craving" refers to greedy craving, all the innate afflictions that moisten rebirth abandoned on the path of cultivation. Among the delusions that moisten rebirth, craving is the strongest; mentioning the strongest also subsumes innate delusion and the like—namely, the three grounds of abiding: craving for desire, form, and existence. As for the meaning of this being able to increase the phenomenal consciousness, there is an opinion: It only increases coarse graspings such as the self, said to rely on ordinary persons' grasping, etc. Therefore, it is said that persons of the two vehicles sever the afflictions of views and craving, merely separating from the primary defilement associated with grasping. Although the two vehicles lack the afflictions of views and craving, they have not yet separated from the mind of the discriminating phenomenal consciousness; thus it is said that the continuing consciousness is also a phenomenal consciousness, which definitely is not increased by views and craving. It is said that based on attachment to dharmas, delusions such as self arise, not allowing afflictions to give rise to attachment to dharmas. When it says that views and craving perfumed form the phenomenal consciousness, it refers to the attachment to self within the consciousness of conventional speech, just as the perfuming of the phenomenal consciousness gives rise to the suffering of ordinary persons—how could the two vehicles and others have this? Therefore, what increases is merely the coarse grasping of self, etc., within consciousness, not the substance of the phenomenal consciousness itself. That is to say, objects nourish and perfume the manifesting consciousness to give rise to that characteristic of cognition and characteristic of continuity, forming the ideational characteristic of attachment to dharmas within the phenomenal consciousness; furthermore, through views and craving perfuming the ideational characteristic of attachment to dharmas within the phenomenal consciousness, grasping of self, etc., arises, hence it is said that attachment to self arises from attachments. Since views and craving are possessed by ordinary persons and perfume to give rise to the attachment to self, it says that relying on ordinary persons grasping becomes increasingly deep, speaking of the mental consciousness, etc. Because of this, although the two vehicles have severed views and craving and separated from the characteristics of self and the like, they have still not separated from the discriminating phenomenal consciousness, because it is not arisen from those. If one makes this explanation, it is wonderfully pleasing to reason and teaching. There is another opinion: The principle of this explanation is not established, as it extremely contradicts the treatise text and its meaning. It says that the perfuming of views and craving is able to form the phenomenal consciousness, not that it perfumes to give rise to self and what belongs to self; it says that the six defiled characteristics are all the phenomenal consciousness, and the six defilements all lack the meaning of self, etc.; the view of self is subsumed under views and craving, being able to perfume and give rise to other things, not arising itself; all consciousnesses have the meaning of relying on others, and the phenomenal consciousness definitely arises relying on views and craving; it is said that the delusions of views and craving are also avidyā, which definitely has the function of perfuming suchness to give rise to consciousness; since fundamental avidyā perfumes to give rise to the fundamental consciousness, the branch [avidyā] should similarly give rise to the phenomenal consciousness. Otherwise, the phenomenal consciousness would not arise from avidyā, because it would not be allowed to be perfumed and arisen from views and craving. If you say that the phenomenal consciousness is merely perfumed and arisen from objects, not from views and craving, the view of self also has the sense of being perfumed and arisen from objects—why not allow that, since objects have the meaning of increasing and perfuming grasping? If you say that because the phenomenal consciousness extends to attachment to dharmas, it is not allowed to be perfumed and arisen from afflictions, why then would you allow that in giving rise to the attachment to self? Treatises do not allow delusions to generate attachments. One should know that the phenomenal consciousness logically has the two characteristics of dharma and self; the phenomenal consciousness associated with the two attachments is not itself the substance of the two attachments—how does being perfumed and arisen from views and craving contradict logic? That treatises do not speak of the afflictions of views and craving giving rise to the phenomenal consciousness is for the time being according to coarse characteristics; in actuality, they also have the meaning of giving rise to the phenomenal consciousness. That is, the cetasikas associated with this phenomenal consciousness definitely have the function of assisting and completing the primary mind; thus it speaks of attention startling and leading the mind, etc. Since cetasikas are manifold and subsumed under the delusions of views and craving, their perfuming to give rise to the phenomenal consciousness does not violate logic. In those defiled states, all wholesome cetasikas not subsumed under the roots of good conducive to liberation arise from avidyā and are all subsumed here, because the phenomenal consciousness definitely associates with wholesome [cetasikas]. Since this is coarse and active, differing from the fundamental consciousness, it must arise from two conditions: first, objects; second, cetasikas associated with views and craving. Therefore, the treatise texts alternate in mentioning one: either saying it is perfumed and arisen from objects, or saying it is increased and arisen from views and craving; combining the former and latter statements, the meaning is fully complete. Therefore, although the two vehicles are separated from views and craving, because false objects exist, they have not separated from the phenomenal consciousness. If so, they would not have separated from the defilement associated with grasping, because there would be objects that can perfume the characteristic of self. Answer: The object is not a real self; having attained the cognition of self-emptiness, they are not perfumed by false objects. When it says that relying on ordinary persons grasping becomes increasingly deep and that the perfuming of the phenomenal consciousness gives rise to the suffering of ordinary persons, it means that the substance of the phenomenal consciousness, in the position of an ordinary person, once grasping is deep, further gives rise to attachment to self, initiating karma of the five destinies and undergoing the suffering of ordinary persons; it does not mean perfuming to give rise to coarse attachments such as the self. Therefore, that which is increased by views and craving is merely the phenomenal consciousness; its principle is extremely well-established.