大乘起信論廣釋卷第三．四．五 4

English (machine translation) 4

Language: English

4.1

First, it reveals the reason for the conditioned arising of avidyā; later, it reveals the marks of the defiled mind in conditioned arising. This is the first. This […] the prior statement that although there is a defiled mind, it is ever constant and unchanging. The words "although defiled, there is a defiled mind that is constantly unchanging" constitute the defilement of active and objective thought; therefore, thought-defilement is used to explain its unchanging nature. First, because its own nature is constantly luminous and pure, it does not change, constituting the defilement of active thought. Second, because its own nature cannot be grasped, it does not change, constituting the defilement of objective thought. Thus the new translation states: "Although there is a defiled mind, it is constantly luminous and pure, without alteration. Furthermore, because its original nature has no differentiated clarity, even though it pervades all cognitive objects, it has no variation." Although this text is brief, its meaning is complete; therefore, having no thought is called unchanging.

4.2

Treatise: "Because of not comprehending […] it is called avidyā." / Commentary: This reveals the reason for the conditioned arising of avidyā, explaining the prior meaning of "yet there is avidyā." One opinion states: non-comprehension is simply one's own mind, and there is no separate avidyā called non-comprehension; that is, one does not understand the equality of single taste, and because it is not associated with one's own fundamental mind, it is called avidyā, as there is no separate phenomenon. Another opinion states: one cannot contradict what was stated above, that defiled by avidyā there is a defiled mind; for there are distinctions in the substance and marks of conditioned arising between the active defiler and the object defiled, the causes, conditions, and fruits. If it were as previously stated, that awakening is itself non-awakening, then it would incur the fault refuted earlier. If it is claimed that being unassociated with the mind is what is called avidyā, then the preceding three defilements should be awakened states, since they are said to be associated. Therefore, there is a distinct avidyā that is capable of deluding: although it is not separate from tathatā, it is not the very substance of tathatā; it is the most extremely subtle delusion identical with mind that fails to comprehend the unthinking realm of phenomena. This precisely should be called "unassociated mind"; because there is not yet the distinction between active and objective, or between primary mind and mental factors, the phrasing is inverted, stating "mind is not associated," not that it is unassociated with components. Thus the new translation states: "Because of not awakening to the one realm of phenomena, it is unassociated; avidyā discriminately arises." Only this can be the source of all defilements; there is no further root of defilement. Therefore it says "suddenly a thought arises." The sūtra speaks of five abodes; because no other phenomenon arises prior to it, it is called the abode ground of beginningless avidyā. Revealing that no other phenomenon initiates avidyā is precisely the meaning of "suddenly arising" in this treatise. This is stated in terms of the gateway of subtle and coarse mutual dependence, not in terms of temporal duration, because its arising has no beginning.

4.3

Treatise: "The defiled mind has six kinds." / Commentary: Next, it reveals the marks of the conditioned arising of the defiled mind. Within this there are two parts: a general outline and a specific explanation. This is the first. This explains the prior phrase, "defiled by avidyā, there is a defiled mind." In stating that defiled by avidyā there is a defiled mind, there are six kinds, namely the consciousness of phenomenal awareness above and the five kinds of intent. Previously, to explain the meaning of causal conditioned arising, the explanation progressed from subtle to coarse. Now, intending also to reveal the meaning of counteracting and severing, it clarifies from coarse to subtle; therefore, although earlier and later differ, their meaning is not different.

4.4

Treatise: "What are the six? […] because of being far removed." / Commentary: Next is the explanation of the six defilements, divided into six parts. This "defilement associated with grasping" is phenomenal consciousness. It is also the grasping and attachment to names among the six coarse marks, and the coarse clinging mark within the four characteristics. Because it is augmented by the afflictions of view and attachment, the coarse grasping associated with "I" and "mine" defiles the pure mind; hence it is called the defilement associated with grasping. This defines the obstruction, while below reveals its antidote. If people of the two vehicles reach the stage of non-learning, they sever the afflictions of view and cultivation and can leave this defilement behind. Bodhisattvas, upon entering the stage of abiding, have their faith-marks perfected without retrogressing, which is called "associated with faith." Thus the *Daśabhūmika-śāstra* and Asanga's treatise both state that prior to the stages is the stage of the practice of faith; having attained the gateway of the emptiness of persons, the afflictions of view and attachment cannot manifest, and thus they are "far removed," not that the latent seeds have been eradicated. Why is it that at this stage the seeds of delusion are not severed? One opinion states: because the power of the path prior to the bhūmis is inferior, manifest delusions will still arise, much less can the seeds be severed. Only when reaching the first bhūmi and attaining the uncontaminated path does one sever the seeds of the discriminative affliction-obstruction, retaining the co-arising seeds to assist practice and take birth, permanently severing them only upon attaining buddhahood; the seeds and manifestations of the cognitive obstruction are severed and suppressed bhūmi by bhūmi, being completely and permanently severed only at the stage of buddhahood. For this reason, seeds of delusion are not severed prior to the bhūmis. Another opinion states: this explanation is not yet completely luminous, merely conforming to the sense of the Faxiang Mahāyāna. If bodhisattvas at the stage of faith can attain the buddha-body, accomplish the path through the eight marks, and perform the deeds of transforming sentient beings, and can also partially see the principle of the emptiness of sentient beings, how could they be unable to sever the seeds of delusion? They are able to generate the superior path to permanently sever afflictions, but fearing it would hinder their practices and vows, they retain the seeds of delusion. Thus the Liang *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* relies on this to say: "If one does not sever the active mind, one does not differ from ordinary beings; if one does not retain the seeds, one does not differ from the two vehicles." For the benefit of self and others, they retain the seeds of delusion. Furthermore, they do not fear delusion, knowing that it is tathatā transforming according to conditions, not different from truth; by taking afflictions as the place of enlightenment, they know that suchness transforms into emptiness, and the defilements of disciples are maintained at will. If they reach the bhūmis, they only sever the cognitive obstruction and no longer retain the affliction-obstruction; without distinguishing between view and cultivation, both seeds and manifestations are severed together, because having no efficacy, there is no use for them, and assisting practice to take birth does not require this. Remaining latent impressions are severed only upon buddhahood. Therefore, it is said in the *Maitreya-paripṛcchā-sūtra* that because all affliction-obstructions benefit the conduct of living beings, in the path of seeing all are severed together; the manas afflictions are also [severed] in the first bhūmi, not falling into the stage of the two vehicles through the power of vows. Furthermore, not only do they sever the delusions of the four abodes, but they can also partially sever the abode ground of avidyā. Thus the treatise below states: "The meaning of not comprehending the one realm of phenomena is observed, practiced, and severed beginning from the stage associated with faith." Here it merely reveals the coarse defilement of grasping.

4.5

Treatise: "Second, the non-interrupted […] because of leaving it ultimately behind." / Commentary: That is, among the five intents, it is called the continuous consciousness; among the earlier six defilements, it is called the characteristic of continuity. The continuity of grasping at dharmas is called non-interrupted; being able to defile the pure mind, it is called the non-interrupted defilement. Bodhisattvas of the three grades of worthies study and practice consciousness-only, investigation, and actual cognition, and through various contemplations gradually suppress such discriminative grasping at dharmas. Entering the bhūmis, they realize the three non-natures: since the manifestations and seeds of discriminative grasping at dharmas are both destroyed, it is said that "attaining the ground of pure mind, they leave it ultimately behind." Newly attaining uncontaminated mind for the first time is called pure mind, not the pure mind of subsequent bhūmis.

4.6

Treatise: "Third, the discriminative […] because of leaving it ultimately behind." / Commentary: That is, among the five intents, it is called the cognitive consciousness; among the earlier six defilements, it is called the characteristic of cognition. Discriminating defilement and purity is called discriminative cognition; defiling the pure mind, it is called a defilement. From the second bhūmi to the sixth bhūmi, one does not abide for a prolonged period in the uncontaminated contemplation; when emerging from contemplation to condition phenomenal things, there are subtle discriminations, so this grasping at dharmas cannot yet be permanently abandoned. However, at each bhūmi, upon entering contemplation, it can be eliminated portion by portion, so it is said to be "gradually abandoned." When reaching the seventh bhūmi, abiding for a long time in contemplation, this never functions again, which is called "leaving it ultimately behind." The ground of endowed morality refers to the second bhūmi, because this bhūmi is endowed with the threefold moral precept. The expedient means of signlessness refers to the seventh bhūmi, because one constantly applies attention to abide in the contemplation of signlessness; it does not mean the cause of signlessness of the eighth bhūmi—all who say that offer erroneous interpretations. What the new translation states as "from the ground endowed with morality to the ground endowed with wisdom, it is abandoned in part" means reaching the sixth bhūmi, which is called endowed with wisdom, because it possesses the higher wisdom associated with the aids to awakening, truth contemplation, and conditioned arising of the preceding three bhūmis.

4.7

Treatise: "Fourth, the manifesting form […] can leave it behind." / Commentary: Among the five intents, this is the third, manifesting consciousness. Among the three subtle marks above, it is the characteristic of appearance. Like a clear mirror manifesting physical forms, because it can defile the pure mind, it is called a defilement. Because in the eighth bhūmi one attains the three masteries, and the nature of form accords with the mind without hindrance, the eighth bhūmi is called mastery over form. Being able to realize the tathatā of mastery over marks and realms, the manifestations of bodily and realm forms arise from the sixth [bhūmi onward], and the deluded objects of avidyā are permanently left behind from this point; thus it is said that the defilement of appearance can be left behind at this bhūmi.

4.8

Treatise: "Fifth, the capable of seeing […] can leave it behind." / Commentary: Among the five intents, this is the second, evolving consciousness. Among the three subtle marks above, it is the characteristic of manifestation. The stirred mind upon which it relies transforms into active seeing; defiling the pure mind, it is called a defilement. In the ninth bhūmi, one attains unhindered cognition; skillfully knowing the dense thicket of sentient beings' mental conduct, free and unhindered, it is called mastery over mind. Hindered active conditioning never arises again from here; thus it is said that "at the ground of mastery over mind, one can leave it behind." Unhindered cognition is briefly fourfold, and in extensive form, fortyfold, as explained elsewhere.

4.9

Treatise: "Sixth, the fundamental […] can leave it behind." / Commentary: That is, among the five intents, it is called the karmic consciousness; among the three subtle marks, it is the karmic characteristic of avidyā. Relying on fundamental avidyā, the mind is stirred; serving as the root of the other defilements, it is called fundamental karma. Defiling the pure mind, it is called a defilement. Relying on the tenth bhūmi, one generates the vajra-samādhi, severs the habituation of subtle thoughts, and enters the buddha-ground; attaining the vision of the mind's nature, the mind is constantly abiding. Therefore it is said: "Relying on the culmination of the bodhisattva grounds, upon entering the Tathāgata ground, one can leave it behind." Question: At the tenth bhūmi there is still the characteristic of karma; how could entering the eighth bhūmi leave behind the defilement of appearance? If it is said that leaving behind karmic consciousness means having no characteristic of seeing, how could the characteristic of seeing be left behind in the ninth bhūmi? Answer: In truth, the eighth and ninth bhūmis have not yet left behind appearance and seeing, just as the tenth bhūmi has not yet left behind the characteristic of karma. Speaking of leaving them behind does not mean leaving them behind ultimately. Just as at the stage associated with faith, although one is said to leave behind the first defilement, it is only temporarily suppressed and abandoned; here it should be understood similarly. Because these two defilements obstruct those bhūmis, their mere suppression is called leaving behind; it does not mean permanent severing. Therefore, the latter three defilements are severed only upon reaching buddhahood, for upon leaving these behind, the great mirror cognition arises. What is said below about the bodhisattvas knowing the coarse within the subtle is also spoken in terms of the coarse marks that manifest. If so, should all three subtle marks be the characteristic of arising? Answer: Initial stirring is called arising, hence only karmic consciousness is so; evolving and manifesting are not, so there is no contradiction in principle.

4.10

Treatise: "Not comprehending the one realm of phenomena […] because of leaving it ultimately behind." / Commentary: The explanation of the substance and marks of conditioned arising above is concluded. Below is a re-examination, within which there are three parts: first, distinguishing the avidyā above in terms of its antidotes; next, explaining the meaning of association; later, revealing that defilement and avidyā constitute the two obstructions. This is the first. Previously it was said that the mind is pure yet there is avidyā; wishing to reveal this mark, the subsequent text said: "Not comprehending the one realm of phenomena, the mind is unassociated," which explains the prior phrase "there is avidyā." Now, re-examining the coarse and subtle in terms of antidotes, it says: "The meaning of not comprehending the one realm of phenomena," etc. However, this avidyā has both coarse and subtle: that is, it is called inborn, acquired, and abode ground. The discriminative kind is attained through the path, while the co-arising kind is attained at birth. Both of these possess seeds and manifestations. If at the stage of the three grades of worthies one attains signless contemplation, one can also suppress the lower discriminative manifestations; hence it says: "at the stage associated with faith, one observes, practices, and severs." Entering the first bhūmi, one permanently severs the non-existent seeds; from this point onward, up to the tenth bhūmi, one gradually severs the co-arising kind, both seeds and manifestations; thus it says: "entering the ground of pure mind, one is able to leave it behind according to one's portion." The first bhūmi and above are collectively called the pure mind; each has what it abandons, hence it is called "according to one's portion." Reaching the buddha-ground, coarse and subtle seeds and habituations are completely eliminated without remainder, which is called "leaving it ultimately behind." Thus various sūtras and treatises divide the cognitive obstruction into eleven kinds, severed across eleven grounds. What is said here of "pure mind leaving it behind according to one's portion" means that the ten bhūmis each leave behind one obstruction; because the text is abbreviated, it is implicit in the words. Were it not so, avidyā would be of only one kind, so how could it be left behind according to one's portion across the ten bhūmis?

4.11

Treatise: "The meaning of 'conjoined' is [...] because the characteristics of perception and the characteristics of condition are identical." Commentary: Next is the explanation of the meaning of conjoined and non-conjoined. Because of this, it is divided into two parts; this explains the meaning of "conjoined". That the first three defilements among the former six defilements are called "conjoined" has two meanings: first, based on primary mind and mental factors (cetasikas); second, based on mind and object. Regarding that based on primary mind and mental factors: because these are phenomenal consciousness and have general and particular conditions of defilement and purity, they necessarily conjoin. This further has five meanings: first, equality of time, because they are of the same single kṣaṇa; second, equality of basis, because they rely on the same sense faculty; third, equality of condition, because they condition the same object; fourth, equality of cognition, because they have the same mode of apprehension; fifth, equality of substance, because each has one substance. "The dharmas of mental factor of the mind are different," etc., reveals the equality of substance. "Mind" refers to the primary mind; "dharmas of mental factor" refers to cetasikas. The treatise says that cetasikas are called dharmas of mental factor, and because primary mind and mental factors are not identical, they are called "different". This means that based on the distinct objects of defilement and purity, there are these differences between mind and dharmas of mental factor. Because the mind and the mental factors are each one, they constitute conjunction. Relying on this meaning of different substances, the new translation says: "the differentiations of the mind are different, and the differentiations of defilement and purity are different." "The characteristics of perception are identical" means the equality of cognition. Based on the aforementioned distinct objects of defilement and purity, when the primary mind perceives defilement, the various defiled cetasikas, such as greed and anger, identical with the primary mind, perceive defilement. If the primary mind perceives purity, [the pure cetasikas] are also identical with it. "The characteristics of condition are identical" means the equality of condition. When the mind has conditioned those defiled or pure objects, the defiled and pure cetasikas condition them together with the primary mind; because they condition identically, it is also called conjoined. Here, it is provisionally based on these three meanings of equality; equality of basis and equality of time may be inferred accordingly. If so, why is it said that the mind and cetasikas have only an identical conditioned object, but not an identical characterized mode? Answer: Each describes [an aspect], and they do not contradict each other. Take, for example, self-view: the activity of the nature of viewing is its [mode], while the nature of self-love is [another] activity. Such differences in activity are called having different activities; yet view, love, and so on all take the self as their mode of apprehension and condition it, which is called having identical perception. Therefore, the two explanations do not contradict each other. Regarding that based on mind and object: because this phenomenal consciousness arises based on objects, it conforms with objects. Below it says: "When the object ceases, the conjoined mind ceases." Thus, "the dharmas of mental factor of the mind are different" reveals that mind and object are not identical, constituting the meaning of conjunction; for conjunction is of other nature, not of own nature. "Mind" refers to the conditioning mind, and "dharmas of mental factor" refers to the conditioned object; because mind and object are not identical, they are called "different". "Relying on the distinction of defilement and purity" reveals that mind and object depend on each other, constituting the meaning of conjunction. That is, because the mind relies on defiled and pure objects, the mind comes to possess the distinction between defilement and purity. If it were not so, there would be no conjunction. "The characteristics of perception and the characteristics of condition are identical": this explains the meaning of conjunction based on mind and object being identical. That is, based on defiled and pure objects, defiled and pure minds are formed. The characteristic of perception is the mind; the characteristic of condition is the object. Whether defiled or pure, mind and object are necessarily identical and do not conflict, thereby constituting conjunction. Because those former three defilements possess these meanings of primary mind and mental factors, and of mind and object, they are called "conjoined".

4.12

Treatise: "The meaning of 'non-conjoined' is [...] [because it does not have identical] characteristics of perception and condition." Commentary: That the latter three defilements and fundamental avidyā are called "non-conjoined" also has three meanings. Regarding that based on primary mind and mental factors: although these latter three defilements are the moving mind, they are subtle and have never been distinct from non-awakening. If it were the coarse phenomenal consciousness, it would be distinct from non-awakening: the moving mind would be the primary mind and non-awakening would be the mental factor. Now, because this characteristic of the moving mind is subtle, it is constantly without distinction from non-awakening. Therefore it says that arising from non-awakening, the three kinds of characteristics are never separated from that non-awakening. Thereby there is no distinction between primary mind and mental factors; hence it says, "the mind itself is non-awakening and constantly without distinction." This reveals the absence of the meaning of equality of substance. Since there is no distinction of primary mind and mental factors with equality of substance, how could there be the meaning of identical perception and identical condition? Therefore it says, "not having identical characteristics of perception and condition." This reveals the absence of equality of perception and equality of condition. It inverts the previous "conjoined" to reveal the meaning of "non-conjoined"; it does not mean that there is equality of substance while perception and condition are different. If so, why does the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra say that the ālayavijñāna is conjoined with primary mind and mental factors? Answer: This is said in terms of the subtle, completely harmonious principle: the mind and non-awakening are harmoniously blended as if one, indivisible. Because they are not yet distinct, there are no defiled cetasikas, and thus it is called non-conjoined. That [text] speaks in terms of the coarse, superficial, established principle: it says that there are indeterminate, omnipresent mental factors of primary mind and cetasika existing together, and thus it constitutes conjunction. Each relies on one meaning and they do not contradict each other. Regarding that based on mind and object: this moving mind is itself in substance non-awakening; it is not that it conjoins with an object and only then becomes non-awakening, for non-awakening is located right on the moving mind. Therefore it says, "the mind itself is [non-]awakening." "Not having identical characteristics of perception and condition": this is to distinguish it from the previous "conjoined", in which there are greed and so on that have identical perception and identical condition. If so, the fundamental consciousness should not manifest objects, which would extremely contradict the various teachings. Answer: Although it merely manifests objects, it does not grasp them. Because it can manifest them, it is said to be able to condition objects; it does not mean that being able to manifest implies being able to grasp. If it were not so, how would it differ from phenomenal consciousness? Therefore, it does not conjoin with objects.

4.13

Treatise: "Furthermore, defiled mind [...] karma-cognition." Commentary: Next is the revelation of the meaning of the two hindrances. Herein there are two parts: first, directly revealing the two hindrances; second, questioning and explaining the reason. This is the first. In the text there are two parts: first, afflictions; second, cognitions. One opinion holds: Here, "hindrance" (礙) differs from "obstruction" (障). In the explicit gate they are called the two obstructions; within the implicit gate they are called the two hindrances. That is, within the coarse and superficial gate of the Dharma-characteristic school, the one hundred and twenty-eight instances of greed, anger, ignorance, and so on, headed by attachment to self, afflict sentient beings and can obstruct nirvāṇa; they are called the affliction obstruction. Views, doubt, ignorance, craving, conceit, and so on, headed by attachment to dharmas, veil the knowable realm and can obstruct bodhi; they are called the knowable obstruction. These two obstructions reside exclusively in the seven distinct consciousnesses and definitely do not accompany the eighth consciousness. Within the esoteric gate of the Dharma-nature school, not only the two attachments and two obstructions in the consciousnesses, but also those eight consciousnesses together are collectively called affliction; the fundamental avidyā, because it is subtle and is that on which they rely, is called the hindrance to cognition. To sever this divergent view, the word "hindrance" (礙) is used. Due to this meaning, "hindrance" differs from "obstruction". Another opinion holds: This explanation is certainly not reasonable. The new translation uses "obstruction" (障) and does not say "hindrance" (礙); therefore, the Liang translation of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha and so on, following the former school's meaning, also use the word "hindrance". How could it be esoteric? The translators used "obstruction" or "hindrance" interchangeably without difference. One can only follow the schools in revealing the depth or shallowness of meaning. "Defiled mind": the six kinds of defiled mind can obstruct, etc., reveals the meaning of hindrance. The marvelous wisdom that illuminates quiescence, the cognition of reality, is called the fundamental cognition. "Fundamental cognition" means either the cognition of the fundamental or that the fundamental is itself cognition; both interpretations are admissible. This is the "characteristic of cognitive purity" mentioned above. This fundamental cognition is said to be tathatā: first, because it is the original awakening cognition of tathatā; second, because it is cultivated and produced in reliance on tathatā; third, because it illuminates the fundamental principle of tathatā. These defiled minds are vexing, disturbing, and moving, obstructing this quiescence, and are called the affliction hindrance; this is a karmadhāraya compound. "Avidyā": that fundamental avidyā obstructs karma-cognition reveals its meaning of hindrance. That is, the subsequent cognition of quantity can, in accordance with the worldly, initiate its own active karma; because it has the active karma of the worldly sphere, it obtains this name; it is a bahuvrīhi compound. This is the inconceivable karma-cognition spoken of above. The arising of this karma also has three meanings: first, because original awakening follows defilement and forms it; second, because it is cultivated and produced in accordance with quantity; third, because it attains this substance of quantity. Avidyā is muddled and makes no distinctions, conflicting with the functioning of this cognition, and is called the hindrance to cognition. It is the hindrance of cognition, so it is a tatpuruṣa compound.

4.14

Treatise: "What does this mean? [...] manifold cognitions." Commentary: This questions and explains the reason. Since the defiled mind is formed due to avidyā, subtle and fundamental avidyā ought to obstruct the cognition of principle, while the coarse and derivative defiled mind ought to obstruct the cognition of quantity. How is it that the obstructed dharmas are explained in reverse? In the reply there are two parts: first, afflictions; second, cognitions. "Relying on the defiled mind, being able to see and able to manifest" refers to the first two defilements among the latter three defilements. "Falsely grasping the realm of objects" extends to the former three defiled minds, for they all arise in reliance on the realm of objects. "Conflicting with the samatā" explains the meaning of hindrance: because the distinction of active and passive in this defiled mind conflicts with the equality of active and passive in tathatā, it obstructs the fundamental cognition of principle. "Because all dharmas are constantly quiescent," etc., adduces the dharmatā obscured by avidyā. "Avidyā is non-awakening and falsely conflicts with dharma" directly reveals how avidyā conflicts with dharmatā. Because it does not understand that true original nature is quiescent and falsely arises, its arising and ceasing conflict with dharma. "Cannot accord with," etc.: because various minds and objects conflicting with quiescence arise, they grasp hindering objects and hindering views constrain the mind; therefore, one cannot match the realm of quantity and accord with the manifold cognitions of the worldly sphere. Hence it is said that avidyā obstructs the cognition of quantity.

4.15

Treatise: "Furthermore, distinguishing [...] there are two kinds." Commentary: The explanation of the causes and conditions of arising and ceasing above is concluded. Next are the characteristics of arising and ceasing. Herein there are three parts: first, stating the number and general designation; second, listing the names and briefly indicating them; third, extensively explaining their characteristics. This is the first. In establishing the doctrine, these are the characteristics of arising and ceasing; hence it says, "distinguishing the characteristics of arising and ceasing," and so on.

4.16

Treatise: "What are the two? [...] because they are non-conjoined." Commentary: This lists the names and briefly discriminates them. What is called "coarse" refers to the former three defilements, which have the coarse and manifest characteristics of mind and cetasikas; in the sūtras this is spoken of as the arising and ceasing of characteristics. "Conjoined with mind" explains the meaning of coarse: it means there are realms of objects and there are cetasikas conjoined with these three kinds of defiled mind; therefore these three defilements are called coarse. It does not mean that they are conjoined with the true mind, nor that cetasikas are conjoined with mind; for the new translation calls them "conjoined mind". What is called "subtle" refers to the latter three defilements, which lack the coarse and manifest characteristics of mind and cetasikas; their substance is subtle and flows constantly without interruption; in the sūtras this is spoken of as the arising and ceasing of the flux. "Not conjoined with mind" explains the meaning of subtle: it means there are no realms of objects and no cetasikas conjoined with those three kinds of defiled mind; therefore the latter three defilements are called subtle. It does not mean that they are not conjoined with the true mind; for the new translation calls them "non-conjoined mind". This is spoken of in the four-fascicle Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra; in the two versions of the seventy-fascicle and ten-fascicle sūtras, it says that consciousness has two kinds of cessation: first, cessation of characteristics; second, cessation of continuity. Arising and abiding are also like this. In the sūtras the names are brought forth without distinctively showing their characteristics; therefore, the author of the treatise now relies on the two meanings of conjoined and non-conjoined, and coarse and subtle, to reveal the characteristics of the two kinds of arising and ceasing.

4.17

Treatise: "Furthermore, within the coarse [...] is the realm of the Buddha." Commentary: Next below is the discrimination of characteristics. Herein there are two parts: first, revealing them in relation to persons; second, determining what the characteristics rely upon. This is the first. Here, the former three defiled minds are explained in relation to three classes of persons. Because they are phenomenal consciousness, they are all called coarse. Among these characteristics, the first is attachment to self, so it is even coarser; the inner ordinary beings of the three levels of worthies, because they attain selflessness, can awaken to this defilement; hence it is called the realm of ordinary beings. Thus the new translation says: "the realm of cognition of ordinary beings." The latter two of the three are attachment to dharmas, so they are slightly subtler; compared to the first, they are called the subtle within the coarse. The latter three are fundamental consciousness, so they all get the name subtle. Among them, the first two are the active and passive; compared to the subsequent karmic characteristic, they are again called coarse. From the initial abode cultivating the contemplation of consciousness-only, entering the first bhūmi to realize tathatā, up to the non-conceptual cognition of the tenth bhūmi, one can awaken to this defilement; hence it is said to be subtle within the coarse, coarse within the subtle, the realm of the bodhisattvas. Thus the new translation says: "the realm of cognition of bodhisattvas." The sixth, the non-conjoined defilement of fundamental karma, does not divide active and passive, and its mode of activity is subtle. Among the latter three, it is even subtler; only the Tathāgata can awaken to and understand it. Therefore it says, "the subtle within the subtle is the realm of the Buddha." The new translation lacks this text and its meaning is incomplete.

4.18

[Treatise:] The two kinds of objects... because of the meaning [of avidyā as the cause].
[Commentary:] Next is the explanation of what they depend on. Herein there are two [parts]: first, explaining in the forward order the conditions for arising; later, revealing the meaning in the reverse order. This is the first. In the text there are two senses: the general condition and the specific causes. Generally speaking, both the coarse and the subtle consciousnesses arise by depending on the entrenchment of avidyā (avidyā-vāsanā-bhūmi). Because fundamental avidyā perfuses, giving rise to the three subtleties, manifesting the objects of the six sense-dusts, and in turn giving rise to the three coarsenesses. Therefore the treatise says: 'Both kinds of arising and ceasing exist by depending on the perfuming of avidyā.' Specifically speaking, depending on avidyā, the three kinds of subtle mind arise; depending on the conditions of objects, the three coarse minds arise. Therefore it says, 'Depending on the cause is because of the meaning of non-awakening,' and so forth. Here the text is abridged, each time adducing only one cause. If explained fully, as the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra says: 'Inconceivable perfuming and inconceivable transformation are the causes of the manifesting consciousness; grasping various sense-dusts and beginningless perfuming of false characteristics are the causes of the phenomenal consciousness of discrimination.' 'Inconceivable perfuming' means that fundamental avidyā is able to perfume tathatā, which is an unperfumable place. 'Inconceivable transformation' means that the mind of tathatā receives the perfuming of avidyā, and though untransformable, it transforms. Furthermore, perfuming is non-perfuming, and non-perfuming is perfuming; transformation is non-transformation, and non-transformation is transformation; this is also called inconceivable perfuming and transformation. That which in the Śrīmālā-sūtra is 'untainted yet tainted, tainted yet untainted, and difficult to comprehend' refers to inconceivable perfuming and transformation. Because this perfuming and transformation are extremely subtle and concealed, the mode of activity of the manifesting consciousness that arises is subtle; having no [dualistic] object, it forms the non-corresponding mind. Within this there are also the evolving consciousness and karmic consciousness; mentioning the coarse to subsume the subtle, it speaks only of the manifesting consciousness. The 'various sense-dusts' are the objects manifested by this manifesting consciousness; they in turn are able to stir the ocean of mind of that manifesting consciousness to raise the waves of consciousness. 'Beginningless false arising' is the branch avidyā. From beginningless time it perfumes the fundamental consciousness, serving as a condition to bring forth the phenomenal consciousness; the deluded mind makes false discriminations regarding the objects of the six sense-dusts. Because the deluded faculties and sense-dusts are coarse and evident, the phenomenal consciousness of discrimination that arises has a coarse and evident mode of activity, forming the corresponding mind. Intending to clarify that the manifesting consciousness arises depending on inconceivable perfuming and abides depending on inconceivable transformation, while the phenomenal consciousness of discrimination arises depending on the condition of objects and abides depending on the cause of false perfuming, now the treatise text is abridged and does not speak of causes for abiding; hence regarding the subtle it speaks only of avidyā, and regarding the coarse it adduces only the condition of objects.

4.19

[Treatise:] If the cause ceases... the corresponding mind ceases.
[Commentary:] Next is the revelation of the meaning of cessation. Herein there are also two [parts]: first, the direct explanation; second, the resolution of doubts. This is the first. Cessation has two meanings: first the general, then the specific. The general cessation means: when the antidote is attained and avidyā ceases, the manifested consciousness and objects that arose immediately cease along with it. Therefore it says, 'When the cause ceases, then the condition ceases.' Specifically revealing cessation: because the three subtle consciousnesses directly arise depending on the cause of avidyā, when avidyā ceases they also cease along with it; therefore it says, 'Because the cause ceases, the non-corresponding mind ceases.' The three coarse consciousnesses directly arise depending on the condition of objects; therefore when objects cease they also cease along with it; hence it says, 'Because the condition ceases, the corresponding mind ceases.' This clarifies the meaning of the two kinds of arising and ceasing according to the principle of beginning-to-end emergence and termination, not the meaning of subtle, moment-to-moment arising and ceasing.

4.20

[Treatise:] The question is: If the mind [ceases... how can it be said to be ultimately ceased?]
[Commentary:] Below is the resolution of doubts, first asking, then answering. This is the first. Here there is an interpretation: depending on the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra, this question is formulated against the non-Buddhists. The non-Buddhists say that when one is born in the markless [realm], the continuous consciousness ceases. The Buddha says that when one is born there, its continuous consciousness in fact does not cease. Now, within this consciousness, questioning and refuting back and forth based on these two statements, this question is posed: If it were as the non-Buddhists say, it would then be annihilated; how could it continue? Therefore it is said: 'If the mind ceases, how can it continue?' If it were as the Buddha said, by what means would this characteristic of continuity ever be eternally ceased? Therefore it is said: 'How can it be said to be ultimately ceased?' Another interpretation is: merely hearing that the corresponding mind ceases, one thinks its substance also ceases, and therefore raises this doubt and objection; why must it necessarily depend on the question in the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra? If, when objects cease, the substance of the corresponding mind also ceases along with them, since the three—karma, manifestation, and appearance—are not yet entirely exhausted, what would they depend on to continue? Therefore it says: 'If it depends on the mind ceasing, how does it continue?' If one says that because the mental substance is not exhausted, it causes the characteristics of avidyā to continue, then those characteristics of avidyā should never cease; therefore it says: 'If it continues, how can it be said to be ultimately ceased?'

4.21

[Treatise:] The answer is: What is called [cessation means only the cessation of the mental characteristics, not the cessation of the mental substance.]

4.22

[Treatise:] Just as the wind, depending on water, [has the characteristic of movement; if the water ceases, the characteristic of wind ceases, and there is nowhere for it to depend; but because the water does not cease, the characteristic of movement continues; only when the wind ceases does the characteristic of movement cease, not the water ceasing.]
[Commentary:] Adducing a simile. In the text there are four sections, using similes to answer the two questions. 'Just as the wind, depending on water, has the characteristic of movement' is the simile of the false arising depending on the real. 'If the water ceases,' and so forth, is the simile of the false following the cessation of the real. 'Because the water does not cease,' and so forth, is the simile of the real persisting and the false continuing. These three passages of text are similes answering the former question. 'Only when the wind ceases,' and so forth, is the simile of the false ceasing while the real persists. This single passage is a simile answering the latter question. If one considers it subtly, its meaning becomes clear of itself.

4.23

[Treatise:] Avidyā is also like this: [depending on the mental substance it moves. If the mental substance ceases, sentient beings would be severed and have nowhere to depend; because the substance does not cease, the mind can continue. Only when delusion ceases does the mental characteristic cease along with it, not the mind-cognition ceasing.]
[Commentary:] This is the application of the simile to the doctrine. 'Avidyā is also like this: depending on the mental substance it moves' reveals that apart from the mind it cannot move by itself. 'If the mental substance ceases, sentient beings,' and so forth, means: when objects cease, if the mental substance were to cease, then the wind of avidyā would have nowhere to depend upon to move; the root-substance of sentient beings—karmic, evolving, and manifesting [consciousnesses]—having nowhere to abide, would then also be severed and cease. 'Because the substance does not cease, the mind can continue' means: because when objects cease the substance does not cease, the non-corresponding mind can continue. Because avidyā ceases, objects cease; it is not because objects cease that avidyā ceases. By this meaning, when objects cease, the mind stirred by avidyā and the three subtleties continue. This reveals the meaning of the cessation of the corresponding mind, answering the first question. 'Only when delusion ceases does the mental characteristic cease along with it,' and so forth, means: when avidyā is exhausted, the moving characteristics such as karma are exhausted; it is not that the tranquil mental substance also ceases along with them. This reveals the meaning of the cessation of the non-corresponding mind, answering the latter question. Here, 'delusion' is avidyā. The phrase 'mind arising' is the nature of the true mind. Previously, to reveal the meaning of arising-and-ceasing and non-arising-and-ceasing in the one consciousness, awakening and non-awakening were spoken of. Now, to reveal the meaning of substance and characteristic within the one mind, delusion and cognition are spoken of. Although the terms and meanings differ, their substance is not distinct.

4.24

[Treatise:] Furthermore, there are four [kinds of phenomena that perfume and produce pure and defiled phenomena without interruption.]
[Commentary:] Within the gate of arising and ceasing, of the two divisions, the preceding has already explained the arising of defilement and purity, directly concluding the explanation of the causal and conditional characteristics of this mind's arising and ceasing within the establishment [of the thesis], elaborating the preceding meaning that this consciousness can subsume all phenomena. Next, it analyzes how defilement and purity mutually support each other, re-clarifying the meaning that it can generate all phenomena. Herein there are four: first, briefly stating the number of perfumings; second, listing the names of defiled and pure perfumings; third, elaborating the meaning of defiled and pure perfumings; fourth, clarifying whether the two perfumings are exhaustible or inexhaustible. This is the first. Because defiled phenomena are uninterrupted, there are ordinary beings of the defiled six destinies. Because pure phenomena are uninterrupted, there are noble ones of the undefiled three vehicles.

4.25

[Treatise:] What are the four? [First is the pure phenomenon, called tathatā. Second is the cause of all defilements, called avidyā. Third is the deluded mind, called karmic consciousness. Fourth is the deluded object, called the six sense-dusts.]
[Commentary:] This lists the names of defiled and pure perfumings. What is called the pure phenomenon, named tathatā: because this tathatā is within the gate of arising and ceasing, it is called a pure phenomenon by virtue of the meaning of the three greatnesses. Although it is associated with defilement, because its self-nature is pure, its internal perfuming turns away from defilement to accomplish initial purity; because its external perfuming responds to spiritual capacities, it accomplishes pure conditions. Therefore the Liang translation of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, in clarifying the Madhyamaka meaning, says: 'That which can establish refers to the ten kinds of merits fundamentally possessed by the real; that which is established refers to the newly arisen ten kinds of superior practices.' What is called the cause of all defilements, named avidyā: 'all defilements' refers to the three subtleties and six coarsenesses. Fundamental avidyā serves as the cause of subtle defilement, and branch avidyā serves as the cause of coarse defilement. What is called the karmic consciousness as the deluded mind: its substance is not real, fundamentally non-existent within the true, arising because of the false perfuming of that avidyā. However, this deluded mind also includes the phenomenal consciousness, etc.; here, based on its fundamental [state], it is merely called karmic consciousness. What is called the six sense-dusts as deluded objects: arising from the deluded mind, their substance is falsely manifested of itself, being grasped by that deluded mind of phenomenal consciousness. However, among the four perfumings, one is pure and three are defiled; because the self-nature of those defiled phenomena is differentiated and relies upon causes and conditions, three are spoken of in full. Although the pure phenomenon forms the meaning of perfuming in opposition to defilement, because substance and activity are without distinction, only one kind is clarified. Furthermore, wishing to show that purity is superior and defilement is inferior, and that the few can oppose the many, one is adduced against three.

4.26

[Treatise:] The meaning of perfuming: [it is like clothing in the world, which originally has neither fragrance nor stench, but if perfumed with fragrance, it then has fragrance.]
[Commentary:] Next is the extensive clarification of the meaning of perfuming. Herein there are two: first general, then specific. Within the general there are also two: first the simile, then the application. This is the first. Here 'clothing' mutually and generally serves as a simile for tathatā and avidyā. 'Fragrance' applies generally to good and bad; according to context it also serves as a simile. Tathatā and avidyā mutually act as that which perfumes and that which is perfumed to produce the scent. Therefore the new translation of the treatise says: 'Just as clothing in the world is neither foul nor fragrant, but when perfumed with any substance, it then possesses that scent.'

4.27

[Treatise:] This is also like that: [tathatā is purely a pure phenomenon; having been perfumed by avidyā, it then has the characteristic of defilement. Avidyā is purely a defiled phenomenon; having been perfumed by tathatā, it then has pure activity.]
[Commentary:] This is the application of the simile to the doctrine. In the text both the defiled and pure senses of perfuming are revealed. That avidyā perfuming the true has the characteristic of defilement reveals that the true has no characteristic, but manifests characteristics following perfuming; it reveals that the false has no substance, but merely has characteristics when perfumed; and it reveals that the false of itself lacks the activity of turning away from defilement, hence it only speaks of 'characteristic' and does not speak of 'activity'. This explains the passage in the sūtra where the tathāgatagarbha, perfumed by bad habits, is called the repository of consciousness (vijñānagarbha), etc. That the true perfuming avidyā has pure activity means: within the gate of arising and ceasing, the internal perfuming of non-awakening by original awakening tathatā causes aversion and aspiration to be formed, turning away from defilement to illuminate the true; hence it is called 'pure activity'. This explains the passage in the sūtra stating that because of the existence of the tathāgatagarbha, one can feel revulsion toward saṃsāra and joyfully seek the bliss of nirvāṇa. The Nirvāṇa-sūtra says: 'Due to the causes and conditions of the power of future buddha-nature, one is reborn with good retribution.' The internal perfuming of original awakening is called the power of buddha-nature. Because the one consciousness contains these two meanings, mutually perfuming each other and universally producing defilement and purity, it is said that avidyā perfumes tathatā, etc. Question: As various treatises say, that which perfumes and that which is perfumed must each possess four qualities before it can be called perfuming. The four of that which is perfumed are: 1. firm endurance; 2. neutrality (avyākṛta); 3. perfumability; 4. harmony with that which perfumes. The four of that which perfumes are: 1. having arising and ceasing; 2. having superior activity; 3. having increase and abundance; 4. moving in harmony with that which is perfumed. Since these exclude permanent phenomena like tathatā and space, why does this treatise say that the true is both that which perfumes and that which is perfumed? Answer: Because there are three meanings, none of which contradict each other. First, perfuming has the conceivable: the various treatises, for those of initial capacities, speak of that conceivable perfuming of arising and ceasing; this treatise, expressly for those of mature capacities, also speaks of the inconceivable perfuming of the permanent dharma. Second, for that which perfumes and that which is perfumed, the true has two gates: the various treatises speak of unmoved tathatā, which cannot generate and therefore is neither that which perfumes nor that which is perfumed; this treatise considers tathatā that accords with conditions, which arises following defilement and therefore constitutes both that which perfumes and that which is perfumed. Third, because the dharma of tathatā is not definitively permanent: the various treatises, based on the conventional doctrine (saṃvṛti-satya), say that tathatā is permanent and not that which perfumes or is perfumed; this treatise also accords with the doctrine of perfect interpenetration, in which the true is not permanently one, and thus constitutes that which perfumes and is perfumed. Each relying on one meaning, they do not contradict each other. If one says that tathatā is definitively permanent and definitively one, it would be identical to the ātman grasped by non-Buddhists; because it is not definitively permanent or one, there is no error in perfuming.

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大乘起信論廣釋卷第三．四．五 — Classical Chinese