大乘起信論廣釋卷第三．四．五 4.20

4.20

[Treatise:] The question is: If the mind [ceases... how can it be said to be ultimately ceased?]
[Commentary:] Below is the resolution of doubts, first asking, then answering. This is the first. Here there is an interpretation: depending on the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra, this question is formulated against the non-Buddhists. The non-Buddhists say that when one is born in the markless [realm], the continuous consciousness ceases. The Buddha says that when one is born there, its continuous consciousness in fact does not cease. Now, within this consciousness, questioning and refuting back and forth based on these two statements, this question is posed: If it were as the non-Buddhists say, it would then be annihilated; how could it continue? Therefore it is said: 'If the mind ceases, how can it continue?' If it were as the Buddha said, by what means would this characteristic of continuity ever be eternally ceased? Therefore it is said: 'How can it be said to be ultimately ceased?' Another interpretation is: merely hearing that the corresponding mind ceases, one thinks its substance also ceases, and therefore raises this doubt and objection; why must it necessarily depend on the question in the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra? If, when objects cease, the substance of the corresponding mind also ceases along with them, since the three—karma, manifestation, and appearance—are not yet entirely exhausted, what would they depend on to continue? Therefore it says: 'If it depends on the mind ceasing, how does it continue?' If one says that because the mental substance is not exhausted, it causes the characteristics of avidyā to continue, then those characteristics of avidyā should never cease; therefore it says: 'If it continues, how can it be said to be ultimately ceased?'