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大乘入道次第開決 1.190

大乘入道次第開決 1.190

Language
Classical Chinese

1.190

又境之體通於內外者。問。既此內外境與四緣中親疏二緣云何。言四緣者。唯識第七廣顯其相。今略舉之。一者因緣。謂有為法親辦自果。此體有二。種子現行。種子者。謂本識中善染無記諸界地等功能差別。能引次後自類功能。及起同時自類現果。此唯望彼是因緣性。現行者。謂七轉識及彼相應所變相見。除佛果善極劣無記。餘熏本識生自類種。此唯望彼是因緣性。因即是緣持業釋。二等無間緣。舊亦說為次第緣。謂八現識及彼心所。前聚於後自類無間。等而開導令彼定生。八識相望既非自類又俱時轉。故非互作等無間緣。心所與心雖恒俱轉。非自體類而相應故。和合似一。不可施設離別殊異。故得互作等無間緣。三所緣緣。謂若有法是帶己相心或相應所慮託。此體有二。一親二疏。若與能緣體不相離。是見分等內所慮託。應知彼是親所緣緣。若與能緣體雖相離。為質能起內所慮託。應知彼是疏所緣緣。親所緣緣能緣皆有。離內所慮託必不生故。疏所緣緣能緣或有。離外所慮託亦得生故。四增上緣。謂若有法有勝勢用。能於餘法或順或違。雖前三緣亦得增上。而今第四除彼取餘。為顯諸緣有差別故。今此所言通外境者。非第三中疏所緣也。以疏所緣亦不離識。不可說為心外境故。但說妄情及諸妄執所計實境說為外耳。是故得之外無內有。若疏所緣外亦有故。若爾外執亦稱實智。如何說是虛妄執也。答。眼等取境但是現量。不能分別強執為外。後意分別強生外相。故說虛妄為不稱實。了知假有實無。觀此義主所釋意云。了知假有實無。是尋思智。由此為因所得決定行智。名如實智。尋攝論意與此不同。推求假有實無行見。說名尋思。了知假有實無行見。名如實智。是故了知假有實無非尋思智。本釋既爾。且依而解決定行者。謂如實智即作假有實無決定行解也。

"Furthermore, the essence of the cognitive object extends to both internal and external": Question: Since these internal and external objects exist, how do they relate to the direct and indirect conditions among the four conditions? Regarding the four conditions, the seventh fascicle of the Cheng weishi lun extensively reveals their characteristics, which are now briefly cited. First is the causal condition (hetu-pratyaya), meaning conditioned phenomena directly producing their own effects. Its essence has two aspects: seeds and actual manifestations. Seeds refer to the differential capacities of good, defiled, and neutral across the realms and stages within the fundamental consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna), which are capable of inducing their own kind of subsequent capacities and giving rise to their own kind of simultaneous actual effects. These are causal conditions solely in relation to those. Actual manifestations refer to the seven evolving consciousnesses (pravṛtti-vijñāna) and their corresponding transformed objective aspects (nimitta-bhāga) and subjective aspects (darśana-bhāga)—excluding the good of the Buddha-fruit and the extremely weak neutral—the rest perfuming the fundamental consciousness to produce seeds of their own kind. These are causal conditions solely in relation to those. "Cause" is itself the "condition"—this is a karmadhāraya compound. Second is the immediately antecedent condition (samanantara-pratyaya), formerly also called the sequential condition (krama-pratyaya), meaning the eight actual consciousnesses and their mental factors: the prior aggregation opens the way and guides the immediately following of its own kind equally, causing it definitely to arise. Since the eight consciousnesses in relation to each other are not of the same kind and also operate simultaneously, they do not serve as immediately antecedent conditions for one another. Although mental factors and the mind always operate simultaneously, they are not of the same essence-kind yet are associated; harmonious, they appear as one and cannot be posited as separate or distinct, so they can mutually serve as immediately antecedent conditions. Third is the cognitive object condition (ālambana-pratyaya), meaning that if a phenomenon bears its own aspect and is what the mind or its associated [mental factors] contemplate and lean upon. Its essence has two kinds: direct and indirect. If it is inseparable in essence from the grasper, being contemplated and leaned upon internally by the subjective aspect and so forth, one should know that it is the direct cognitive object condition. If it is separate in essence from the grasper, yet serves as the archetype (bimba) capable of giving rise to what is internally contemplated and leaned upon, one should know that it is the indirect cognitive object condition. The direct cognitive object condition is present in all grasping [consciousnesses], for apart from what is internally contemplated and leaned upon, they certainly do not arise. The indirect cognitive object condition may or may not be present in grasping [consciousnesses], for even apart from what is externally contemplated and leaned upon, they can still arise. Fourth is the sovereign condition (adhipati-pratyaya), meaning that if a phenomenon has superior power and function, it can be favorable or obstructive toward other phenomena. Although the prior three conditions are also sovereign, the fourth excludes them and takes the remainder in order to reveal that the conditions have distinctions. What is now spoken of as "extending to external objects" is not the indirect cognitive object of the third condition, because the indirect cognitive object is also not apart from consciousness and cannot be spoken of as an object outside the mind; it only refers to the real objects imagined by deluded sentiment and various false graspings being called "external." Therefore, there is externality without internal existence. If it were the indirect cognitive object, it would also exist externally. If so, external grasping would also correspond to real knowledge; how could it be called false grasping? Answer: The eye and [other senses] taking objects is merely direct perception (pratyakṣa); it cannot conceptualize and forcefully grasp them as external. Subsequent conceptualization by the mental consciousness forcefully produces the external aspect; hence, it is called false as it does not correspond to reality. "Comprehending conventional existence and substantial non-existence": Observing the meaning explained by this master, it says: Comprehending conventional existence and substantial non-existence is the wisdom of scrutiny. The decisive active wisdom obtained with this as the cause is called as-it-is knowledge (yathābhūta-jñāna). Searching the intent of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, it is different from this: the practice and view of investigating conventional existence and substantial non-existence is called scrutiny; the practice and view of comprehending conventional existence and substantial non-existence is called as-it-is knowledge. Therefore, comprehending conventional existence and substantial non-existence is not the wisdom of scrutiny. Since the original commentary is thus, we temporarily rely on it and explain decisive action as meaning that as-it-is knowledge forms the decisive active understanding of conventional existence and substantial non-existence.

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