大乘入道次第開決 1.66

1.66

As for "the imagined [nature], relying on this, falsely grasps, etc.": the Sarvāstivādins grasp consciousness and objects as separately real; Bhavya's grasp relies on ultimate truth, asserting that both consciousness and objects are non-existent. Like the Sāṃkhya grasping that the possessor of the property and the property are identical or different; like the Vaiśeṣika grasping that the possessor of the property and the property are both different and both [identical], being both existent and non-existent; like Bhavya grasping that the conventional and the ultimate, existence and emptiness, are identical yet both identical and different; like the Acyuta (?) and others grasping that on a single phenomenon identity and difference share one substance and are not both existent, being neither existent nor non-existent; and Bhavya also, reversing the third proposition, negates both existence and non-existence, being neither identical nor different; like the Ājīvikas and others, avoiding the errors of identity, difference, and both, doubly asserting neither identical nor different. The general idea here is: the two aspects of mark and seeing truly arise from causes and are of the other-dependent nature. Only when, relying on these two aspects, one falsely grasps them through the four propositions of definitely real existence and non-existence, or the four propositions of identity and difference, do the two marks receive the name 'imagined nature.' It does not mean that the conditionally arisen aspects of mark and seeing are themselves also called the imagined nature.