Dighanikaya 1.8_2

1.8_2

Tattha pāṇassa atipāto pāṇātipāto, pāṇavadho, pāṇaghātoti vuttaṃ hoti. Pāṇoti cettha vohārato satto, paramatthato jīvitindriyaṃ, tasmiṃ pana pāṇe pāṇasaññino jīvitindriyupacchedakaupakkamasamuṭṭhāpikā kāyavacīdvārānaṃ aññataradvārappavattā vadhakacetanā pāṇātipāto. So guṇavirahitesu tiracchānagatādīsu pāṇesu khuddake pāṇe appasāvajjo, mahāsarīre mahāsāvajjo, kasmā? Payogamahantatāya. Payogasamattepi vatthumahantatāya. Guṇavantesu manussādīsu appaguṇe pāṇe appasāvajjo, mahāguṇe mahāsāvajjo. Sarīraguṇānaṃ pana samabhāve sati kilesānaṃ upakkamānañca mudutāya appasāvajjo, tibbatāya mahāsāvajjoti veditabbo.

Herein, destruction of life means the slaughter of life, the killing of life, this is what is said. And here, in conventional speech, “life” is a living being; in the ultimate sense, it is the life faculty. Furthermore, with respect to that living being, the volition to kill that occurs through one of the doors of body or speech, which instigates an exertion that cuts off the life faculty in one who perceives it as a living being, is destruction of life. When directed at living beings devoid of virtues, such as animals, it is less blameworthy in the case of a small living being, and greatly blameworthy in the case of one with a large body. Why? Because of the greatness of the exertion; and even when the exertion is equal, because of the greatness of the object. When directed at those possessing virtues, such as human beings, it is less blameworthy in the case of a living being with few virtues, and greatly blameworthy in the case of one with great virtues. But when body and virtues are equal, it should be understood as less blameworthy through the mildness of the defilements and exertions, and greatly blameworthy through their intensity.