Establishment of Brahman 1.41

1.41

tatra na tāvatprathamaḥ kalpaḥ /
na hi karmādividhayaḥ svavākyasamadhigatasvargādikāryāḥ kāryāntaramapekṣante /
nāpyātmajñānavidhiryathoditabrahmacaryādisādhananirākāṅkṣaḥ karmavidhīnapekṣate /
tatra kuta ekādhikāratvam /
yadi manyetānavagatakāryā (atha anavagata@ -- edition) eva karmādividhayaḥ, svargādīnāṃ guṇatvena saṃbandhāditi, svargakāmādhikaraṇamasmai vyācakṣīta /
api ca sarvavidhiniṣedhānāṃ nāmarūpapravilayakāryāpavargitve jantūnāmabhyudayavinipātā akarmanimittā ākasmikāḥ syuḥ /
tathāpavargo 'pi syāditi vaiyarthyaṃ śāstrasyāpi /
atha svargādikāryadvāreṇa karmavidhīnāṃ jñānādhikārānupraveśitā mārgagrāmagamanopadeśānāmivābhimatanagaragamanopadeśānupraveśitvam /
tadasat /
yuktaṃ mārgagrāmaprāpteranabhimatadeśaprāptyupadeśānupraveśitvam /
na hi mārgagrāmopadeśeṣu puruṣārthaprāptiḥ /
ataḥ sākāṅkṣatvādyatra puruṣārthaprāptiḥ, tamanupraviśanti /
na tvevaṃ karmavidhiṣu puruṣārthasyālābhaḥ, svargādīnāṃ puruṣeṇārthyamānatvāt /
tatra ca nairākāṅkṣye kathamanyānupraveśaḥ? atha matam ---
yadopacchandya nīyata uttarottaragrāmaguṇopadarśanenābhipretaṃ deśam, tadā pūrvagrāmopadeśāḥ prāptābhimatakāryā upadeśāntarānupraveśinaśceti /
yuktaṃ tatrāpi pramāṇāntareṇa vakturabhiprāyādhigamāt /
pramāṇāntareṇa hi tatredamadhigatam ---
etaddeśaprāptāvidamasya samīhitaṃ vaktuḥ saṃpadyate, tasmādidamasya vivakṣitamiti /
na tu śabdavṛttimātrānusāreṇa (śabdapravṛttimātrā@ Ms A; śabdavṛttamātrā@ -- edition) /
itaścaitadevam ---
yatpratigrāmaṃ vaktuḥ śrotuśca satyāmarthaprāptau pramāṇāntareṇānadhigate paradeśaprāptyabhiprāye pūrvopadeśān pūrvārthāneva pārśvasthāḥ pratipattāraḥ pratipadyante, paradeśopadeśaṃ ca svārthaniṣṭham /
yadyapi vastusthityā pūrvopadeśārthāḥ paropakāriṇaḥ, tathāpi na śabdasya tātparyam, dravyārjanādividheriva kratuvidhyarthopakāre 'pi /
śabdavṛttānusāreṇa ceha tātparyam, pramāṇāntarābhāvāditi /

To begin with, the first alternative is not tenable.
For injunctions to action and the like, having heaven and the like as their effects known from their own statements, do not depend on another effect.
Nor does the injunction to knowledge of the Self, being devoid of expectancy [due to possessing] the means such as chastity as stated, depend on injunctions to action.
Under such circumstances, whence could there be qualification for a single [person]?
If one should think that injunctions to action and the like do not have their effects understood at all, because heaven and the like are connected as subordinate elements, one should explain to him the section on the one desiring heaven (svargakāmādhikaraṇa).
Moreover, if all injunctions and prohibitions have as their effect the dissolution of name and form and terminate in liberation, the rise and fall of creatures would be causeless and accidental.
Likewise, liberation too would [occur accidentally], and thus the scripture too would be futile.
Now [suppose it is claimed that] injunctions to action enter into the qualification for knowledge by way of an effect such as heaven, just as instructions on travelling to a village along the path enter into instructions on travelling to the desired city.
That is incorrect.
It is appropriate for reaching a village along the path to enter into an instruction for reaching an undesired place [as an intermediary toward a desired place].
For in instructions regarding villages along the path, there is no attainment of a human end.
Hence, because of having expectancy, they enter into that where the attainment of a human end lies.
In the case of injunctions to action, however, there is no such failure to obtain a human end, because heaven and the like are sought after by man.
And there being no expectancy in that case, how can there be entry into another?
Now [one might] think:
when one is led by persuasion to the intended place through showing successive superior qualities of villages, then the instructions regarding preceding villages, having achieved their intended effect, enter into another instruction.
That too is appropriate because the intention of the speaker is understood there by another means of valid cognition.
For by another means of valid cognition this is understood there:
‘Upon reaching this place, this desired purpose of the speaker is accomplished; therefore, this is what he wishes to say.’
It is not, however, based merely on the operation of words.
And this is so for the following reason as well:
because, when there is attainment of benefit for the speaker and the listener at each village, and the intention to reach the further place is not understood by another means of valid cognition, bystanders understand the preceding instructions as having only their preceding purposes, and the instruction regarding the further place as terminating in its own purpose.
Even though according to the factual situation the purposes of the preceding instructions assist the further [goal], still that is not the purport of the verbal testimony, just as in the case of the injunction to acquire wealth and the like, even though it assists the purpose of the injunction to sacrifice.
And here the purport is in accordance with the operation of words, because there is no other means of valid cognition.