Establishment of Brahman 1.42

1.42

api cādhvagrāmopadeśānāṃ tatparatvādhyavasāyenaiva tatra gamanamarthaprāptiśca /
tatra paradeśaprāptiparatāyāṃ tu na niyogatastatra gamanam /
mārgāntareṇāpi tatprāptervivakṣitatvādgacchet /
na ca niyogato 'rthaprāptiḥ, anyapareṣu prayojanaśruterapyarthavādatvāt /
tadiha yadi vidhiniṣedhāḥ kāryāntaraparāḥ, na svargādikāryāḥ /
na khalu svargādikāryaṃ prayājādikāryatulyam, yena kāryāntaramanupatet /
kathaṃ ca dṛṣṭenaivātmajñānādhikāropakāriṇa iti vaktavyam /
yadi tāvadrāgādyākṣiptadṛṣṭārthapravṛttinirodhena, bhavatu pratiṣedhānāmevaṃbhāvaḥ /
karmavidhayastu kathaṃ nirundhantīti vācyam /
nahi te parisaṃkhyāyakāḥ, na ca niyāmakāḥ, atyantamaprāptārthatvāt /
prāptārtho hi vidhiranyanivṛttiphalo vijñāyate /
na ca tulyakāryatvena virodhena nivṛttiḥ /
aniyatakālaphalā hi naiyogikyaḥ pravṛttayo 'dṛṣṭārthāḥ /
dṛṣṭārthāstu rāgādyākṣiptāḥ svābhāvikyaḥ /
na ca sāṅgrahaṇyāḥ sevāyāśca grāmopāyatve kaścidvirodhaḥ, etāvati pramāṇatvācchāstrasya /
tatra yugapatkrameṇa vā phalabhūmārthinaḥ sevāsāṅgrahaṇyāvanutiṣṭhataḥ ko virodhaḥ? api ca sakaladṛṣṭārthapravṛttinirodhe niyoganiṣṭhā api pravṛttayo nirudhyeran, anārjitadhanasya sādhanavikalasya tāsāmasambhavāt /
api ca tulye kāmopāyatve dṛṣṭādṛṣṭārthapravṛttyorna na viśeṣo rāgādyākṣiptatve /
tathā hi ---
‘svargakāmaḥ'iti rāgādyākṣiptapravṛttyanuvādena viśeṣavidhānam /
tathā ca prapañcābhiniveśe tulye kena viśeṣeṇa ekātmānuguṇyaṃ bhajate, tadvirodhinyaparā? kāmākṣepo hyaviśiṣṭo manasaḥ /
atha kāmopāyatvameva na manyeta, varṇitamākasmikatvam, uktaśca nyāyaḥ pratyuddhriyeta /
tulyakāryanibandhanatvācca virodhādyā nirodhāśaṅkā sā dūrato nirastāvakāśā syāt /
atha kāmaprāptyā karmavidhayaḥ kāmān pravilāpayanto jñānādhikārānuguṇāḥ /
yathoktam ---

Moreover, going there and obtaining the objective occur only through the ascertainment that the instructions regarding the villages on the path are directed toward that [destination].
In that case, however, if they were directed toward reaching the further place, going there would not take place by necessity.
One would go [by another path], since reaching that [further place] even by another path would be intended.
Nor would the objective be attained by necessity, because even the statement of purpose is an explanatory passage (arthavāda) in the case of [texts] directed toward something else.
Therefore, in this context, if injunctions and prohibitions are directed toward another effect, they do not have heaven and the like as their effects.
Indeed, the effect such as heaven is not comparable to an effect such as the preliminary sacrifices (prayāja), by which it could fall under another effect.
And it must be explained: how do they assist the qualification for knowledge of the Self by visible [means] alone?
If, first, it is by restraining activities aimed at visible ends prompted by attachment and the like, let prohibitions be of such a nature.
But it must be stated how injunctions to action restrain.
For they are neither restrictive through exclusion (parisaṃkhyā) nor restrictive through regulation (niyama), because their subject-matter is utterly unestablished [elsewhere].
For an injunction whose subject-matter is already established is understood to have the cessation of another [action] as its fruit.
Nor is there cessation through contradiction by virtue of having an identical effect.
For injunctive activities aimed at the unseen end have fruits occurring at an indefinite time.
Those aimed at visible ends, however, are natural, prompted by attachment and the like.
Nor is there any contradiction between the sāṅgrahaṇī sacrifice and [courtly] service as means to [obtain] a village, because scripture is authoritative to this extent.
In that case, what contradiction is there for one desiring an abundance of fruits who undertakes both service and the sāṅgrahaṇī sacrifice simultaneously or sequentially?
Moreover, if all activities aimed at visible ends were restrained, activities based on injunction would also be restrained, because they would be impossible for one who has not acquired wealth and is devoid of means.
Furthermore, when being a means to a desired object is equal, there is no distinction between an activity aimed at a visible end and an activity aimed at an unseen end regarding their being prompted by attachment and the like.
To explain:
[the statement] ‘one who desires heaven’ is an injunction of a particular [action] by restating an activity prompted by attachment and the like.
And thus, the immersion in the manifold [world] being equal, by what specific difference does one [activity] accord with the Self while the other is contrary to it?
For the mind's being prompted by desire is indistinguishable.
Now, if one were not to admit its being a means to a desired object at all, accidentalness has [already] been depicted, and the reasoned principle stated would be overthrown.
And the suspicion of restraint arising from contradiction due to having an identical effect would have its scope refuted from afar.
[Now, suppose one says:] by attaining desires, injunctions to action dissolve desires and thereby accord with the qualification for knowledge.
As has been said: