Establishment of Brahman 2.24

2.24

na vyāvṛttirvastusvabhāvaḥ, sā khalvekānekādhiṣṭhānā pratijñāyate prajñāyate ca /
tathā ca tasyā ekasyā anekavṛttervastusvabhāvatve vastūnāmapi bhedo na syāt, naikasmādabhinnasvabhāvaṃ bhinnaṃ yujyate tadvadeva /
atha mā bhūdeṣa doṣa ityarthāntarameva vyāvṛttirāsthīyate, tathāpi vyāvṛtterarūpatvātsvarūpeṇa na bhāvā vyāvṛttāḥ syuḥ /
aparaḥ kalpaḥ ---
bhedaḥ parasparānātmasvabhāvaḥ, sa cedvastunaḥ svabhāvaḥ, vastūnāmabhāvaprasaṅgaḥ, abhāvātmakatvapratijñānāt /
aparaḥ prakāraḥ ---
bhedaścedvastunaḥ svabhāvaḥ, naikaṃ kiñcana vastu syāt, bhedenaikatvasya virodhāt /
paramāṇurapi bhedādanekātmaka iti naikaḥ /
tathā ca tatsamuccayarūpo 'neko 'pyasyātmā nāvakalpate, tatraikatvānekatvayoranupapattestṛtīyaprakārāsaṃbhavācca vastuno niḥsvabhāvatvaprasaṅgaḥ /
anyā vyākhyā dvitīyārdhasya ---
vyatirekāvyatirekavikalpe pratyavatiṣṭhate, vastugata eṣa vibhāgaḥ ---
tatsvabhāvatvamanyatvaṃ ceti, nāvastuni vikalpaviracitaśarīre bhede 'vatāramarhati /
tathā hi ---
tattvānyatvābhyāmanirvacanīyo 'nādivikalpavāsanopādānavikalpaparidarśitaśarīraḥ ‘ayamasmādbhinnaḥ, ayamanayorbhedaḥ'; iti vyavahāraṃ pravartayati, na bhedo nāma kiñcidvastu, yasya tattvamanyatvaṃ vā kiñcidvicāryeta /
tatredaṃ punarupatiṣṭhate ---
arūpeṇa ca bhinnatvaṃ vastuno nāvakalpate /
yadi tarhyarūpo niḥsvabhāvo bhedaḥ ---
na hi vastusthityāsti, vikalpaireva kevalamupadarśyate ---
na tarhi vastuno bhinnatvam, paramārthato bhedābhāvāt, na hi kalpitena svabhāvena pāramārthikī tadvattā yujyate, kalpitaiva syāt /
tadetadasmābhirucyamānaṃ kimiti bhavānnānumanyate? vayamapyetadeva brūmaḥ ---
na bhedo bhāvato 'sti, anādyavidyāvilasitametaditi /

Differentiation is not the nature of an entity. Indeed, it is asserted and known as having one locus or multiple loci.
And so, if that single [differentiation] residing in many were the nature of the entity, there would be no difference even among the entities; what is non-different in nature from one thing cannot reasonably be different [from the others], just like that [one thing].
Now, if, in order to avoid this defect, differentiation is maintained to be an entirely different thing, even so, because differentiation would lack [the entity's own] nature, entities would not be differentiated through their own nature.
Another alternative:
Difference is the nature of being mutual non-selves. If that were the nature of an entity, the non-existence of entities would follow, because they would be asserted to have the nature of non-existence.
Another way:
If difference were the nature of an entity, nothing whatsoever could be a single entity, because oneness is contradicted by difference.
Even an atom, owing to difference, would consist of many, and so would not be one.
And thus, an aggregate of them, even though multiple, cannot be conceived as its self; since oneness and multiplicity are both impossible there, and a third kind is impossible, it would entail that the entity is devoid of nature.
Another interpretation of the second half [of the verse]:
[An opponent] raises an objection against the alternatives of difference and non-difference: 'This distinction—namely, having that nature or being something else—belongs to real entities; it cannot apply to difference, which is a non-entity whose body is fabricated by conceptual construction.
For this reason:
Indescribable as reality or otherness, with its body exhibited by conceptual constructions that take the latent impressions of beginningless conceptual construction as their material cause, it sets in motion the linguistic and practical usage: "This is different from that; this is the difference between these two." Difference is not any real entity whose identity or otherness could be investigated at all.'
On this point, this [verse-half] replies again:
'Nor is it tenable for an entity to be different by means of that which lacks a nature.'
If, then, difference is formless and devoid of nature—
for it does not exist according to the reality of the entity, but is merely displayed by conceptual constructions—
then the entity cannot be different, because difference does not exist in the ultimate sense. For possession of that [difference] cannot be real by means of an imagined nature; it would be purely imagined.
Why do you not agree to this very thing that is being stated by us? We too say precisely this:
Difference does not exist in reality; this is a display of beginningless nescience.