Establishment of Brahman 3.32

3.32

vidhimantareṇa na kāryopadeśapratītiḥ /
yathāvasthitaṃ vastu tadvidhasyānuvādamātratvaṃ gamyate /
anuvādaśca pramāṇāntaraviṣaya iti tadapekṣo bhūtārtho nārtha ucyata iti sāpekṣatvādaprāmāṇyam /
vidhyarthasya tu pramāṇāntarāviṣayatvāttanniṣṭhamanapekṣaṃ pramāṇaṃ karmavidhivākyavat /
pramāṇāntarāviṣayaśca vidhyarthaḥ /
na hi ‘kuru'iti śabdajñānādanyataḥ pratītiḥ /
evaṃ ca sati tattvapratipattipare vākye yadyapi vākyārthabodhātparācīnā pravṛttiḥ, vidhiphalaṃ nāsti /
prāmāṇyāyaiva tu vidhiniṣṭhatvameṣitavyamiti /
atrocyate ---

Without an injunction, there is no apprehension of instruction regarding what is to be done.
An entity that is already established as such is understood to be a mere reiteration of that sort.
And reiteration has for its sphere another means of valid cognition; hence an existent fact dependent on that is not declared to be the [primary] meaning, so because of dependence it lacks validity.
On the other hand, the meaning of an injunction is independent, being a means of valid cognition focused on that [duty], because it is not within the scope of any other means of valid cognition, just like sentences enjoining ritual acts.
And the meaning of an injunction is indeed not within the scope of any other means of valid cognition;
for there is no apprehension [of it] from anything other than the verbal cognition 'do [this]'.
And this being so, even if in a sentence intent on imparting reality, activity subsequent to understanding the sentence-meaning—the fruit of an injunction—does not exist,
yet intentness on an injunction must be accepted simply for the sake of validity.
To this, it is replied:—