Establishment of Brahman 3.78

3.78

na pramāṇāvagamyatvamastyarthaḥ na ‘asti'; iti buddhestadviṣayaḥ /
yataḥ pramāṇādeva tridhā buddhirbhavati ---
‘dhūmādastyatrāgniḥ'; ‘nadīpūraviśeṣādabhūdvṛṣṭiḥ'; ‘meghodayaviśeṣād bhaviṣyati vṛṣṭiḥ'; iti /
tatra yadi buddhiḥ pramāṇaviṣayatāṃ gocarayati pramite hi syāt na pramāṇādeva /
na hi prāk pramāṇotpatteḥ san pramāṇasaṃbandhaḥ /
pramāṇasaṃbandhanibandhanā ceyaṃ buddhiḥ /
atha vaiyātyāduttarakālatāmevāsyā brūyāt /
traividhyamanupapannam, pramāṇasaṃbandhasyābhedādbhinnakāleṣvapyartheṣu /

Being cognised by a means of valid cognition is not the meaning of [the verb] “is” (asti), nor is it the object of the cognition “it exists” (asti),
because it is from a means of valid cognition itself that a threefold cognition arises:
“From smoke, there is fire here”; “From a particular river flood, there was rain”; “From a particular rising of clouds, there will be rain.”
In that regard, if the cognition were to take as its object the state of being the object of a means of valid cognition, it would occur only after [the thing] has been cognised, not from the means of valid cognition itself.
For prior to the arising of the means of valid cognition, a connection with the means of valid cognition does not exist,
and this cognition would have to be grounded on a connection with the means of valid cognition.
If, out of impudence, [the opponent] should say that it occurs only at a later time,
its threefold nature would be untenable, because the connection with the means of valid cognition does not differ, even when the objects belong to different times.