Establishment of Brahman 2.136

2.136

First, this proponent of difference must be asked:
How does this appearance of non-difference and continuous practical usage occur among differentiated unique particulars? If from similarity, that is impossible among things that are entirely disconnected.
Or, if from non-apprehension of differentiation:
'for who is capable of apprehending the differentiation of the red color of guñjā berries, coral, and the like?'—
that is incorrect;
for if the differentiated nature is not apprehended, there would be no apprehension of it at all.
Or, if from non-determination due to difference of nature between ascertainment and perception,
that is incorrect, because linguistic and practical usage of both forms is observed.
To explain:
In the case of a black-eyed cow, linguistic and practical usage grounded in the universal 'cowness' is seen, as well as differentiation from other cows.
And that is not coherent if differentiation from other cows is not ascertained.
Or, if [it is] because of performing the same causal efficiency, due to the identity of exclusion from that which does not perform that action,
that too is improper, because even causal efficiencies are different, and so the exclusion from what does not perform that action cannot be the same.
The causal efficiency of another cannot be accomplished by one, such that exclusion from what does not perform it would be the same.
And differentiation, being the nature of an entity, is not the same because of the difference of each entity.
If [exclusions] have no real nature, how can they be the same? Or, if it is caused by beginningless impressions and does not depend on a specific property belonging to the entity,
that too is untenable, because of restriction.
For only in certain individuals does a certain appearance arise; that is not coherent if it were caused by impressions alone.
Therefore, it would have to be postulated that, contrary to their nature, entities have extraordinary capacities such that by their very nature some are suited for a certain apprehension of non-difference and some are not.
That being so, because of heaviness of postulation in that way,
let it be the greatness of the One alone that, though one, it appears as if manifold, because of parsimony of postulation;
and not those extraordinary capacities of the different [things], by which these appear as if non-different.