Establishment of Brahman 3.99

3.99

Now, if it is thought:
'Being is not the connection with a present means of valid cognition, nor is it mere connection with that without reference to time;
rather, it is fitness with respect to a means of valid cognition.
And that [fitness] has departed from what has been destroyed, so the absurd consequence that it exists does not follow.
In the case of what is remembered, however, it has departed from some [points of view] and not from others, so it does not follow that everything [remembered] is non-existent.'—
This too is not sound, because it abandons what was admitted.
To explain:
In this way, being turns out to be described as nothing but the intrinsic nature of the object.
The intrinsic nature of the object that is fit for a means of valid cognition is being; the division of linguistic and practical usage regarding what exists and what does not exist is based solely on the intrinsic nature of the object, not on the limiting condition consisting of a means of valid cognition and its absence.
This, however, is [merely] a means of describing it, not a contact with a means of valid cognition—just as, although it is explained that 'an object fit for a cognition with a blue form is blue', the word 'blue' does not have cognition of blue as its limiting condition.
And likewise, since that is designated by the word 'exists', the sentence whose principal element is the meaning of 'exists' has its culmination in the intrinsic nature of the object; so whence would there be dependence? Because there is no contact with a means of valid cognition.