Establishment of Brahman 3
English (machine translation) 3
- Language
- English
Contents
- 3.258 — 3 parts
3.1
// Section on Injunction
3.2
Thus, an effort has been made to awaken those who think that the Vedāntas have a metaphorical meaning because accepting their literal sense would contradict perception and so forth, as well as the injunctions to action. Now, however: [Some hold that] the validity of the Veda pertains only to what is to be done, not to an accomplished entity. For thus it has been said: “Dharma is a matter characterised by injunction” — that is to say, the meaning of the Veda has injunction as its means of valid cognition. And an injunction is a statement that prompts activity; therefore, the Veda is a means of valid cognition regarding what is to be done. Even for the Vedāntas, which possess validity concerning the duty of comprehension, their teaching regarding the reality of the Self as an accomplished entity that underlies that [comprehension] occurs by means of that [duty]. Therefore, they too do not transcend being directed toward what is to be done. And likewise, raising the objection: “How then [can you explain] the mantras and arthavādas along with the Upaniṣads?”, it has been said: “For an injunction [teaches] what is past and present...”, and so forth. What is meant is this: An effort is now made to awaken those who think that it is only the injunction itself, in making known what is to be done, that makes known accomplished entities and the like as well. And there are three comprehensions regarding Brahman: first, indeed, from verbal testimony; another, having been comprehended from verbal testimony, possesses continuity with that and is denoted by words such as meditation, creative contemplation, and worship; another, having attained completion from that, has all conceptual distinctions dissolved and has the nature of direct realization. Among these, with reference to the first, it is said:
3.3
The consciousness of the Self that arises from verbal testimony is certainly not enjoined;
for it arises for one who has studied the Veda, just like the comprehension of ritual action. //
3.4
Since Brahman's nature cannot be apprehended by other means of valid cognition, knowledge whose object is of a nature knowable through verbal testimony would have to be enjoined. There, the knowledge that arises solely from verbal testimony is not to be enjoined, because it occurs without an injunction, just like the comprehension of ritual action. Just as the comprehension of the meaning of the sentence “One who desires heaven should sacrifice” occurs from the validity of that sentence alone and does not depend on another injunction, so too the comprehension of the Self arises independently of an injunction, from the validity of the sentence expressing the true nature of the Self; because when the means of valid cognition is present, the cognition of the object of valid cognition arises by its very capacity. Indeed, when the complete means of valid cognition along with its auxiliaries is present, not even a person's desire is required for knowledge — since there is cognition even of undesired things — let alone an injunction.
3.5
He shows that very lack of dependence on an injunction in the case of comprehension of ritual action:
3.6
In this comprehension, “One who desires heaven should sacrifice”, another injunction
is not required because of infinite regress, nor this [injunction itself], because it is settled on the ritual action. //
3.7
Another injunction is not required for the occurrence of the knowledge of the sentence meaning of an injunction to action, nor is the injunction contained within it [so required]; because in the case of another [injunction], there would be the fault of infinite regress, since another injunction would also have to be required for the knowledge of its meaning; and that which is contained within it, having ritual action as its object, is incapable of enjoining its own comprehension.
3.8
Objection: Just as in their apprehension another injunction is required, namely, “One's own Vedic text is to be studied”, and there is no infinite regress, so it could also be with respect to the comprehension of their meaning. And there is an injunction: “The entire Veda is to be acquired”.
3.9
The comparison is uneven: For one who has not yet engaged in studying the sentence enjoining the study of one's own Vedic text nonetheless engages in the study of that and other sentences from that which was studied by another person, just as the collection of auxiliary elements from another Vedic branch [occurs] upon merely hearing [them]. Indeed, the sentence itself, studied by oneself, does not prompt one. As with one person, so with others too, because that study is also beginningless, just like the Veda. An injunction to comprehend whose meaning is not yet understood, however, cannot prompt one to comprehend. If the comprehension of its meaning depended on an injunction, it itself could not prompt one toward that, because its meaning is not yet understood. There would be mutual dependence: activity arises from the comprehension of its meaning, and comprehension of its meaning belongs to one who has engaged [in it]. Therefore, another injunction would have to be required, which leads to infinite regress. Nor is “The entire Veda is to be acquired” an injunction conveying a previously unknown matter; rather, an understanding arrived at through reasoning is pointed out, namely, “For its purpose is seen to be the comprehension of ritual action”. Even if this were an injunction, and knowledge of the meaning were not said to be implied by the injunction to study one's own Vedic text, still no separate injunction would need to be required for the cognition arising from the Vedic sentences expressing the true nature of Brahman, just as in the case of sentences enjoining ritual action. Just as when [understanding] is established by the general injunction, “One who desires heaven should sacrifice”, no other is required because of infinite regress, since even if there were an injunction another would be required; nor can it be the one contained within it, because it has ritual action as its object — so too, in the case of sentences intent upon the comprehension of reality, no injunction is to be required, because the rise of the knowledge of reality occurs solely through the capacity of the sentence.
3.10
For this reason too:
3.11
The fruit of an injunction is activity subsequent to understanding what is to be enjoined;
it is not this verbal cognition, because of mutual dependence; that [comprehension of reality] is not beyond it. //
3.12
The activity that occurs after understanding what is to be enjoined from verbal testimony is the purpose of the injunction; it is not the understanding itself of what is to be enjoined arising from verbal testimony, because of mutual dependence: for activity occurs when the meaning of the word has been understood, and understanding would belong to one who has engaged [in it]. Or, [if it were said that] comprehension of the sentence meaning arises solely from comprehension of the sentence meaning, there would be self-dependence. But mutual dependence is mentioned because of their equal implausibility. As for the comprehension of reality arising from a sentence intent upon the comprehension of reality, it is not subsequent to the comprehension of the sentence meaning; rather, it is that very thing.
3.13
Moreover:
3.14
Once cognition has arisen, one cannot be prompted; even less so when the word does not produce cognition;
since certainty is not [produced] by the word, therefore [your view is] desiring something else from another. //
3.15
If knowledge of the reality of the Self is produced from the sentence that begins, 'In the beginning, gentle one, this was Being alone, one only without a second,' and ends with, 'You are that,' because the words have meanings connected with one another, what else will an injunction do? One who has already engaged in activity is not to be impelled.
Now, if the arising of the knowledge of reality does not occur merely from the connection of word-meanings, [one] is all the more not to be impelled, because verbal knowledge of reality would then be impossible.
It might be said: even though the appearance of reality has arisen from the word, one is to be impelled toward certainty: 'This is so.'
That is not right. If certainty arises from that word, it has already been born. If certainty comes from elsewhere, desiring something else is a reliance on another means of valid cognition; verbal testimony would not be the cause of the certainty of reality in that case. Thus, first of all, an injunction is not desired for certainty of reality.
3.16
Now, an injunction is sought for the cessation of the non-intended character of the meaning: / when it is said, 'The meaning is to be known,' it would be an object of knowledge, not non-intended. // 2.5
3.17
As for the view: even when there is an emergence of meaning from a sentence, primary intention is hard to attain, because what is aimed at an established fact is purposeless; or it is doubtful, since lack of primary intention is also seen in muttered mantras; but when there is an injunction, because knowledge of the meaning is enjoined, the meaning cannot be non-intended; therefore an injunction must be sought for the intended character of the meaning:
3.18
That is nonsense: the aiming at meaning belongs to words in ordinary life and in the Veda, / because it is governed by the general rule, 'The sentence-meaning, however, is not qualified.' // 2.6
3.19
The subsidiary relation of words toward their meaning is general. Only due to some other cause does having one's own form as primary, or having a non-intended meaning, constitute an exception in ordinary life. So it is in the Veda as well, because the expressive capacity of words is understood from ordinary life. Thus it has been said: 'The sentence-meaning, however, is not qualified.'
3.20
Moreover:
3.21
And here the character of having a seen purpose of the injunction to study one's own Veda does not differ; / otherwise, that entire injunction-meaning would be non-intended. // 2.7
3.22
Just as in the case of injunctions to action, on the ground that 'Indeed, its seen purpose is the understanding of action,' there is no postulation of another result from study whose meaning is non-intended, so too, because knowledge of the reality of the Self is a seen [result], [there is no such postulation] for the Vedāntas. And it will be stated that there is no purposelessness in the apprehension of an established fact. And in an injunction to apprehension, it is equal.
And this must necessarily be understood in this way; otherwise, the entire [corpus], together with what enjoins, would have a non-intended meaning. For the intended meaning of other [words] is based on the enjoining word, but there is no such basis for the enjoining word [itself]. And thus, if its meaning were non-intended, the others too would be so. If the enjoining word is aimed at meaning by its nature and by having a seen purpose, the others too are likewise; thus that injunction is useless.
3.23
An injunction is accepted for establishing that knowledge is a human end; / that the character of being a human end comes from an injunction everywhere is also inelegant. // 2.8
3.24
The apprehension of being a means to a human end depends on an injunction; the apprehension that knowledge of the reality of the Self—even when it has obtained its birth from that verbal testimony—is a means to a human end comes from an injunction: this too is not plausible.
3.25
Because there is no result other than consciousness beyond the pervasion of the object of knowledge; / if it is said that liberation is desired, it is not an effect, because of falling away from reality. // 2.9
3.26
For knowledge has an entirely seen result: the pervasion of the object of knowledge by the knower, its manifestation to the knower—not an unseen [result] occurring at a later time, for the sake of which there would be an injunction.
It might be said: another result of Self-knowledge is also desired, namely liberation.
That is not right, because it cannot be brought about. That liberation is not produced by a cause, because [otherwise there would be] a falling away from reality; because if it were an effect, through its destruction there would be transmigratory existence again. And the absolute cessation of transmigratory existence is called liberation.
[Objection:] But even though an effect, destruction does not perish!
[Advaitin:] True, but this is said intending liberation as an existent entity characterised by unexcelled bliss and characterised by unexcelled sovereignty, because an existent entity that is an effect is invariably concomitant with destruction. The prior absence consisting of the non-connection with future body, sense organs, and intellect cannot be an effect at all. As for the cessation of the cause of bondage, although it is an effect, and even though an effect there is no contingency of impermanence for it, nevertheless it is not separate from knowledge of reality, and so is not to be brought about by it. For nescience is the cause of bondage, and its cessation is the very arising of the knowledge of reality.
3.27
Or rather, liberation is stated to be abiding in one's own nature: 'Having attained the supreme light, he remains in his own form.' And if it were an effect to be accomplished, it would not be abiding in one's own nature; therefore it would fall away from being liberation. As for the claim that, on the authority of the scripture 'He does not return again', liberation—even though an effect—is eternal: that would be resorted to, even though contrary to what is observed, only if scripture had no other purport. But when the seeker has known the reality of the Self, sees the Self as non-dual and of pure illumination, and nescience is completely uprooted, non-recurrence of bondage is impossible due to the absence of its cause; hence scripture, through a statement in the present tense, merely reiterates an already established fact by way of eulogy. In that case, whence could its infinite result arise on the authority of that text? To explain: precisely because it is stated in the present tense, non-return is not understood as something to be accomplished. Nor is there any connection with desire from which an end to be accomplished could be grasped. Therefore it is a eulogy. Moreover, any assumption of a result even from a eulogy is unjustified with respect to knowledge, which lacks any desire for another result because of the observed result, namely the manifestation of the reality of the object to be known. And its status as a human end will be explained.
3.28
Others, however, say:
3.29
Without an injunction, an utterance devoid of an effect [to be done] is reiterative of an already established entity; / and a reiteration occurs only with regard to an object within the scope of another means of valid cognition. //
3.30
Depending on that other means of valid cognition, it falls short of validity. / But when established in the meaning of an injunction, outside the scope of another means of valid cognition, //
3.31
it attains independence as a means of valid cognition, just like the sentences concerning action. / Even in the absence of activity on the part of another, the injunction concerning that [knowledge] is solely for the sake of [its] validity. //
3.32
Without an injunction, there is no apprehension of instruction regarding what is to be done.
An entity that is already established as such is understood to be a mere reiteration of that sort.
And reiteration has for its sphere another means of valid cognition; hence an existent fact dependent on that is not declared to be the [primary] meaning, so because of dependence it lacks validity.
On the other hand, the meaning of an injunction is independent, being a means of valid cognition focused on that [duty], because it is not within the scope of any other means of valid cognition, just like sentences enjoining ritual acts.
And the meaning of an injunction is indeed not within the scope of any other means of valid cognition;
for there is no apprehension [of it] from anything other than the verbal cognition 'do [this]'.
And this being so, even if in a sentence intent on imparting reality, activity subsequent to understanding the sentence-meaning—the fruit of an injunction—does not exist,
yet intentness on an injunction must be accepted simply for the sake of validity.
To this, it is replied:—
3.33
Is being a reiteration the condition of having an object already attained by another means of valid cognition,
or is it being an existent fact? In that regard, even a statement about an established fact, //
3.34
which does not convey that [object] as having its object acquired through another means of cognition,
is not dependent on it, if this intended nature of reiteration is accepted. //
3.35
What indeed is reiteration?—
Is it having an object commingled with another cognition, or conveying that it is apprehended by another means of cognition, or is it merely being an existent fact? Among these, on the first alternative, let an object commingled with another cognition be dependent.
However, that which, even though an existent fact, does not teach that it is apprehended by another means of cognition is not reiterative, nor is it dependent, because there is no apprehension through contact with a prior cognition.
3.36
Now the other alternative:—
3.37
If it is pure established factuality, what is the cause of dependence?
Commingling with another means of valid cognition is the cause of depending on it. //
3.38
That [cause] does not exist in the Vedic [word], even regarding an existent fact, because it does not originate from human intellect.
3.39
If being a reiteration is merely being an existent fact, there is no cause of dependence.
Being an existent fact is not itself the cause of dependence, because perception and inference, though having existent facts [as objects], are independent.
Therefore, whether regarding an existent fact or an non-existent fact, contact with another cognition is the cause of dependence on another means of valid cognition, as seen in memory.
For that [memory] has an object commingled with another cognition, and so depends on the instrument of that [prior apprehension].
And in this way, a statement originating from the intellect of a person, whether about an existent fact or an non-existent fact, is dependent.
For from that arises a cognition only of an object commingled with that [prior cognition], not independently regarding the object without expecting a prior cognition.
As it is said:—
'Moreover, from a human utterance arises the cognition, "Thus this person knows", not "Thus is the fact"';
Because it does not originate from the intellect of a person, in the Vedic utterance, even regarding an existent fact, there is no cause of dependence, because the commingling with a prior cognition is caused by association with a person.
3.40
It might be argued:—
Even in an existent fact that is not of human origin, because another means of valid cognition is possible with respect to its object, there is dependence upon it.
To explain:—
When another means of valid cognition is possible regarding its object, conflict with it might also be suspected.
Therefore, to rule out that [conflict], correspondence with it must be sought.
On the other hand, with regard to an object to be done, since no [other means] is possible, no suspicion of conflict can arise from anywhere, and so there is nothing to be sought.
To this, it is replied:—
3.41
Nor does dependence on that [other means] stand to reason merely by virtue of its possibility; //
3.42
for no distinction between the two in terms of dependence would then be apprehended.
3.43
When two [means of cognition] are possible regarding a single object, whence is it that
verbal testimony is dependent on it, but that other means of valid cognition is not dependent on verbal testimony? If [it is said] that verbal testimony is observed in worldly experience to have an object apprehended by another means of valid cognition, then it would all the less have validity regarding what is not an object of another means of valid cognition.
For regarding an object of another means of valid cognition, [validity] might at least exist due to the possibility of another means of valid cognition; elsewhere, due to its absence, that [validity] would be hard to find.
If [it is said] that the fact that worldly utterances have objects apprehended by another means of valid cognition is caused by human authorship, not caused by the intrinsic capacity of the word;
[and that] the word has capacity only regarding an object uncommingled with another means of valid cognition;
then verbal testimony alone is not dependent merely because of the possibility of another means of valid cognition: that [other means] too would be dependent on verbal testimony because of the possibility of verbal testimony.
What of it if it were dependent? It would be invalid.
[Opponent:] Dependence on verbal testimony is not appropriate there;
for only if it had validity would correspondence or conflict with it be expected.
[Maṇḍana:] If it is argued that because verbal testimony is invalid, that [other means] is not a means of valid cognition with dependence on verbal testimony;
[we reply:] it is indeed a means of valid cognition, because of independence.
Whence is the invalidity of verbal testimony? Because of dependence on another means of valid cognition.
And its validity is due to independence, while its independence is due to the invalidity of verbal testimony: this is mutual dependence.
For if verbal testimony were a means of valid cognition, when possible regarding that object, that [other means] too would be dependent, just like verbal testimony upon its possibility, since there is no difference.
If, even when verbal testimony is possible, it is not dependent on it,
[then] even when that [other means] is possible, verbal testimony is not dependent, since there is no difference.
3.44
Moreover:
3.45
In this way, when perception and inference operate upon each other's domain, //
3.46
the consequence would be mutual dependence without distinction;
even a sense organ would be dependent when [operating] in the domain of another sense organ. //
3.47
If dependence resulted merely from the possibility [of another means of valid cognition], then because perception and inference are possible with respect to the same object, they would depend on one another, and invalidity would absurdly follow. Likewise, with regard to existence, qualityhood, and substances, which are graspable by multiple senses, the absurd consequence would follow that the other sense organs depend on another sense organ. If [it is argued that] verbal testimony alone is dependent when another means of valid cognition is possible, a distinguishing reason must be stated. If it is said: 'Because its object is observed to have been apprehended by another means of valid cognition'—it has already been replied on this point: If this is an intrinsic property of verbal testimony as such, then precisely because perception and the like are impossible with respect to its object, it would result in invalidity, like the utterances of the Buddha and others; whereas when they are possible, its validity is proper with respect to a sensory object, just like the utterance of a reliable person. As it has been said: 'If that [word] proceeds from a trustworthy person, or has a sensible object, it is certainly not false.' If, on the other hand, this is a property of human speech, then scripture, being authorless, is not dependent even if its object could be the object of another means of valid cognition. Furthermore, just because some inference has an object already apprehended by perception, inference based on general correlation is not thereby dependent on perception; and just as perception preceded by tradition regarding the distinction of musical notes like ṣaḍja does not mean that all perception is of that kind, so too, even though the utterances of human beings are observed to have objects apprehended by other means of valid cognition, authorless scripture—even regarding an already established entity—is not of that nature. Otherwise, as has been said, it would all the more be invalid because of the impossibility of another means of valid cognition.
3.48
Moreover:
3.49
Because of [such] impossibility, a secular injunction concerning medicine and the like / would absurdly follow to be independent; [yet] it is preceded by human conviction. //
3.50
Application is there [in human speech], and through that it has dependence. But in the Veda, / that too is not preceded by [human] intellect; hence independence is spoken of. //
3.51
If sentences of the Veda that are devoted to an injunction have independence because another means of valid cognition is impossible with respect to the effect which is the object of the injunction, then secular utterances devoted to an effect—such as 'One desiring to be free from fever should drink this medicine', or 'One desiring heaven should eat sand'—would also attain independence and validity. If [it is countered that] the relation of means and end there is preceded by a person's intention to speak, and therefore dependence exists there, whereas in the Veda even the relation of means and end is not preceded by a person's intention to speak, and hence there is independence; or that the connection between the object, the person enjoined, and the injunction is constructed by human intellect in secular speech, whereas in the Veda the injunction alone is not preceded by human intellect, and therefore it is independent—we reply:
3.52
Alas, then being preceded by human intellect is precisely the ground for dependence, / since there is dependence in that case even though another means of valid cognition is impossible! //
3.53
If a sentence, even when devoted to an effect where another means of valid cognition is impossible, is dependent because of its connection with a person, then by positive and negative concomitance, being preceded by human intellect alone is the cause of dependence on another means of valid cognition. For when it is present, there is dependence in secular speech; and when it is absent, there is independence in the Veda. The possibility of another means of valid cognition regarding the object is not the cause, because even in its absence, dependence is observed in a secular injunction.
3.54
Now, it may be thought:
3.55
In the Veda there is devotion to an injunction, while in ordinary usage the primary factor is application; / in the Veda there is no dependence, and therefore there is dependence in ordinary usage. //
3.56
Vedic speech culminates in an injunction, and that is not within the scope of another means of valid cognition; hence there is independence. But secular speech is devoted to the relation of means and end, and that is an object of another means of valid cognition; hence there is dependence.
3.57
Such a distinction in expressive power does not belong to word as such; / a word makes things known in the Veda too only with the power understood from ordinary usage. //
3.58
First of all, this division of expressive power does not belong to word as such, without regard to connection or non-connection with a person—namely that in one case an injunction is the meaning of the word, and in the other case application is, just as the word 'cow' means that which possesses a dewlap and the word 'horse' that which possesses a mane. For a word conveys meaning in the Veda too only with the expressive power grasped from ordinary usage. If application were the meaning of the word in ordinary usage, its expressive power would be apprehended only there, not in an injunction. In that case, in the Veda too, application alone would be the meaning established by the means of valid cognition.
3.59
If [it is said that] a person employs a sentence having known the object from another means of valid cognition, / and because of that it is devoted to that, whereas the other is established differently— //
3.60
Now, if it is thought:
This is not a division of capacity belonging to speech in general.
For the innate capacity of speech is indeed nothing but culminating in that which is to be done.
To explain:
The meaning of an injunction is that which is to be done.
And the connection of anything else is understood for the sake of that which is to be done,
not, however, is the connection of that which is to be done for the sake of something else.
Therefore, because an injunction is that which is to be done, it has primacy.
A human being, however, having understood an object from another means of valid cognition, uses speech with respect to it.
And an injunction is not an object within the range of another means of valid cognition;
therefore, one cannot use [words] with respect to it.
Application, however, being of such a nature [as to fall within empirical experience], its use with respect to that is appropriate.
Therefore, human speech has application as its primary purpose,
whereas Vedic [speech], by its capacity, because an injunction is that which is to be done, has that as its primary purpose.
3.61
To this it is said in reply:
3.62
Because it depends on another means of cognition, its object can indeed / be known through another means of valid cognition; not from this is its dependence on another valid cognition. //
3.63
If it is assumed that human speech has application as its domain on the ground that a person uses speech regarding a known object, because of dependence on another means of valid cognition, then its object is something for which another means of valid cognition is possible.
It is not, however, that because its object is accessible to another means of valid cognition human speech is also dependent, for an object of that kind is [merely] an occasion for dependence.
3.64
Therefore, having known from another means of valid cognition, a person uses speech / to instruct another; therefore, not groundlessly does his statement //
3.65
admit connection with another means of valid cognition from dependence, not from possibility.
3.66
A person's utterance is for the sake of making known his own apprehension; hence, in it there is a connection with another means of valid cognition—the meaning being, 'This object has been apprehended by me.'
Therefore, in that case, only the possibility or impossibility of apprehension should be considered.
Where apprehension is determined, 'His apprehension is possible, and he is not speaking without having apprehended,' there validity exists, as in the case of a trustworthy person with respect to an object of a means of valid cognition.
Where, on the other hand, apprehension is wholly impossible, as with statements of the Buddha and others regarding seen matters, and where there is the possibility of speech proceeding even without having apprehended, there is invalidity;
not, however, that just because another means of valid cognition is possible, human speech also has a dependence on it.
3.67
Therefore, authorlessness / and authorship indeed //
3.68
are described by the wise as causes of independence and dependence [respectively]; / therefore, even [if speaking of] an accomplished entity, that which does not arise from human intellect is not dependent. //
3.69
For this very reason, authorship and authorlessness were shown by the masters of logic to be the causes of dependence and independence, through the effort to refute authorship [with the aphorism]:
'Inherent, however, is the relation of the word with its meaning.'
When the relation between word and meaning is inherent, because a word is not dependent, it does not originate from human intellect; hence, the apprehension of meaning from a word is not commingled with another means of valid cognition, and so there is independence.
3.70
Objection: But an effort was indeed made regarding the impossibility of another means of valid cognition [with the aphorism]:
'When there is contact with the existent…'
True,
[this was] for the sake of establishing the restriction: 'An injunctive statement alone is a means of valid cognition, nothing else',
not, however, that 'it is a means of valid cognition only [if no other means of cognition is possible].'
3.71
Now, even if another means of valid cognition were possible, if the validity of an injunctive statement were not contradicted, what would be the purpose of refuting other means of valid cognition? The purpose is knowledge of the reality of dharma.
For if another means of valid cognition were possible, dharma taught even by the Buddha and others regarded as omniscient would be accepted; in that case, the reality of dharma would not be ascertained.
And this effort is for the sake of ascertaining that.
The validity of an injunctive statement is also sought for that purpose, not for an unseen result.
Or, because of conflict with that [other means], the injunctive statement would be sublated, or there would be doubt if they are of equal strength; therefore its impossibility is demonstrated,
not, however, that dependence arises from the possibility of that [other means].
Objection: Its absence would have to be depended upon.
Granted;
nevertheless, verbal testimony does not make known an object dependent on another means of valid cognition.
For that which makes known an object is not depended upon,
and that which is depended upon does not make known the object;
for the absence of an opposing means of valid cognition is not the cause of apprehension.
And if there were invalidity merely by the possibility of opposition, that would be the case even for perception and the rest.
Moreover, invalidity due to the possibility of an opposing [means] would be unavoidable even on the view that [scripture] culminates in that which is to be done, because apprehension of an accomplished entity is accepted through the medium of what is to be done,
and in that case, the possibility of an opposing means of valid cognition is present.
Because an accomplished entity is an object of another means of valid cognition, culmination in that which is to be done is maintained [by you].
If it were an object of another means of valid cognition, it would indeed, being reiterative, make known an object dependent on another means of valid cognition—
'This has been understood by another means of valid cognition'—
and not independently.
On the view that it culminates in that which is to be done, however, it makes it known independently, because that is not in the scope of another means of valid cognition.
[Yet,] according to the manner explained, there is no dependence; hence it is well said: 'therefore, even [if speaking of] an accomplished entity, that which does not arise from human intellect is not dependent.'
3.72
If word-meanings do not enter into connection without an action, / what does that have to do with an injunction? Even that [action], such as 'is', is easily available where not? //
3.73
If it is thought:
Without the meaning of a verbal form, there is no connection among the meanings of nouns.
For an action is the cause of the blending together of word-meanings, because in its absence there is syntactic expectancy.
Therefore, an established entity such as Brahman is not within the scope of a word, because a word, having an unknown relation [to it], does not convey meaning;
nor is it the sentence-meaning, because that consists in a connection,
and word-meanings devoid of action do not connect.
Even so, let an action be accepted,
and through that, let the establishment of the connection among word-meanings be expected;
there is no use for an injunction.
And that action too, such as 'is', even when not explicitly heard, is easily available everywhere, according to: 'The root *as* with a present suffix in the third person is understood even when not employed.'
There, a sentence whose purpose is to convey the essential nature of Brahman culminates in the meaning of the verb 'to be.'
The blending of word-meanings there is based on that.
And since being (sattā) is, by its very nature, predominant in what is existent, through that the establishment of the qualified entity is achieved.
3.74
On this [the opponents] say:
Existence is nothing other than being cognised by a means of valid cognition.
For instance:
When an object is cognised by a means of valid cognition, ordinary people use the linguistic expression “it exists” (asti) with regard to it; in the opposite case, [they use] “it does not exist” (nāsti).
Indeed, no other ground for distinguishing between the existent and non-existent is perceived.
If it is argued that it is the presence or absence of causal efficacy,
no, because those two also depend on the presence or absence of a means of valid cognition.
For instance:
If the linguistic and practical usage of “existent” even regarding an effect were grounded on a further effect, there would be an infinite regress.
Therefore, in the final analysis as well, the linguistic and practical usage of “existent” comes only from a means of valid cognition, and the linguistic and practical usage of “non-existent” from its opposite.
If so, right at the beginning, let the linguistic and practical usages of “existent” and “non-existent” be grounded on the presence and absence of a means of valid cognition.
And thus, a statement devoted to the meaning of [the verb] “is” (asti) conveys an object only by depending on another means of valid cognition, because being the object of a means of valid cognition is the meaning of [the verb] “is”.
3.75
To this it is replied:
3.76
Nor is being cognised by a means of valid cognition held to be the object of [the thought] “it exists”,
for it is from a means of valid cognition itself that the cognition “it was”, “it exists”, or “it will be” arises. //
3.77
For if this [cognition] were to occur regarding fire and the like once cognised by smoke and the like, [it would arise] differently;
or, occurring at a later time, it would certainly not be threefold. //
3.78
Being cognised by a means of valid cognition is not the meaning of [the verb] “is” (asti), nor is it the object of the cognition “it exists” (asti),
because it is from a means of valid cognition itself that a threefold cognition arises:
“From smoke, there is fire here”; “From a particular river flood, there was rain”; “From a particular rising of clouds, there will be rain.”
In that regard, if the cognition were to take as its object the state of being the object of a means of valid cognition, it would occur only after [the thing] has been cognised, not from the means of valid cognition itself.
For prior to the arising of the means of valid cognition, a connection with the means of valid cognition does not exist,
and this cognition would have to be grounded on a connection with the means of valid cognition.
If, out of impudence, [the opponent] should say that it occurs only at a later time,
its threefold nature would be untenable, because the connection with the means of valid cognition does not differ, even when the objects belong to different times.
3.79
If a means of valid cognition apprehends a thing as related to itself,
even then it would not differ at all, and in this way there would be no dependence on another [means of valid cognition]. //
3.80
Now, if it is held:
The object is cognised by a means of valid cognition only as related to itself;
therefore, the cognition “it exists” does not occur at a later time, even though it has the connection with the means of valid cognition as its object, because the object is apprehended only as related to itself—
even so, there would only be [the cognition] “it exists” everywhere;
there would not be the threefold division, because whenever anything is cognised, the connection with the means of valid cognition is present [in the present time].
And in this way, there would be no dependence on another means of valid cognition in a statement devoted to the meaning of [the verb] “is”, because the meaning of “is” would be nothing but the connection with that [very] means of valid cognition.
3.81
If it is held that being cognised by another means of valid cognition is threefold from an inferential mark,
then the inferential mark too would be dependent [on another means of valid cognition]; if its establishment is from that [mark] itself, //
3.82
if there is independence, that is not prevented in the Veda by any decree.
3.83
Now, if it is held:
What is cognised by the inferential mark is precisely the state of being cognisable by another means of valid cognition;
therefore, it does not occur at a later time;
and that means of valid cognition pertains to the three times, so there is a threefold nature.
What, then, is that [other means of valid cognition]? Perception.
For instance:
When the rain is past, someone's perception is past; when it is future, [the perception] is future; when the fire is present, it is present.
And this is trifling, because it does not exist in the case of what is eternally inferable.
Moreover, in this way the inferential mark too would be invalid, because it would depend on another means of valid cognition.
If [the opponent says that] there is independence because the existence of another means of valid cognition is established from the inferential mark itself;
for instance:
the inferential mark is now the means of valid cognition precisely for the existence of another means of valid cognition;
and there, nothing else is depended upon;
[and] the establishment of the object of valid cognition is by means of the existence of the means of valid cognition—
this procedure is not prevented in the Veda by any decree.
A Vedic statement too, devoted to the meaning of [the verb] “is”, is a means of valid cognition precisely for the existence of a means of valid cognition for a qualified object;
there it is independent;
and the establishment of the qualified object is by means of that means of valid cognition: so it is equal.
3.84
However, its occurrence with regard to an extra-empirical object is not like the meaning of the Buddha's statements; //
3.85
[if it is objected that it is] here, this is improper, because of the means for direct realization.
3.86
It might be thought:
In this way, the validity of an inferential mark is reasonable, because that other means of valid cognition is possible with regard to the object;
for another means of valid cognition is possible with regard to rain and the like;
hence the apprehension of the object occurs by means of that;
but [such another means of valid cognition] is not accepted with regard to Brahman, which transcends all specific attributes and is grounded solely on scripture;
in that case, just as the statements of the Buddha and others, which are devoted to knowledge [such as] “in this way this person knows”, do not have validity with regard to the object because knowledge is impossible with regard to an supersensible object for those who teach supersensible objects, so it would be here as well;
whereas, like the statement of a trustworthy person regarding an object accessible to a possible means of valid cognition, the validity of an inferential mark is appropriate even if it is devoted to a means of valid cognition.
This is incorrect, because direct realization is accepted even with regard to Brahman when nescience is destroyed;
for it is only with regard to those possessing nescience that it is said to be grounded solely on scripture.
Moreover:
3.87
If existence is just the state of being an object of valid cognition, whence the threefold nature in the means of valid cognition? //
3.88
Due to connection with that, therefore, a threefold nature in the object is not intelligible.
3.89
And if what is cognised by the inferential mark is only the means of valid cognition, and existence is precisely being cognised, then, because it is being cognised, every means of valid cognition is existent;
and what is existent is said to be present [in time];
in that case, because the means of valid cognition is present, there would only be [the cognition] “it exists” regarding every object;
a threefold nature in the object does not result from a threefold nature in the means of valid cognition, because that which is being cognised exists, and that which exists is present [in time].
3.90
Moreover, he must be asked this:
Is existence the connection with a means of valid cognition that is conjunction with a present means of valid cognition, and non-existence its opposite? Or is it merely conjunction with a means of valid cognition, not tied to a particular time? In that regard:
3.91
Conjunction with a present means of valid cognition is existence, and non-existence is its opposite: //
3.92
if this is held, then non-existence would follow for that which is the domain of memory.
3.93
That which is remembered has no connection with a present means of valid cognition.
If it is objected that regarding what is remembered there is no linguistic and practical usage “it exists” because destruction is possible,
true;
neither is there [the usage] “it does not exist”.
If conjunction with a present means of valid cognition were existence and its opposite non-existence, there would only be [the usage] “it does not exist”, and not “it exists”.
Therefore, existence and non-existence are different [from that].
3.94
If existence is merely conjunction with a means of valid cognition, and non-existence its opposite: //
3.95
Holding honey with a pot that was cognized and then destroyed would follow; / and once cognized, there would not be another desire to know about its existence or nonexistence.
3.96
If existence were merely relation to a means of valid cognition without reference to a specific time, an object that was cognized and then destroyed would also be existent, and in that case its causal efficacy would ensue just like that of an undestroyed one, since their existence would be indistinguishable.
If it is objected that it is not so because of a difference between the destroyed and the undestroyed, then that very difference would be the cause of the determination of linguistic and practical usage regarding existence and nonexistence, just as it is for the determination of effects, and not relation to a means of valid cognition.
3.97
Indeed, this [usage] is observed in the world to follow precisely that [difference].
For the world certainly does not treat as 'existent' that which was cognized and then destroyed.
Moreover, once an object was cognized, ordinary people would not desire to know further about its existence or nonexistence, because mere relation to a means of valid cognition has already been established and existence is defined by that.
3.98
Now, [if it is argued that] existence is fitness for a means of valid cognition, and that is lost from what is destroyed, / while in what is remembered it is shaken somewhere—this too is unsound.
3.99
Now, if it is thought:
'Being is not the connection with a present means of valid cognition, nor is it mere connection with that without reference to time;
rather, it is fitness with respect to a means of valid cognition.
And that [fitness] has departed from what has been destroyed, so the absurd consequence that it exists does not follow.
In the case of what is remembered, however, it has departed from some [points of view] and not from others, so it does not follow that everything [remembered] is non-existent.'—
This too is not sound, because it abandons what was admitted.
To explain:
In this way, being turns out to be described as nothing but the intrinsic nature of the object.
The intrinsic nature of the object that is fit for a means of valid cognition is being; the division of linguistic and practical usage regarding what exists and what does not exist is based solely on the intrinsic nature of the object, not on the limiting condition consisting of a means of valid cognition and its absence.
This, however, is [merely] a means of describing it, not a contact with a means of valid cognition—just as, although it is explained that 'an object fit for a cognition with a blue form is blue', the word 'blue' does not have cognition of blue as its limiting condition.
And likewise, since that is designated by the word 'exists', the sentence whose principal element is the meaning of 'exists' has its culmination in the intrinsic nature of the object; so whence would there be dependence? Because there is no contact with a means of valid cognition.
3.100
It may be said:
'Let distinct intrinsic natures of objects, which are fit with respect to a means of valid cognition, be the referents of the word “existent”; let there not be a single being.'—
Let it not be; this is not what is to be established [by us].
In any case, the word 'exists' denotes the intrinsic nature of the object and does not have connection with a means of valid cognition as its cause.
For only if there were contact with a means of valid cognition would there be dependence.
Multiplicity, however, brings no fault whatsoever.
Moreover, if it has multiplicity, how can there be the application of an undivided word? To explain:
One word could apply to distinct things by resorting to an undivided qualifier or an indicator, or there could be an equivocal word having distinct causes [of application], like the word akṣa, etc.
Among these, first of all, equivocality cannot be maintained across infinite intrinsic natures of objects, because of [the limits on] the capacity to grasp relations [of denotation].
For words like akṣa have as their scope a limited number of universals, or they are indicated by a limited number of indicators.
It may be said:
'The word “existent” is equivocal with respect to things indicated by the triad of universals, substancehood, and the like.'—
That is not so.
For whoever denies being also denies substancehood and the like as well.
Surely, one who has seen fire does not have the reflective awareness of it in water.
Moreover, universal, particularity, and inherence are also existent indeed.
The word 'existent' is not metaphorical with respect to them, because the cognition is non-different.
And there is no metaphor without a universal.
Or, if a universal exists, that alone is the meaning of the word 'existent'.
And that alone is being, because the cognition is equal.
Now, if it is thought:
'In all philosophical doctrines, all categories are subsumed under certain limited properties.
The word “existent” is equivocal with respect to things, infinite though they are, that have those [properties] as indicators.'—
That is improper.
For a subsumption cannot occur without a single [unifying factor].
There, if the subsumption is made in the capacity of being the meaning of the word 'existent', [saying:] 'The meaning of the word “existent” has just this many divisions', there would be no exclusion of other things.
There, there would not be a subsumption of all things—just as [saying] 'the meaning of the word “cow” is of nine kinds' does not imply the non-existence of other things.
There, no comprehension of the reality of things could arise from the philosophical doctrines.
[Objection:] Surely, the meaningfulness of philosophical doctrines is not what is to be established!
We do not say that the meaningfulness of philosophical doctrines is to be established.
Rather, the proponents of doctrines acknowledge a certain single intrinsic nature of an object, of which this is the subsumption of divisions such as 'five, six', etc.,
because without a single subsuming factor, there can be no placement of subordinate numbers.
If [it is said that] the subsumption is based on fitness for a means of valid cognition or on capacity for causal efficacy, [saying:] 'It is this much which is fit for a means of valid cognition, or has capacity for causal efficacy'—then let the meaning of the word 'existent' be indicated by those very two; the presentation of limited properties is useless.
In that case, it would be a word signifying a universal, not an equivocal word.
And if it had distinct causes [of application], doubt would arise due to the diversity of causes, just as from words like akṣa, etc., and not the cognition of a specific thing.
For hearers do not doubt among diverse causes when they hear: 'The pot is existent.'
Just as one has no expectancy when hearing: 'The cloth is white', so too when hearing: 'The pot is existent.'
As for the doubt whether it is a substance, a quality, an action, a visible form, or consciousness—that does not belong to ordinary people.
Ordinary people, however, cognize a single, undivided cause [of application].
And the doubt arises from the thing, not from the word.
Why? Because the hearer is free from expectancy even without cognizing the specific [entity].
For where doubt arises from the nature of the thing—as in 'let the tree be cut', with respect to an axe, hatchet, etc.—there, even though neither specific item is known, there is freedom from expectancy because any one whatever is taken, as otherwise there would be infinite regress.
Where, however, [doubt arises] from the word, there expectancy remains without a cause for knowing the specific item.
Therefore, thus, it is not an equivocal word having multiple causes [of application].
Nor could a single means of valid cognition be a qualifier.
And it has been stated at length in [the verse beginning:] 'Since cognition arises from the means of valid cognition itself...' that that is impossible because the cognition permeated by the word 'existent' arises even prior to that.
Moreover, a means of valid cognition is determined as having operated only from [its] effect.
Then whence could there be the state of being qualified by that?
Indeed, an object is not qualified when the specific quality is not present.
And when the absence of a qualifier is ascertained, there is no doubt permeated by the expression of the qualified, just as when the absence of a staff is ascertained, there is no [doubt]: 'Is he a staff-bearer or not?'
And in deserted cities and the like, or in the case of treasures buried long ago, even when the absence of a means of valid cognition is ascertained, there is the doubt: 'Do they exist or not?'
Therefore, the meaning of 'existent' in which this doubt occurs is different from connection with a means of valid cognition.
Nor is a means of valid cognition an indicator, because the word 'existent' is not used for things that are cognized by a means of valid cognition and then destroyed, and because with respect to what is remembered, there is a doubt permeated by the word 'existent'.
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Commentaries (1)
- Tattvasamīkṣā — Vācaspati Miśra, Sanskrit
Other recensions (1)
- English (machine translation) (mt) — English, machine translation
Linked texts (1)
- Brahmasiddhi — Maṇḍana Miśra, Sanskrit