Advaitasiddhi 2.13

2.13

nanu jīvacaitanyasyāsaṅgatve brahmacaitanyaṃ sutirāmasaṅgam. tathā ca māyopādhikaviṣayoparāgatvāt svataḥ sārvajñyaṃ na syāt. na ca brahma sarvopādānatvādupādhiṃ vinaiva svasvarūpavatsvābhinnaṃ jagadavabhāsayatīti vācyam. upādānatvaṃ na tāvadviśiṣṭaniṣṭhaṃ pariṇāmitvam. ādhyāsikasambandhasyātantratāpatteḥ. anādyavidyādikaṃ prati tadabhāvācca. nāpi śuddhaniṣṭhamadhiṣṭhānatvam. śuddhasya sarvajñatvasarvaśaktitvāderabhāvāditi cenna. brahmaṇo'saṅgatve'pi sarveṣāṃ tatrādhyāsena māyopādhiṃ vinaiva tasya sarvaprakāśakatayā sārvajñyopapatteḥ. na ca śuddhaniṣṭhamadhiṣṭhānatvaṃ nopādānatvam sārvajñyābhāvādityuktamiti vācyam. avidyākalpitānāṃ sarvajñatvādīnāṃ śuddhe sattvāt. anyathā teṣāṃ taṭasthalakṣaṇatvamapi na syāt. nanu āvaraṇābhibhavārthatvapakṣo na yuktaḥ. vivartādhiṣṭhānasya cinmātrasyājñānādisākṣitvena sadā prakāśanāt. anyasyājñānakalpitasyāvaraṇasyābhāvāditi cenna. ajñānādisākṣitvena svaprakāśe'pyaśanāyādyatītatvādinā prakāśābhāvādāvaraṇasyāvaśyatvāt. nanu ajñānasya nayanapaṭalavat puṅgatatve caitrasyājñānanāśe'pi maitrasya tadanāśād aprakāśo yuktaḥ. viṣayagatatve tu caitrārjitayā vṛttyā ajñāne dīpena tamasīva nāśite maitrasyāpi prakāśaḥ syāditi cenna. caitrāvaraṇaśakterevājñānagatāyāścaitrārjitavṛttyā nāśitatvena sa paśyati, na maitraḥ tatpratiyogikāvaraṇaśakteranāśād. āvaraṇaśaktīnāṃ draṣṭṛviṣayabhedābhyāṃ bhinnatvāt. tamastu na tathetyekānītapradīpenāpyanyāt prati prakāśo yujyate. etena- ekājñānapakṣe śuktijñānena tadajñānanivṛttau sadya eva mokṣāpātaḥ. anivṛttau rūpyādeḥ savilāsāvidyānivṛttirūpabādhāyoga iti nirastam. āvaraṇaśaktināśe'pi mūlājñānanāśābhāvena sadyo mokṣābhāvasya rūpyādau savilāsaśaktimadavidyānivṛttirūpabādhasya copapatteḥ.

[Objection:] If the consciousness of the individual self is unattached, then the consciousness that is Brahman is far more unattached. And thus, since it is affected by objects through the adjunct of illusion, it would not have omniscience by its own nature. Nor can it be said that Brahman, being the material cause of everything, manifests the universe as non-different from itself, just like its own nature, even without an adjunct. For being a material cause is not, to begin with, being a transformative cause residing in the qualified [Brahman]; for that would entail that the superimpositional relation is of no consequence, and also because that [transformative causality] is absent with respect to beginningless ignorance and the like. Nor is it being the substratum residing in the pure [Brahman]; for omniscience, omnipotence, and the like do not exist in the pure [Brahman].

[Reply:] This is not so. Even though Brahman is unattached, because everything is superimposed upon it, it illuminates everything even without the adjunct of illusion, and thus omniscience is established. And it should not be said that being a substratum residing in the pure [Brahman] is not being a material cause because of the absence of omniscience; for omniscience and the like, though fabricated by ignorance, do exist in the pure [Brahman]. Otherwise, they would not even be accidental definitions of it.

[Objection:] The view that [cognition] serves to overcome concealment is not tenable; for pure consciousness, which is the substratum of illusory transformation, is always manifest as the witness of ignorance and the like, and there is no other concealment fabricated by ignorance.

[Reply:] This is not so. Even though it is self-luminous as the witness of ignorance and the like, because it is not manifest as transcending hunger and the like, concealment is necessary.

[Objection:] If ignorance resides in the person, like a cataract of the eye, then it is reasonable that, even when ignorance is destroyed for Caitra, there is no manifestation for Maitra because it is not destroyed for him. But if it resides in the object, then when ignorance is destroyed by a mental state produced by Caitra, just like darkness by a lamp, it would be manifest for Maitra as well.

[Reply:] This is not so. Caitra sees because only the concealing power belonging to Caitra, which resides in ignorance, is destroyed by the mental state produced by Caitra, whereas Maitra does not, because the concealing power whose counterpositive is [Maitra] is not destroyed; for concealing powers are differentiated by differences in perceivers and objects. Darkness, however, is not like that, and so illumination with respect to another person even by a lamp brought by one person is reasonable. By this is refuted [the objection]: "On the view of a single ignorance, if that ignorance were removed by the knowledge of nacre, immediate liberation would result; and if it were not removed, the sublation of silver and the like, which consists in the removal of ignorance along with its manifestations, would not be possible." For even when the concealing power is destroyed, there is no immediate liberation because the primal ignorance is not destroyed, and sublation consisting in the removal of ignorance possessing power along with its manifestations with respect to silver and the like is established.