Advaitasiddhi 2.287

2.287

anumānaṃ ca- ahamarthaḥ, anātmā, ahaṃpratyayaviṣayatvāt, śarīravat. na cāhamarthāntargatādhiṣṭhānabhūtacito'pi tatpratyayaviṣayatvāt tatra vyabhicāraḥ, yena rupeṇāhampratyayaviṣayatā, tena rūpeṇa tasyāpyanātmatvāt svarūpeṇāhampratyayaviṣayatvābhāvānna vyabhicāraḥ. ahamarthaḥ, ātmānyaḥ, ahaṃśabdābhidheyatvāt, ahaṃkāraśabdābhidheyavat. na cātrāsiddhiḥ, paryāyatāyā darśitatvāt. na ca- tvayāpyātmano gauro'hamityanātmāropādhiṣṭhānatvaṃ, mā na bhūvaṃ bhūyāsamityādinā paramapremāspadatvaṃ, ahamarthasya svasattāyāṃ prakāśāvyabhicāreṇātmanaḥ svaprakāśatvaṃ coktam, tatsarvamahamarthasyānātmatve na yuktaṃ syāditi- vācyam, idama ivādhiṣṭhānāvacchedakatvenādhiṣṭhānatvokteḥ. paramapremāspadatvamahamarthe ātmaikyāropāt. na caivamanyonyāśrayaḥ, suṣuptikālīnaprakāśāprakāśābhyāṃ vaidharmyeṇa bhedasādhanāt. na cāhamarthapremṇo'nyasya premṇo'nanubhavaḥ, parāmarśasiddhasuṣuptikālīnatādṛśapremānubhavasya sattvāt. na ca ahite hitabuddhyā premotpattidarśane'pi apremāspade pramāspadatāropo na dṛṣṭa iti- vācyam, ahamarthe ātmaikyāropanibandhanaṃ premāspadatvam, na tu svābhāvikamiti brūmaḥ, na tu premāspadatvāropam. ahamarthātmanorbhede'pi ahamarthasya prakāśāvyabhicāraḥ svaprakāśātmasambandhaṃ vinā na ghaṭata iti so'pi tatra pramāṇamiti nāyuktileśo'pi. na ca-

And there is the inference: The referent of 'I' is non-Self, because it is an object of the notion 'I', like the body. Nor is there an inconstancy (vyabhicāra) on the grounds that pure consciousness, which constitutes the substratum included within the referent of 'I', is also the object of that cognition; for under whichever aspect it is the object of the notion 'I', under that aspect it is also non-Self, and as its essential nature it is not the object of the notion 'I', so there is no inconstancy. [Another inference:] The referent of 'I' is distinct from the Self, because it is the designatum of the word 'I', like that which is the designatum of the word 'ahaṅkāra'. Nor is there unestablishedness (asiddhi) here, because their synonymy has been shown. Nor should it be said: "You too have stated that the Self is the substratum of the superimposition of the non-Self in 'I am fair', that it is the object of supreme love through [desires such as] 'May I not cease to be; may I be', and that the Self is self-luminous because the referent of 'I' does not fail to shine whenever it exists; all of this would not be fitting if the referent of 'I' were non-Self." For it is stated to be the substratum in the sense of being the delimitation of the substratum, like the 'this' [in 'this is silver']. It is an object of supreme love because of the superimposition of identity with the Self upon the referent of 'I'. Nor is there mutual dependence in this manner, because their difference is established through the dissimilarity between manifestation and non-manifestation at the time of deep sleep. Nor is there a non-experience of any love other than love for the referent of 'I', because such an experience of love at the time of deep sleep, established by subsequent recollection, exists. Nor should it be said: "Although the arising of love is observed toward what is non-beneficial through the notion that it is beneficial, the superimposition of the status of being the object of love upon an object that is not an object of love is not observed." For we say that being an object of love is conditioned by the superimposition of identity with the Self upon the referent of 'I', not that it is intrinsic, and not that there is a superimposition of the status of being an object of love. Even though there is a difference between the referent of 'I' and the Self, the constant manifestation of the referent of 'I' is not possible without a relation to the self-luminous Self, and so that too is an instrument of valid knowledge (pramāṇa) in that regard; thus, there is not even a trace of impropriety. Nor can it be argued that—