Advaitasiddhi 2.290

2.290

iti vācaspatyukterantaḥkaraṇagatāpremāspadatvasyaivātmani pratītyāpattiriti- vācyam, kimadhiṣṭhānagatadharmasyāropye'bhānamāpādyate? āropyagatadharmasyādhiṣṭhāne bhānaṃ vā? nādyaḥ, yaddharmavattayā jñāyamāne adhiṣṭhāne āropyanivṛttistasyaivāropye'bhānaniyamena prakṛte tadabhāvāt. na dvitīyaḥ, adhiṣṭhānagatadharmapratītyavirodhinaḥ āropyagatasyādhiṣṭhāne bhāne'pi prakṛte avirodhāt. ātmaikyādhyāsakāla eva premāspadatvasambhavenāropye'pi apremāspadatvāpratīteḥ kuto viṣaye tatpratītiḥ? yathā idamiti rajatādhyāsakāla eva rajate anidantvāpratītiḥ. yattu- kaiścit parihriyate- sukhānubhavarūpasyātmano ahamarthāt bhedenaiva sukhamanubhavāmītyādau pratītiḥ- iti, tanna, vaiṣayikasukhānubhavasyātmānyatvāt. na ca- mokṣe ahamarthābhāvenātmanāśo mokṣa iti bāhyamatāpattiḥ, premāspadasyāhamarthasya tvanmate'pi nāśāt, tadanyasya śūnyasya tanmate'pyanāśāditi- vācyam; aupādhikapremāspadanāśena bāhyamatapraveśāpattau śarīranāśe'pi tadāpatteḥ. etāvatāhamarthasya muktyananvaye'pi `māmamṛtaṃ kṛdhi' `jyotirahaṃ virajā vipāpmā bhūyāsamiti śrutirapi caitanyagatamevāmṛtatvaṃ viṣayīkaroti, `ahaṃ puṣṭaḥ syā'mitīccheva svasamayavidyamānaśarīravṛttipuṣṭim. na ca- `śarīraṃ puṣṭaṃ syā'diti śarīramātre puṣṭīcchāvad `ātmamātraṃ muktaṃ syā'ditīcchāyā adarśanena mukteraniṣṭatvāpattiriti- vācyam; icchāsamaye antaḥkaraṇādhyāsasambhavena yadyapi nātmamātragatamuktīcchā, tathāpi viśiṣṭagatamuktīcchāyā eva vivakṣitavivekena viśeṣyamātragatamuktiviṣayatvaparyavasānāt tasyāmiṣṭatvopapatteḥ. na cāhamarthasyāntaḥkaraṇagranthitve `mama mana iti dhīrna syāt; cidacid‌granthirahaṅkāraḥ, acinmātramantaḥkaraṇam iti bhedena ṣaṣṭhyupapatteḥ. na caivaṃ- `manaḥ sphurati mano'stī' tyādijñānādahamiti jñānasya vaiṣamyānubhavo na syāt, cidacitsambalanaviṣayatvāviśeṣāditi- vācyam, saṃvalanaṃ hi na sambandhamātram, kintu tādātmyena pratibhāsaḥ. sa ca tatra nāstīti viśeṣāt.

from this statement of Vācaspati, it would follow that non-lovableness residing in the internal organ would indeed appear in the Self. For is it being urged that an attribute belonging to the substratum does not appear in the superimposed? Or that an attribute belonging to the superimposed appears in the substratum? Not the first: for the rule that an attribute does not appear in the superimposed applies only to that attribute the knowledge of whose possession in the substratum cancels the superimposed, and in the present case there is no such factor. Not the second: because even when an attribute belonging to the superimposed that is not opposed to the cognition of the attribute of the substratum appears in the substratum, there is no opposition in the present case. Since being the object of love is possible at the very time of the superimposition of identity with the Self, non-lovableness is not perceived even in the superimposed; whence then its perception in the substrate? Just as at the very time of the superimposition of silver in 'this', the non-'this'-ness is not perceived in the silver. As for the solution offered by some—that the Self, which is of the nature of the experience of happiness, is perceived as distinct from the referent of 'I' in 'I experience happiness' and so forth—that is not correct, because the experience of objective pleasure is distinct from the Self. Nor should it be said: "Since in liberation the referent of 'I' is absent, liberation would be the destruction of the Self, which entails entering into the view of the externalists [Buddhists]; for the referent of 'I', which is the object of love, is destroyed even in your view, while the void (śūnya), which is distinct from it, is not destroyed even in their view." For if entering into the view of the externalists were entailed by the destruction of an adventitious object of love, it would follow even upon the destruction of the body. Even though to this extent the referent of 'I' does not continue into liberation, scripture too—in 'Make me immortal' and 'May I become light, free from taint, free from sin'—takes as its object only the immortality belonging to pure consciousness, just as the desire 'May I be stout' [takes as its object] the stoutness residing in the body that exists at its own time. Nor should it be said: "Since we do not observe a desire 'May the Self alone be liberated', like the desire for stoutness in the body alone as 'May the body be stout', liberation would entail being non-desirable." For although at the time of desire a desire for liberation belonging to the Self alone does not occur because of the possibility of superimposition of the internal organ, nonetheless, through the intended discernment, the desire for liberation belonging to the qualified entity culminates in having as its object liberation belonging to the pure qualificand alone; hence its desirability is established. Nor, if the referent of 'I' is a knot of the internal organ, would the cognition 'my mind' be impossible; for the genitive is accounted for by the difference, namely: the ego-maker (ahaṅkāra) is a knot of the conscious and the non-conscious, while the internal organ is pure non-consciousness. Nor in this way should it be said: "There would be no experience of difference between the cognition 'I' and cognitions like 'the mind shines' or 'the mind exists', because there is no distinction in having for their object an entanglement of the conscious and the non-conscious." For entanglement is indeed not mere relation, but an appearance as identical (tādātmya); and that does not exist there: hence there is a difference.