Advaitasiddhi 2.291

2.291

nanu- sarvāpi bhrāntirdvyaṃśaviṣayā; anyathā niradhiṣṭhānakabhramāpatteḥ, na ca `aha'miti buddheḥ dvyaṃśatvamanubhūyate. kalpyate cet, ātmeti buddherapi dvyaṃśatvaṃ kalpyatāmiti- cenna, kimidaṃ dvyaṃśaviṣayatvam? adhiṣṭhānāropyaviṣayatvaṃ cettarhīṣṭāpattiḥ, ahamarthamithyātvasyaiva dvitīyāṃśaviṣayatve pramāṇatvāt. ātmetyatra tu dvyaṃśaviṣayatve naivaṃ pramāṇamasti, yena tathā kalpyate. na ca dvyaṃśaviṣayatvaṃ bhinnabhinnaprakārāvacchinnāropyaviṣayatvam, rajatatvasaṃsargāropanibandhanedaṃrajatamiti pratītau vyabhicārāt. na hi rajatatve'pi tatra kaścana prakāro bhāsate, rajatādestatra prakāratvakalpane mānābhāvāt, tatkalpanāṃ vinaivopapatteḥ, tathā kalpanāyāmatiprasaṅgādaprayojakatvācca. yadvā- atrāpi `ahaṃ sphurāmi' `ahamasmī'ti dvyaṃśatā bhātyeva `rūpyaṃ sphurati' `rūpyamastītyatreva. iyāṃstu viśeṣaḥ- yattatra idaṃtvāvacchinnasphuraṇamadhiṣṭhānamiti idaṃ rūpyamiti dhīḥ, iha tu sphuraṇamātramadhiṣṭhānamiti sphurāmītyeva buddhiḥ. na ca bhramasyāpyadhyastatvenādhiṣṭhānatvāyogaḥ, bhrānto'si, sphuraṇaṃ caitanyaṃ brūmaḥ, na tvavidyāvṛttyādikam. evaṃ ca na pratyakṣamahamarthasyātmatve pramāṇam.

[Objection:] Now, every illusion has a dual-factor object; otherwise, an illusion without a substratum would result. And the cognition of 'I' is not experienced as having two factors. If it is postulated [to have two factors], then let the cognition of the Self also be postulated as having two factors! — [Reply:] If this is said, no. What is this 'having a dual-factor object'? If it is having the substratum and the superimposition as its object, then this is an acceptance of the desired conclusion, because the very falsity of the referent of the 'I' is the means of knowledge for its having a second factor as object. But in the case of the Self, there is no such means of knowledge for its having a dual-factor object by virtue of which it could be postulated in that way. Nor is having a dual-factor object the having as object a superimposition delimited by distinct qualifiers, because of deviation in the case of the cognition 'this is silver' caused by the superimposition of the relation of silverness. For in that case, no qualifier whatsoever appears in silverness, since there is no means of knowledge for postulating silver or the like as a qualifier there, because it is explained even without such a postulation, and because postulating it in that way would lead to overextension and lack of efficacy. Or rather, here too, duality indeed appears as 'I shine' or 'I am', just as in 'silver shines' or 'silver is'. But there is only this difference: in that case, the substratum is shining delimited by this-ness, so the cognition is 'this is silver'; but here, pure shining is the substratum, so the cognition is just 'I shine'. Nor can it be said that since illusion is also superimposed, it cannot be the substratum; you are mistaken: by 'shining' we mean consciousness, not a mental modification of ignorance or the like. And thus, perception is not a means of knowledge for the referent of the 'I' being the Self.