Advaitasiddhi 2.297

2.297

nanu- kartṛtvaṃ yadyanātmadharmaḥ syāt, kathamātmani bhāseta? na ca- japākusumasthaṃ lauhityaṃ sphaṭika ivāntaḥkaraṇagataṃ kartṛtvamātmanyadhyastaṃ, na tu tāttvikam, nirvikāratvaśrutivirodhāt, suṣuptau buddhyabhāve'kartṛtvadarśanācceti- vācyam, evaṃ hi `raktaṃ kusuma'mitivat kadācid manaḥ kartriti pratyakṣapramā `lohitaḥ sphaṭika' itivat caitanyaṃ kartriti bhramaśca syāditi cenna, kartṛtvaviśiṣṭāntaḥkaraṇasya caitanyātmanādhyāsena na tathā pratītiḥ, kusumasya tu sphaṭikātmanā nādhyāsa iti vaiṣamyāt. na ca- adhiṣṭhānātmanā'nadhyastajapākusumasthānīyamupādhiṃ vinā bhīṣaṇatvādiyuktasarpasya rajjvātmaneva kartṛtvādiyuktabuddheścidātmanādhyāse rajjau bhīṣaṇatvāntarasyevātmani kartṛtvāntarasyānadhyāsena sopādhikatvaṃ na syāditi- vācyam, ātmani kartṛtvāntarasyaivādhyāsāt. na ca tarhi kartṛtvadvayasya vivicya pratītiḥ syāt, ātmāntaḥkaraṇayoraikyādhyāsāt. rajjusarpādau adhyasyamānakrūratvādiviśiṣṭasarpāpekṣayā adhikasattākasya sarpāntarasya sambhavena nāyamupādhiḥ, ato nirupādhikatvam. atra tvadhyasyamānāntaḥkaraṇāpekṣayā kartṛtvādidharmaviśiṣṭamanyadadhikasattākaṃ nāstyeveti antaḥkaraṇamatropādhiriti na sopādhikatvānupapattiḥ. na ca evamapi mano na sphuraṇam, kintu sphuratīti tayorbhedadhīdaśāyāṃ pratyekaṃ `raktaṃ kusumaṃ' `sphaṭiko raktaḥ' itivat `manaḥ kartṛ' `caitanyaṃ kartri'ti pratītyāpattiriti- vācyam, tādātmyāropavirodhibhedagrahasyaiva tatprayojakatvāt, prakṛte ca tadabhāvāt. yattvabhedagrahadaśāyāmapi `ayaṃ bhīṣaṇaḥ sarpo bhīṣaṇaḥ, ahaṃ gauraḥ śarīraṃ gaurami'tivat `manaḥ kartṛ' `caitanyaṃ kartri'ti pratītiḥ syāditi, tanna, tādātmyagrahasyaiva pratibandhakasya sattvena dṛṣṭāntasyaivāsampratipatteḥ.

[Objection:] If agency were an attribute of the non-Self, how could it appear in the Self? And it should not be said that, like the redness situated in a hibiscus flower [appearing] in a crystal, agency situated in the internal organ is superimposed on the Self and is not real, because of contradiction with the Vedic texts on changelessness and because non-agency is observed in deep sleep in the absence of the intellect. For in that case, just as in 'the flower is red', there would at some time be the perceptual veridical cognition 'the mind is an agent', and just as in 'the crystal is red', the illusion 'consciousness is an agent' [would occur separately]. — [Reply:] If this is said, no. Because the internal organ qualified by agency is superimposed in identity with consciousness, there is no such cognition; whereas the flower is not superimposed in identity with the crystal—hence there is a disparity. Nor should it be said: 'If the intellect endowed with agency and the like is superimposed in identity with consciousness, like a snake endowed with terrifyingness and the like in identity with a rope, without an adjunct corresponding to the hibiscus flower that is not superimposed in identity with the substratum, then—since another agency is not superimposed on the Self just as another terrifyingness is not [superimposed] on the rope—it would not be conditional [i.e., with an adjunct];' for it is indeed another agency that is superimposed on the Self. Nor could it be said that in that case two agencies would be cognized distinctly, because of the superimposition of identity between the Self and the internal organ. In the case of the rope-snake and the like, because another snake possessing a higher reality is possible in comparison with the snake qualified by cruelty and the like that is being superimposed, this is not an adjunct; therefore it is unconditional. But here, in comparison with the internal organ being superimposed, another [entity] possessing a higher reality and qualified by attributes such as agency does not exist at all; hence the internal organ is an adjunct here, so there is no inconsistency in its being conditional. Nor should it be said: 'Even so, in the state of cognizing the difference between them as "the mind is not the shining, but rather it shines", there would result respectively the cognitions "the mind is an agent" and "consciousness is an agent", just like "the flower is red" and "the crystal is red";' because only that apprehension of difference which is opposed to the superimposition of identity is the cause of that [separate cognition], and in the present case that is absent. As for the claim that even in the state of apprehension of non-difference there would be the cognition 'the mind is an agent' and 'consciousness is an agent', like 'this is terrifying, the snake is terrifying' or 'I am fair, the body is fair'—that is not so, because, since the apprehension of identity itself is present as an obstructor, the very example is not agreed upon.