Advaitasiddhi 2.298

2.298

yadapi sopādhikatve tantratvenādhiṣṭhānasamasattākatvamupādheḥ taddharmasya vā, adhyasyamānāpekṣayādhikasattākatvaṃ vā tayoriti pakṣadvayamudbhāvya prakṛte taddvayaṃ na sambhavatīti dūṣaṇābhidhānam, tadanuktopālambhanam, yadanvayavyatirekānuvidhāyitayā yatpratīyate tadapekṣayā adhikasattākataddharmāśrayāntarābhāvasyaiva sopādhikatve tantratvāt. na caivaṃ kṣīrasampraktanīraikyādhyāsanibandhanakṣīradharmapratītiḥ sopādhikī syāt, tasyāḥ sopādhikatve iṣṭāpatteḥ. nanu- buddhigataṃ kartṛtvaṃ kimahamarthe, ahamarthagataṃ vātmani adhyasyate. ādye āropitasyāpyanarthasyātmanyabhāve tasya bandhamokṣānadhikaraṇatvāpattiḥ, dvitīye anadhyāsenaiva `ahaṃ karte'ti pratīttyupapattau kimadhyāseneti cenna, ahaṅkārastu cidacid‌granthirūpatayā dvyaṃśaḥ. tatrācidaṃśe buddhau kartṛtvasattve'pi tadviśiṣṭāyā buddheścityaikyādhyāsaṃ vinā `ahaṃ karte'ti pratīterayogenādhyāsasyāvaśyakatvāt. etena- āropitakartṛtvasyāpyabhāve ātmano bandhamokṣānadhikaraṇatvaṃ syāditi- nirastam.

As for what was also argued—having raised two alternatives regarding the determinant condition of having an adjunct: either that the adjunct or its attribute possesses reality equal to that of the substratum, or that the two possess reality superior to what is superimposed, and having stated the objection that in the present case neither of the two is possible—that is finding fault with what was never asserted. For the determinant condition of having an adjunct is solely the absence of another substratum for that attribute possessing a degree of reality higher than that which is perceived in accordance with its positive and negative concomitance. Nor does it follow from this that the cognition of the attributes of milk based on the superimposition of identity with water mixed with milk would be conditional on an adjunct, because its having an adjunct is an accepted conclusion. If it is asked: Is agency residing in the intellect superimposed on the referent of 'I', or is that residing in the referent of 'I' superimposed on the self? If the first, since the evil even when superimposed is absent in the self, it would follow that the self is not the locus of bondage and liberation. If the second, since the cognition 'I am the agent' is accounted for without superimposition, what need is there for superimposition?—we reply: No. The ego consists of two parts, being of the nature of a knot of consciousness and insentience. In that regard, even though agency exists in the intellect, which is the insentient part, the cognition 'I am the agent' is impossible without the superimposition of identity of the intellect qualified by that [agency] upon consciousness, and therefore superimposition is indispensable. By this, the objection that 'in the absence of even superimposed agency, the self would not be the locus of bondage and liberation' is refuted.