Advaitasiddhi 2.300

2.300

yadapi buddheḥ kartṛtve karaṇatvaṃ kathamiti? tadapyayuktam, anyatra kartryā eva buddherupalabdhiṃ prati karaṇatvopapatteḥ. na ca kartṛtvādyanartharūpabandhasya buddhigatatvena mokṣasyāpi tadanvayāpattiḥ, anarthatannivṛttyoraikādhikaraṇyaniyamāditi- vācyam, kartṛtvādeścetanagatatayaivānarthatayā buddheranarthānāśrayatvāt. na ca caitanyagatasyānarthatve caitanyasyāpyanarthakoṭau niveśāpattiḥ, ātmasabandhitvenaivānarthasya heyatvenātmano'pi heyatvaṃ sarvamate'pi syāt. āropitatvapuraskāreṇānarthatvābhāvāt nānyonyāśrayaḥ. na ca- śuddhātmanaḥ kadāpi nānarthāśrayatvena pratītiḥ, bhramakāle ahaṃ bhoktā pramākāle buddhirbhoktrīti pratīteriti- vācyam, śuddhasya bhoktṛtvādyanarthānāśrayatve'pi upahitasya śuddhātsvābhāvikabhedābhāvena bandhamokṣasāmānādhikaraṇyopapatteḥ. etena- buddhiḥ śravaṇādikartrīti tasyā eva phalaṃ mokṣo'pi syāditi vācyam, `śāstraphalaṃ prayoktarī'ti nyāyād, anyathā'tiprasaṅgāditi- nirastam,jāteṣṭipitṛyajñayorvyabhicārāt. na ca pūtaputrakatvaṃ svargabhāgipitṛkatvaṃ vā kartṛgatameva phalam, tasya phalatvenāśravaṇāt. na ca tādṛkputrakatvaṃ phalena sambandhaḥ, na tu phalamiti- vācyam, evaṃ hi saṃyuktasamavāyādinā pitranyasyāpi tatphalaṃ syāt, aśāstrīyatvāviśeṣāt. na ca- pitrarthaputragataṃ pūtatvādikaṃ tadanuṣṭhātuḥ pitureva phalam, tena taduddeśāt, na cehātmā antaḥkaraṇārthaḥ yenātmagato mokṣaḥ tasyoddeśyaḥ syāditi- vācyam, ātmā yadyapi nāntaḥkaraṇārthaḥ, ahamarthagatatayā tathāpi phalasyoddeśyatvānubhavād ahamarthasya cātmānātmarūpatvenātmanyapi phale uddesyagatatvānapāyāt. yadvā- āropitānāropitasādhāraṇaṃ kartṛtvameva phalabhāktve prayojakam, taccātmanyastyeva. na ca śarīre'pyāropitakartṛtvena phalabhāktvāpattiḥ, phalaparyantamasattvena phalabhāktvāsambhavāt. na hi kartuḥ phalabhāktvaniyamaṃ brūmaḥ kintu phalabhājaḥ kartṛtvaniyamam, ajanitaphalakarmakartari vyabhicārāt, aprayojaketvācca.

As for the question, 'If the intellect is the agent, how can it be an instrument?'—that too is improper, because it is consistent that the intellect, which is the agent with respect to other things, is an instrument with respect to perception. Nor should it be said that since bondage, which is of the nature of evil such as agency, resides in the intellect, liberation too would have to follow it, by the rule of co-locationality of an evil and its cessation; for agency and the like are evils only as belonging to the conscious entity, and so the intellect is not the locus of evils. Nor does it follow that if what resides in consciousness is an evil, consciousness too would be included within the category of evil; for if an evil were to be abandoned merely by being related to the self, the self too would have to be abandoned in all philosophical systems. There is no mutual dependence, because it is not an evil by virtue of its superimposed status. Nor should it be said that the pure self is never cognised as the locus of evil, since at the time of illusion the cognition is 'I am the enjoyer', and at the time of valid cognition 'the intellect is the enjoyer'; for even though the pure self is not the locus of evils like enjoyership, co-locationality of bondage and liberation is established because the self qualified by adjuncts is not intrinsically distinct from the pure self. By this, the following is refuted: 'The intellect is the agent of hearing and the like, so liberation too, as the result, would belong to it alone, according to the principle that "the result of a scripture belongs to the performer"; otherwise there would be absurd overextension'—for there is an exception in the cases of the Jāteṣṭi and the Pitṛyajña. Nor can it be said that having a purified son or having a father who partakes of heaven is itself the result residing in the agent, for that is not taught in scripture as the result. Nor should it be said that possessing such a son is the relation with the result, not the result itself; for in that case, through conjunction-cum-inherence and the like, that result would belong to someone other than the father as well, since there is no difference in being unscriptural. Nor can it be said that purification and the like residing in the son for the sake of the father is the result for the father alone who performs it, because it is intended by him, whereas here the self is not for the sake of the internal organ such that liberation residing in the self would be its intended object; for although the self is not for the sake of the internal organ, the result is nevertheless experienced as intended in the manner of residing in the referent of 'I', and since the referent of 'I' consists of the self and the non-self, the quality of being in the intended object is not lost in the result even with respect to the self. Alternatively, agency common to the superimposed and the non-superimposed is itself the determinant for being a partaker of the result, and that certainly exists in the self. Nor does it follow that the body too would partake of the result due to superimposed agency, because it cannot partake of the result since it does not exist up to the time of the result. For we do not maintain the invariant rule that the agent partakes of the result, but rather the invariant rule that the partaker of the result is an agent; because there is an exception in the case of an agent of an action that does not produce a result, and because [the former] lacks efficacy.