Advaitasiddhi 2.299

2.299

na ca `kartā śāstrārthavattvādi'tyadhikaraṇe tvayā'pi sāṅkhyarītyā buddheḥ kartṛtve prāpte, jīvasyaiveti siddhāntitatvena virodhaḥ. na cāvivekanibandhanaṃ jīvaniṣṭhatvam, avivekasya sāṅkhyamate'pi sattvāditi- vācyam, buddhereva kartṛtvam, bhoktṛtvaṃ caitanyasyeti pūrvapakṣaṃ kṛtvā kartṛtvabhoktṛtvayoraikādhikaraṇyaniyamena bhoktṛtvavat kartṛtvamapyaṅgīkartavyamityuktam, na tu buddheḥ akartṛtvaṃ ātmano vā svābhāvikaṃ kartṛtvaṃmiti. `yathā ca takṣobhayathā' ityuttarādhikaraṇe pūrvādhikaraṇoktasyātmakartṛtvasya svābhāvikatvapūrvapakṣe aupādhikatvasya sthāpitatvāt. ato na tadadhikaraṇavirodhaḥ.

Nor should it be said that there is a contradiction with the aphorism, 'The agent [is the self], because the scriptures have meaning, etc.', where, after the agency of the intellect had been obtained according to the Sāṅkhya method, it was established as the final conclusion even by you that [agency belongs] to the individual self alone; nor should it be said that its residing in the individual self is caused by non-discrimination, because non-discrimination exists in the Sāṅkhya doctrine as well. For, having raised the prima facie view that agency belongs to the intellect alone while enjoyership belongs to consciousness, it was stated that agency too must be accepted just like enjoyership by the rule of co-locationality of agency and enjoyership, but not that the intellect is a non-agent or that the self's agency is intrinsic. Because in the subsequent section, 'And as the carpenter in both ways', when the prima facie view maintained the intrinsic nature of the self's agency stated in the previous section, its nature of having an adjunct was established. Therefore, there is no contradiction with that section.