Advaitasiddhi 2.7

2.7

paramāṇvādeścāparokṣatvāpātāditi- cet,na. viṣayeṣvabhivyaktaciduparāge na tadākāratvamātraṃ tantram, parokṣasthale'pi prasaṅgāt, kiṃtu tatsaṃśleṣaḥ. prabhāyā viṣayasannikṛṣṭatejastvenāvaraṇābhibhāvakatvadarśanāt. taijasasya manaso'pyajñānarūpāvaraṇābhibhavāya tatsaṃśleṣa āvaśyakaḥ. dhruvādidehamadhyavartiparamāṇvādāvatiprasaṅgastu tadākāratvaprayojakasāmagrīvirahādeva pariharaṇīyaḥ. anyathendriyasannikarṣādervidyamānatvāt paramāṇvādyākaratāyā durnivāratvāpatteḥ. tasmāt prabhāvadaviśeṣānvayavyatirekābhyāṃ yat klṛptaṃ sannikṛṣṭatejastvenāvaraṇābhibhāvakatvaṃ, tasya tadākāratvarūpaviśeṣāpekṣāyāmapi na tyāgaḥ. na hi pṛthivītvagandhatvādinā kāryakāraṇabhāve āvaśyake anityaguṇatvadravyatvādinā tattyāgaḥ. ata eva- taditarahetusākalye sati ghaṭacakṣuḥsannikarṣasyaiva ghaṭānubhavajanakatvam, na tu ghaṭamanaḥsannikarṣasya, tadvilambena tadvilambābhāvāditi nirastam. āvaraṇabhaṅge sannikṛṣṭatejaḥkāraṇatvāvadhāraṇena tasyāpyāvaśyakatvāt. na ca spārśanapratyakṣe cakṣurādivanniyatagolakadvārābhāvenāntaḥkaraṇanirgatyayogādāvaraṇābhibhavānupapattiriti vācyam. sarvatra tattadindriyādhiṣṭhānasyaiva dvāratvasambhavāt. na ca antaḥkaraṇavṛttitvāviśeṣādicchādveṣādirūpavṛttayo'pi dehānnirgatya viṣayasaṃsṛṣṭā bhavantīti kathaṃ na svīkriyata iti vācyam. āvaraṇābhibhāvakatejastvasya tatpramāpakasya jñānavat tatrābhāvāt.

If [the opponent] says: "No, because it is not merely taking the form of the object that is the determinant for the association of manifest consciousness with objects—for then [direct perception] would absurdly apply in the case of mediate [cognition] as well—but rather contact with it. For light is observed to overpower the veil [of darkness] by virtue of being luminous substance in contact with the object. For the mind, which is also composed of light, contact with it is necessary to overpower the veil consisting of ignorance. As for the over-extension to atoms and the like lying between the body and the Pole Star and so on, that is to be averted precisely because of the absence of the causal complex bringing about [a mental mode] having their form. Otherwise, since sense contact and so forth are present, taking the form of atoms and so forth would absurdly be unavoidable. Therefore, just as with light, the capacity to overpower the veil by being luminous substance in contact [with the object]—which is established by generic positive and negative concomitance—is not abandoned even while depending on the particular condition of having the form of that [object]. For an indispensable causal relation [established] through earthness and odorness is not abandoned through non-eternal qualityness, substanceness, and the like. For this very reason, the view that—when all other causes are present—it is only the contact of the eye with the pot that produces the experience of the pot, and not the contact of the mind with the pot, because there is no delay corresponding to a delay of the latter, is refuted; for this too is necessary, since luminous substance in contact is ascertained to be a cause in the destruction of the veil. Nor should it be said that in tactile perception, because there is no fixed bodily orifice like the eye and so on, the mind cannot go out, and thus the overpowering of the veil would be untenable; for in all cases, the seat of the respective sense organ itself can serve as the orifice. Nor should it be said: 'Since they are indistinguishably modes of the internal organ, why is it not admitted that modes in the form of desire, aversion, and so forth also go out from the body and come into contact with the object?' For luminous substance that overpowers the veil, which is the instrument of that [apprehension], does not exist there as it does in the case of knowledge."