Advaitasiddhi 2.8

2.8

nanu ghaṭaprakāśakaṃ caitanyamupadeśasāhasryanusāreṇa ghaṭākāradhīsthā cidvā? parāgarthaprameyeṣvityādivārttikoktarītyā dhīpratibimbacaitanyābhedābhivyaktaviṣayādhiṣṭhānacaitanyaṃ vā? nādyaḥ. ādhyāsikasambandhasyātantratāpātāt. na dvitīyaḥ. āvaśyakena viṣayasaṃśliṣṭavṛttipratibimbitacaitanyenaiva tadajñānanivṛttivat tatprakāśasyāpyupapattau kiṃ viṣayādhiṣṭhānacaitanyābhivyaktikalpaneneti cenna. prakāśakaṃ tāvad adhiṣṭhānacaitanyam. taccādhyāsena viṣayaiḥ saha sākṣātsambaddham. prakāśasya ca svayaṃ bhāsamānasya svasambaddhasarvabhāsakatvamapi klṛptameva. etadanabhyupagame kalpanāntare gauravāpatteḥ. taccānabhivyaktaṃ nirvikalpakarūpamācchāditadīpavanna prakāśakamiti tadabhivyaktirapekṣitā. tacca parokṣasthale vṛttyavacchedenaivābhivyajyate. aparokṣasthale tu vṛttisamparkādāpannajāḍyābhibhave viṣayo'bhivyajyate, vṛtterviṣayaparyantatvāt. na ca parokṣasthale'pyevaṃ prasaṅgaḥ. dvārābhāvenāntaḥkaraṇanirgatyabhāvāt. nanu- vṛttestadākāratvaṃ na tāvattadviṣayatvam. tvayaiva nirāsāt. nāpi tasmin caitanyoparāgayogyatāpādakatvaṃ, tadajñānābhibhāvakatvaṃ vā. ubhayorapi tadākāratvaprayojyatvena tattvāyogāt. nāpi ghaṭādivat pṛthubudhnodarādyākāratvaṃ, sākāravādāpātāt. saṃsthānahīnajātiguṇādivṛtternirākāratvaprasaṅgācca. ghaṭapaṭāviti samūhālasbane viruddhanānākāratvāpatteśceti cenna. astītyāditadviṣayakavyavahārapratibandhakājñānanivartanayogyatvasya, tatsannikṛṣṭakaraṇajanyatvasya vā tadākāratvarūpatvāt. tadubhayaṃ ca svakāraṇādhīnasvabhāvaviśeṣāt. na cātmāśrayaḥ. nivṛttijananasvarūpayogyatayā phalopadhānasya sādhyatvena svānapekṣaṇāt.

[The opponent asks:] "Now, is the consciousness that illumines the pot the consciousness residing in the thought having the form of the pot, according to the *Upadeśasāhasrī*? Or is it the consciousness of the substratum of the object, manifested through non-difference from the consciousness reflected in thought, in the manner stated in the *Vārttika* beginning 'Regarding the knowables of outward objects…'? Not the first, for the superimpositional relation would absurdly become non-essential. Not the second, because if the illumination of that [object] can be accounted for by the necessary consciousness reflected in the mode that is in contact with the object—just as the removal of its ignorance is—what is the point of postulating the manifestation of the consciousness of the object's substratum?" / If this is said, we reply: No. First, the illuminator is the substratum-consciousness. And that is directly related to objects through superimposition. And for light, which is itself self-shining, it is already established that it illumines everything connected to itself. If this is not accepted, there would be the fault of heaviness in postulating another [mechanism]. And that, unmanifest and of indeterminate nature, is not illuminative, like a covered lamp; therefore, its manifestation is required. And that, in the case of mediate cognition, is manifested solely as delimited by the mode. In the case of direct perception, however, when the insentience that has befallen it is overpowered due to contact with the mode, the object is manifested, because the mode extends all the way to the object. Nor would this absurdly apply in the case of mediate cognition as well, because there is no departure of the internal organ due to the absence of an orifice. / If it is objected: "The mode's 'having the form of that' is not, to begin with, its having that as its object, because that has been refuted by you yourself. Nor is it bringing about fitness for the association of consciousness in it, nor is it overpowering the ignorance of it; for neither can be that, since both are produced by having the form of that. Nor is it having a broad base, belly, and so on like a pot and the like, for that would entail the doctrine of cognition having objective form, and because it would absurdly follow that a mode regarding formless universals, qualities, and the like would be formless, and because in an aggregate cognition such as 'pot and cloth' contradictory multiple forms would absurdly follow"—if this is objected, we say: No. For having the form of that consists in the fitness to remove the ignorance that obstructs the conventional usage regarding that object such as 'it exists', or in being produced by an instrument in contact with that. And both of these are due to a particular intrinsic nature dependent upon their own causes. Nor is there mutual dependence [or self-dependence], because the actual realization of the result is what is to be proved through the intrinsic fitness to produce the removal, and hence does not depend on itself.