Sarvadarshanasangraha 2.122

2.122

kecana bauddhāḥ: bāhyeṣu gandhādiṣv āntareṣu rūpādiskandheṣu satsv api tatrānāsthām utpādayituṃ sarvaṃ śūnyam iti prāthamikān vineyān acakathad bhagavān dvitīyāṃs tu vijñānamātragrahāviṣṭān vijñānam evaikaṃ sad iti tṛtīyān ubhayaṃ satyam ity āsthitān vijñeyam anumeyam iti seyaṃ viruddhā bhāṣeti varṇayantaḥ: vaibhāṣikākhyayā khyātāḥ/ eṣā hi teṣāṃ paribhāṣā samunmiṣati/ vijñeyānumeyatvavāde prātyakṣikasya kasyacid apy arthasyābhāvena vyāptisaṃvedanasthānābhāvenānumānapravṛttyanupapattiḥ sakalalokānubhavavirodhaś ca/ tataś cārtho dvividhaḥ: grāhyo ´dhyavaseyaś ca/ tatra grahaṇaṃ nirvikalpakarūpaṃ pramāṇam/ kalpanāpoḍhatvāt/ adhyavasāyaḥ savikalpakarūpo ´pramāṇam/ tad uktam:

Certain Bauddhas, though there exist the external world, consisting of odours, &c., and the internal, consisting of colours, &c., in order to produce unbelief in these, declared the universe to be a void. These the venerated Buddha styled Prāthamika (primary) disciples. A second school, attached to the apprehension of sensations only, maintain that sensation is the only reality. A third school, who contend that both are true (the internal and the external), and maintain that sensible objects are inferrible. Others hold all this to be absurd language (viruddhā bhāshā), and are known under the designation of Vaibhāshikas. Their technical language springs up as follows:—According to the doctrine of inferrible sensibles, there being no perceptible object, and consequently no object from which a universal rule can be attained, it will be impossible that any illation should take place, and therefore a contradiction will emerge to the consciousness of all mankind. Objects, therefore, are of two kinds, sensible and cogitable. Of these apprehension is a non-discriminative instrument of knowledge as other than mere representation; cognition which is discriminative is not a form of evidence, as being a merely ideal cognition. Therefore it has been said—