Sarvadarshanasangraha 2.122

2.122

Certain Buddhists, declaring: 'Although external things like smell and internal aggregates like form exist, the Blessed One, in order to generate indifference toward them, taught the primary pupils that everything is empty; to the second group, who were seized by the grasp of mere consciousness, he taught that consciousness alone is real; but to the third group, who maintained that both are real, [they maintain] that the knowable is inferable, which is a contradictory discourse'—are known by the name of Vaibhāṣikas. For this is the definition that emerges among them: in the doctrine that the knowable is inferable, because there is no perceived object whatsoever, there is no place to grasp pervasion, so inference cannot function, and there is contradiction with the experience of all people. Therefore, an object is of two kinds: the directly apprehended and the conceptually determined. Between them, direct apprehension, being indeterminate, is a means of valid cognition, because it is free from conceptual construction. Conceptual determination, being determinate, is not a means of valid cognition. Thus it has been said: