Sarvadarshanasangraha 2.6

2.6

māivaṃ vocaḥ/ vināpi kāraṇaṃ kāryam utpadyatām ity evaṃvidhāyāḥ śaṅkāyā vyāghātāvadhikatayā nivṛttatvāt/ tad eva hy āśaṅkyeta yasminn āśaṅkyamāne vyāghātādayo nāvatareyuḥ/ tad uktam: vyāghātāvadhir āśaṅkā iti/ tasmāt tadutpattiniścayenāvinābhāvo niścīyate/ tadutpattiniścayaś ca kāryahetvoḥ pratyakṣopalambhānupalambhapañcakanibandhanaḥ/ (1) kāryasyotpatteḥ prāg anupalambhaḥ (2-3) kāraṇopalambhe saty upalambhaḥ (4-5) upalabdhasya paścāt kāraṇānupalambhād anupalambhaḥ iti pañcakāraṇyā dhūmadhūmadhvajayoḥ kāryakāraṇabhāvo niścīyate/ tathā tādātmyaniścayenāpy avinābhāvo niścīyate/ yadi śiṃśapā vṛkṣatvam atipatet svātmānam eva jahyād iti vipakṣe bādhakapravṛtteḥ/ apravṛtte tu bādhake bhūyaḥ sahabhāvopalambhe ´pi vyabhicāraśaṅkāyāḥ ko nivārayitā/ śiṃśapāvṛkṣayoś ca tādātmyaniścayo vṛkṣo ´yaṃ śiṃśapeti sāmānādhikaraṇyabalād upapadyate/ na hy atyantābhede tat saṃbhavati/ paryāyatvena yugapat prayogāyogāt/ nāpy atyantabhede/ gavāśvayor anupalambhāt/ tasmāt kāryātmānau kāraṇātmānāv anumāpayata iti siddham/

1. By ascertainment of an effectuation, then, of that (viz., of the designate of the middle) is ascertained the invariable concomitance (of the major); and the ascertainment of such effectuation may arise from the well-known series of five causes, in the perceptive cognition or non-cognition of cause and effect. That fire and smoke, for instance, stand in the relation of cause and effect is ascertained by five indications, viz., (1.) That an effect is not cognised prior to its effectuation, that (2.) the cause being perceived (3.) the effect is perceived, and that after the effect is cognised (4.) there is its non-cognition, (5.) when the (material) cause is no longer cognised.

2. In like manner an invariable concomitance is ascertained by the ascertainment of identity (e.g., a sisu-tree is a tree, or wherever we observe the attributes of a sisu we observe also the attribute arboreity), an absurdity attaching to the contrary opinion, inasmuch as if a sisu-tree should lose its arboreity it would lose its own self. But, on the other hand, where there exists no absurdity, and where a (mere) concomitance is again and again observed, who can exclude all doubt of failure in the concomitance? An ascertainment of the identity of sisu and tree is competent in virtue of the reference to the same object (i.e., predication),—This tree is a sisu. For reference to the same object (predication) is not competent where there is no difference whatever (e.g., to say, "A jar is a jar," is no combination of diverse attributes in a common subject), because the two terms cannot, as being synonymous, be simultaneously employed; nor can reference to the same object take place where there is a reciprocal exclusion (of the two terms), inasmuch as we never find, for instance, horse and cow predicated the one of the other.

It has thus been evinced that an effect or a self-same supposes a cause or a self-same (as invariable concomitants).

On the hypothesis (of the Naiyāyikas) that it is concomitance and non-concomitance (e.g., A is where B is, A is not where B is not) that determine an invariable connection, the unconditional attendance of the major or the middle term would be unascertainable, it being impossible to exclude all doubt with regard to instances past and future, and present but unperceived. If one (a Naiyāyika) rejoin that uncertainty in regard to such instances is equally inevitable on our system, we reply: Say not so, for such a supposition as that an effect may be produced without any cause would destroy itself by putting a stop to activity of any kind; for such doubts alone are to be entertained, the entertainment of which does not implicate us in practical absurdity and the like, as it has been said, "Doubt terminates where there is a practical absurdity."[2]