Sarvadarshanasangraha 2.7

2.7

yadi kaścit prāmāṇyam anumānasya nāṅgīkuryāt taṃ prati brūyāt/ anumānaṃ pramāṇaṃ na bhavatīty etāvanmātram ucyate tatra na kiṃcana sādhanam upanyasyata upanyasyate vā/ na prathamaḥ/ aśiraskavacanasyopanyāse sādhyāsiddheḥ/

If a man does not allow that inference is a form of evidence, pramāṇa, one may reply: You merely assert thus much, that inference is not a form of evidence: do you allege no proof of this, or do you allege any? The former alternative is not allowable according to the maxim that bare assertion is no proof of the matter asserted. Nor is the latter alternative any better, for if while you assert that inference is no form of evidence, you produce some truncated argument (to prove, i.e., infer, that it is none), you will be involved in an absurdity, just as if you asserted your own mother to be barren. Besides, when you affirm that the establishment of a form of evidence and of the corresponding fallacious evidence results from their homogeneity, you yourself admit induction by identity. Again, when you affirm that the dissentiency of others is known by the symbolism of words, you yourself allow induction by causality. When you deny the existence of any object on the ground of its not being perceived, you yourself admit an inference of which non-perception is the middle term. Conformably it has been said by Tathāgata—