Sarvadarshanasangraha 3.24

3.24

nanu mā bhūj jaḍatāyā grahaṇam/ kiṃ naś chinnam/ tadagrahaṇe ´pi nīlākāragrahaṇe tayor bhedo ´nekānto vā bhavet/ nīlākāragrahaṇe cāgṛhītā jaḍatā kathaṃ tasya svarūpaṃ syāt/ aparathā gṛhītasya stambhasyāgṛhītaṃ trailokyam api rūpaṃ bhavet/ tad etat prameyajātaṃ prabhācandraprabhṛtibhir arhanmatānusāribhiḥ prameyakamalamārtaṇḍādau (p. 27) prabandhe prapañcitam iti granthabhūyatvabhayān nopanyastam/

All this collection of topics for proof has been discussed at full length by the Jaina authors, Pratāpacandra and others, in the Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa, &c., and is here omitted for fear of swelling the book too much.

If, in your wish to escape this difficulty, you assert that "the perception does not follow the object in being insentient," then there would be no perception that the object is insentient,[6] and so it is a case of the proverb, "While he looks for one thing which he has lost, another drops." "But what harm will it be if there is no perception of a thing's being insentient?" [We reply], that if its being insentient is not perceived, while its blue form is perceived, the two may be quite distinct [and as different from each other as a jar and cloth], or it may be a case of "indeterminateness" [so that the two may be only occasionally found together, as smoke with fire]. And again, if insentience is not perceived contemporaneously with the blue form, how could there then be conformity between them [so that both the blue and the insentience should together constitute the character of the thing?] We might just as well maintain that, on perceiving a post, the unperceived universe entered into it as also constituting its character.[7]