Sarvadarshanasangraha 15

English (machine translation) 15

Language: English

15.1

Now is set forth the view of those who follow the opinion of sages such as Patañjali, the promulgators of the theistic Sāṃkhya.

Among them, the Yoga treatise, which bears the secondary name Sāṃkhyapravacana and was composed by Patañjali, consists of four chapters. There, in the first chapter, having made the initial statement to undertake the Yoga treatise in the words “Now the instruction on Yoga,” and having stated the definition of yoga in the words “Yoga is the cessation of the fluctuations of the mind,” the venerable Patañjali taught meditative absorption in detail. In the second, by the words “Austerity, self-study, and devotion to God are the yoga of action,” [he taught] the yoga of action for the distracted mind and the five external means beginning with restraints. In the third, by the words “Fixation of the mind on a place is concentration,” [he taught] the triad of concentration, meditation, and meditative absorption, which are internal and designated by the term ‘constraint,’ and the collection of supernormal powers which are intermediate fruits thereof. In the fourth, by the words “Supernormal powers are born of birth, herbs, mantras, austerities, or meditative absorption,” proceeding with an exposition of the fivefold supernormal powers, [he taught] isolation, which is the supreme goal. The twenty-five principles beginning with the primordial source are accepted as established by the ancient [Sāṃkhya]. But the twenty-sixth principle is the Supreme Lord, a spirit untouched by afflictions, actions, fruits of action, and latent impressions, who, assuming an illusory body by his own will, is the initiator of worldly and Vedic traditions and is compassionate to living beings burning in the charcoal of cyclic existence.

15.3

Now, it may be asked: How is the state of being tormented possible for that [spirit] which is untainted like a lotus leaf, on account of which the Supreme Lord is accepted as a benefactor? In response, it is said: The sattva itself, transformed in the form of the intellect, is the object to be tormented by rajas, which is the tormentor; thus, when sattva is tormented, by virtue of superimposing that [torment], the spirit too, immersing itself in nondifference from it, is said to be tormented. This has been stated by the teachers:

15.4

“Sattva, transformed into the intellect, is the object of torment; those states which belong to rajas are the tormentors;

15.5

and the self is said to be the tormented one in the mental fluctuation that is tāmasa and apprehends non-difference from the object of torment.”

15.6

Thus. Pañcaśikha also said: “For the power of consciousness, non-transforming and non-transmissible, appearing to be transmitted into a transforming object, conforms to its mental fluctuation.” ‘The power of the experiencer’ refers to the power of consciousness. And that is the self itself. “Appearing to be transmitted into a transforming object,” namely the intellect-principle, means appearing to be reflected; “conforms to its mental fluctuation” means that the power of consciousness reflected in the intellect, through acquiring the reflection of the intellect, imitates the fluctuations of the intellect—this is the sense. Likewise: “Though pure, the spirit beholds the cognitive state of the intellect; beholding it, though not of its nature, it appears to be of its nature.” When, through the performance of the eightfold yoga consisting of restraints, observances, and so forth, undertaken with reverence, uninterruptedly, and for a long time, and through devotion to the Supreme Lord, the undistorted discernment of the difference between sattva and the spirit has arisen for the spirit that is being tormented in this way, the five afflictions beginning with nescience are ground down to their roots. And the karmic latencies, good and evil, are destroyed at their roots. And then, the untainted spirit’s abiding in its own isolated state is isolation—this is established.

15.7

There, by the first aphorism, “Now the instruction on Yoga,” the four preliminary factors consisting of the subject matter, the purpose, the connection, and the qualified aspirant, which are subsidiary to the engagement of wise people, are set forth.

15.8

Here, the word “now” (atha) is accepted in the sense of undertaking. Since the word “now” can have many meanings, how could there be partiality toward the view of the meaning of undertaking? That the word “now” has many meanings, such as auspiciousness, is taught by the Nāmaliṅgānuśāsana:

15.9

“The words atho and atha are used in the senses of auspiciousness, immediate sequence, undertaking, inquiry, and completeness.”

15.10

Thus. Even though inquiry and completeness are impossible here, because of the possibility of four meanings—namely, immediate sequence, auspiciousness, reference to what was previously treated, and undertaking—the sense of undertaking is untenable. If this is urged—

15.11

Do not think so, because it does not withstand alternatives. On the view that immediate sequence is the meaning of the word “now,” is it immediate sequence after just anything, or immediate sequence after an uncommon cause, such as previously acquired tranquility and the like? Not the first,

15.12

“For no one ever remains even for a moment without performing an action” —

15.13

by this principle, every living creature inevitably does something after having done something, so that [sequence] would be obtained even without being stated, which would result in the uselessness of employing the word “now” in that sense. Nor the second: even if yoga takes place immediately after tranquility and the like, since it is taken as an accessory to the undertaking of the instruction, it lacks grammatical primacy. Nor should it be said: why could not immediate sequence after tranquility and the like belong to the instruction, which is grammatically primary, as the meaning of the word “now”? For “instruction” means the treatise, by the etymological derivation: “that by which yoga—along with its definitions, divisions, means, and fruits—is instructed, that is, explained, is instruction.” And because instruction occurs immediately after the desire to make known the knowledge of reality, there is no necessary rule that it follows tranquility, restraint, and the like. But immediate sequence after tranquility and the like is handed down by tradition in the case of the desire to know and knowledge, in such passages as: “Therefore, having become tranquil, self-restrained, quiet, patient, and concentrated, one should see the self in the self alone.”

15.14

Nor is immediate sequence after the desire to make known the knowledge of reality the meaning of the word “now”; for even if that were possible, it is not something to be stated because it serves no purpose in the hearer’s comprehension and engagement. For you too, is the instruction on yoga known by valid cognition as the cause of the highest good, or not? On the first alternative, even in the absence of that [desire of the teacher], it would be worthy of adoption. On the second alternative, even in the presence of that, it would be worthy of rejection. And its being the cause of the highest good is known by valid cognition.

15.15

“Realising the God through the attainment of contemplative union with the inner self, the wise person leaves behind joy and sorrow,”

15.16

from scripture;

15.17

and, “When your intellect stands unshakeable in absorption, then you will attain yoga,”

15.18

from traditional text. For this very reason, [the view that the word *atha* denotes] succession after a disciple's question, ascetic practice, the use of elixirs, or the like is refuted. But in [the sūtra] “Now, therefore, the inquiry into Brahman,” because an inquiry into Brahman cannot be a topic undertaken [as an instruction], the meaning of “commencement” was abandoned, and Śaṅkarācārya established that the meaning of the word *atha* is succession after tranquility, self-restraint, and the like prescribed in the texts on tranquility, self-restraint, and so forth, in order to supply a qualified aspirant endowed with the group of four prerequisites.

15.19

Now, let it be granted that the word *atha* does not mean succession; why should it not mean an auspicious blessing? It cannot, because an auspicious blessing cannot be construed in the sentence-meaning. An auspicious blessing is the attainment of a desired object that is not censured, and a desired object is accepted as consisting in the attainment of pleasure and the avoidance of pain. And since the teaching on yoga is neither pleasure nor the cessation of pain, it is not an auspicious blessing. Thus, [the sentence] cannot mean “the teaching on yoga is an auspicious blessing.” Moreover, since the hearing of the word *atha* is an effect, like the sound of a clay drum, it is impossible for an auspicious blessing to be the primary or implied meaning [of the word]. Just as a matter implied by the context does not enter into the literal sentence-meaning, so too an effect would not enter [it], since both equally lack the status of being a word-meaning. For only a word-meaning is syntactically connected in the sentence-meaning. Otherwise, for those who take verbal testimony as a means of valid cognition, the rule that “a verbal syntactic expectancy is fulfilled only by a verbal expression” would be breached.

15.20

Now, it may be objected: an auspicious rite should be performed at the beginning of a treatise in order to pacify the host of obstacles impeding the completion of the work one is about to undertake, and to observe the conduct of the virtuous; as the authoritative statement says: “Treatises that have an auspicious beginning, an auspicious middle, and an auspicious end spread far; their authors live long lives and become powerful men.” And the word *atha* has an auspicious sense, [as in:]

15.21

“The syllable *oṃ* and the word *atha*—these two formerly

15.22

burst forth from the throat of Brahmā; therefore both are auspicious,”

15.23

since this traditional text exists. And so, just like the words *vṛddhi* and the like in [the rule] “*vṛddhir ādaic*,” the word *atha* should serve the purpose of an auspicious blessing. If this is urged, do not say so: for the word *atha*, employed to convey another meaning, logically produces the result of an auspicious blessing by its mere audition, like the sound of a lute or a flute. If it is asked: how can the word *atha*, whose fruit is the cognition of the sentence-meaning introducing another topic, have a different fruit? [We say] that is not so; for this is possible just like the sighting of a water-jar being carried for another purpose. Nor is there a contradiction with the traditional text, because it applies with the intention of expressing that it has an auspicious purpose.

15.24

Nor does the word *atha* denote reference to what was previously under discussion, because, as it is not practically distinct from succession, the fault stated earlier would ensue; and because, although that might be possible in an interrogative sentence presenting an alternative such as “Does this word *atha* mean commencement or does it mean succession?”, it is impossible in the present case.

15.25

Therefore, by elimination, it is stated that the specific meaning of the word *atha* is commencement, which is denoted by the word “undertaking” (*adhikāra*). Just as in [the Vedic passage] “Now (*atha*) this light, now (*atha*) this all-light,” the word *atha* is accepted as meaning the commencement of a particular sacrifice, and just as in “Now (*atha*) the instruction on words,” the word *atha* has the sense of undertaking the science of grammar, so it is here. This was stated in Vyāsa’s commentary devoted to explaining the *Yoga-sūtra*: “This word *atha* is used in the sense of commencement (*adhikāra*).” Vācaspati explained it thus: in this way, on the view that this word *atha* means commencement, because yoga is being introduced by the treatise, through the explanation of the essential purport of the entire treatise, the disciple's engagement takes place with easy comprehension; therefore, the meaning of commencement for the word *atha* is established.

15.26

Now, it may be objected:

15.27

“Hiraṇyagarbha is the speaker of yoga; there is no other ancient [teacher],”

15.28

according to this traditional text of Yājñavalkya; so how can Patañjali be the teacher of yoga? If this is urged, quite true: for this very reason, thinking that, because yoga was scattered here and there in the Purāṇas and elsewhere, its meaning was difficult to grasp, the venerable Lord of Serpents, an ocean of compassion, wishing to gather together the essence, commenced an *anuśāsana* (subsequent instruction), but not a direct original instruction (*śāsana*). When this word *atha* has the sense of commencement, then the sentence-meaning is established as follows: “The treatise that is a subsequent instruction on yoga is to be known as commenced.”

15.29

Here, yoga, along with its means and its fruit, being expounded in the treatise, is the subject matter. The instruction on it is the intermediate fruit. Liberation (*kaivalya*) resulting from the yoga so instructed is the ultimate purpose. The relation between the treatise and yoga is characterized as that between the expounder and the expounded. The relation between yoga and liberation is characterized as that between the means and the end to be accomplished. And that this is well known from scripture and the like has already been stated by me. That only those desiring liberation are the qualified aspirants is established by the sense. Nor should it be suspected that in [the sūtra] “Now, therefore, the inquiry into Brahman,” the qualified aspirant is established [merely] by the sense; for there, since the qualified aspirant is established through the process of denoting succession by the word *atha*, the suspicion of it being merely implied by the sense does not arise. For this very reason it is said: “Where direct statement (*śruti*) applies, there is no scope for context (*prakaraṇa*) and the rest.” The meaning of this is: only where a sense is not obtained from direct statement do context and the rest supply the sense, not elsewhere. But where the apprehension of the sense is from the word itself, another [means] is impossible there; for, since the application is conveyed by direct statement which generates comprehension swiftly, other [means] have no scope because expectancy has been eliminated. Furthermore, when a sense is conveyed by direct statement, does context or the like supply a meaning contrary to it, or one not contrary? Not the first, because that which conveys a contrary meaning is sublated. Nor the last, because it would be superfluous. So it has been said: “When direct statement, inferential sign, syntactical connection, context, position, and name concur, each subsequent one is weaker because of the remoteness of the sense.”

15.30

“Direct statement is always sublative; name is always sublated;

15.31

and the intermediate ones are sublated or sublative depending on what they are compared to.” And so forth.

15.32

Therefore, since it possesses a subject matter and the other prerequisites, it is settled that, like the treatise investigating Brahman, the treatise that is the instruction on yoga is to be undertaken.

15.33

If it is objected: ‘Since it is what is to be explained, it is yoga alone that is introduced here, not the treatise [on yoga]’ — that is true. Yoga is introduced as primary because it is the subject to be demonstrated. And since it is demonstrated by the treatise that has it as its subject, the treatise is the instrument in demonstrating it. Moreover, the operation of the agent pertains to the instrument; it does not take on the role of pertaining to the object. For instance, the activity consisting in lifting up and bringing down, which is the operation of Devadatta the woodcutter, pertains to the axe which is the instrument; it does not pertain to the tree or the like which is the object. And likewise, in relation to the activity of exposition belonging to Patañjali the speaker, the treatise as the instrument has precedence with respect to the subject of yoga, whereas in relation to the activity of designation, [precedence] belongs to yoga alone — such is the distinction. And consequently, the commencement of the treatise on yoga is plausible.

15.34

And here, yoga, which is to be taught, is stated to be the cessation of the fluctuations of the mind. If it is objected: ‘Since the word *yoga* is derived from the root *yuj*, which is recited in the grammatical list as meaning connection (*saṃyoga*), namely “*yujir yoga*”, it must express only connection and not cessation; hence it was said by Yājñavalkya:

15.35

“Yoga is declared to be the connection of the individual self and the supreme Self”’ —

15.36

this is hollow. For a connection between the individual and the supreme [Self] is impossible, because a cause such as action in one or the other does not exist; and because connection between unproduced things is rejected by Kaṇāda, Akṣapāda, and others; and even if that were accepted according to the view of the Mīmāṃsakas, since that [connection] is eternally accomplished, it cannot be an object to be achieved, which would entail the futility of the treatise; and because, since verbal roots have multiple meanings, it is established that *yuj* has the meaning of *samādhi*. Thus it has been said:

15.37

“Particles, prefixes, and verbal roots — these three —

15.38

are all remembered as having multiple meanings; their listing [in the Dhātupāṭha] is merely illustrative.”

15.39

For this very reason, some recite the root *yuj* in the sense of *samādhi* as well, namely “*yuja samādhau*”. Nor is there any contradiction with the statement of Yājñavalkya, since the word *yoga* standing there also has the meaning of *samādhi*;

15.40

“*Samādhi* is the state of equality of the individual self and the supreme Self;

15.41

that abiding in Brahman alone is the *samādhi* of the inner self” —

15.42

because this was also stated by that very author. So it has been said by the venerable Vyāsa: ‘Yoga is *samādhi*.’

15.43

If it is objected: ‘In that case, in the eight-limbed yoga the status of being the final limb was stated by Patañjali to be *samādhi*: “Restraint, observance, posture, breath-control, withdrawal of the senses, concentration, meditation, and *samādhi* are the eight limbs of yoga.” And the whole containing limbs cannot itself assume the status of a limb, because the relationship of beneficiary and benefactor requires entirely distinct bases, as in the case of the New and Full Moon sacrifices and the fore-offerings. Therefore, *samādhi* cannot properly be the meaning of the word *yoga*’ — that is not proper. For, wishing to express a mere etymological derivation, it is valid to designate the whole, yoga, by the word *samādhi* which expresses the final limb defined as ‘that alone, shining forth as the object alone, as if empty of its own nature, is *samādhi*’, out of a desire to express their non-difference. Nor does a word function everywhere solely on the strength of etymological derivation. Were it so, on the basis of the etymology ‘a cow (*go*) is that which walks (*gacchati*)’, a stationary [animal] would not be a cow, and a walking Devadatta would be a cow.

15.44

And the criterion for the application of the word was already stated: ‘the cessation of the fluctuations of the mind.’ Thus it was stated: ‘Yoga is the cessation of the fluctuations of the mind.’

15.45

If it is objected: ‘If yoga is held to be the cessation of fluctuations, then, since these are forms of cognition and thus have the self as their locus, their cessation also, which is known by the term “subsequent non-existence”, would have that [self] as its locus, because of the rule that antecedent non-existence and subsequent non-existence must have the same locus as their counterpositive. And consequently,

15.46

“For an attribute that arises and departs modifies the possessor of the attribute” —

15.47

according to this principle, the immutability of the self would be ruined’ — that also does not hold. For the fluctuations that are the counterpositives of cessation, consisting in means of valid cognition, error, conceptual construction, sleep, and memory, are accepted to be attributes of the mind, which is synonymous with the internal organ and the like. The power of consciousness, immutable, eternal, and non-transforming, can never be the locus of cognitive attributes. Nor should it be considered that the non-transforming nature of the power of consciousness is unproven. For there are inferences such as: ‘The power of consciousness is non-transforming, because it is always a knower; whatever is not so is not so, like the mind and the like.’ Likewise, if this *puruṣa* were subject to transformation, then, because transformation is occasional, those fluctuations of the mind could not be constantly known. Since the inner, pure *sattva* of the *puruṣa*, whose nature is consciousness and who abides eternally as the presiding entity, is also ever-present, whenever it is colored by an object, that knowable object shines forth through the reflection of consciousness falling upon it; thus the detachment of the *puruṣa* is possible. And consequently, its constant knowership is established, so the doubt of its transformability never arises. The mind, on the other hand, knows an object by which it is colored, and does not know that by which it is not colored; thus, because it possesses the attributes of being colored and uncolored—which are the causes of knowing and not-knowing an entity that resembles a lodestone—the mind, sharing the nature of iron, is said to be transforming.

15.48

If it is objected: ‘Since the mind and the senses, being products of egoity (*ahaṃkāra*), are omnipresent, they are always in contact with all objects. And thus the absurd consequence would follow that all persons would have cognition of everything at all times!’ — this is not so. Although it is omnipresent, the mind has activity in a particular body, and it has cognition only of those objects that are connected with that body, and not of others, so there is no unwarranted overextension. For this very reason it has been said that objects, resembling a lodestone, connect with and color the mind, which shares the nature of iron, through the conduit of the senses. Therefore, fluctuations are attributes of the mind, not of the self. And likewise the Śruti says: ‘Desire, resolve, doubt, faith, lack of faith, steadfastness, lack of steadfastness, modesty, intellect, fear—all this is only the mind.’ The non-transforming nature of the power of consciousness was declared by Master Pañcaśikha: ‘The power of the experiencer is non-transforming.’ Also by Patañjali: ‘The fluctuations of the mind are always known, because their master, the *puruṣa*, is non-transforming.’ An inference for the transformability of the mind is stated: ‘The mind is transforming, because its objects are both known and unknown, like the sense of hearing and the like.’

15.49

Transformation is well known to be threefold, according to the distinction of property-transformation, character-transformation, and state-transformation. The perception of blue and the like by the mind, which is the substrate of properties, is property-transformation, just like a bracelet, crown, armlet, and so forth [made] of gold. The presentness and so forth of a property is character-transformation. The clarity and so forth of the perception of blue and the like is state-transformation, whereas the newness, oldness, and so forth of a bracelet and the like is state-transformation. In the same way, the triad of transformations should be inferred elsewhere as well, as appropriate. And likewise, because mental modifications such as the means of valid cognition are properties of the mind, their cessation also resides in that very [mind]; thus nothing is untenable.

15.50

Now, if it is accepted that yoga is the cessation of mental modifications, then in deep sleep and the like, since the cessation of the modifications of restless, stupefied, and other minds can occur, the unwanted consequence of its being yoga would follow. And this is not tenable, because in the restless and other states the abandonment of afflictions and the like is impossible, and because they are obstacles to the highest good. To explain: that which is tossed among various objects and is unsteady is called the restless mind. That which is submerged in the ocean of darkness and permeated by the modification of sleep is called the stupefied. The mind that is distinguished from the restless is called the distracted. The distinction is:

15.51

“For the mind is unsteady, O Kṛṣṇa, turbulent, powerful, and obstinate”

15.52

according to this maxim, even for an unsteady mind there is stability due to the occasional occurrence of stability regarding an object. And unsteadiness is either innate or produced by latent inclinations such as disease. Thus it is said: “Disease, languor, doubt, carelessness, laziness, worldly attachment, erroneous perception, non-attainment of any stage, and instability are the mental distractions; they are the obstacles.” Here, disease is fever and the like caused by an imbalance of the three bodily humors. Languor is the unfitness of the mind for action. Doubt is a cognition that touches two contradictory alternatives. Carelessness is the non-cultivation of the means to samādhi. Laziness is inaction due to heaviness of body, speech, and mind. Worldly attachment is desire for objects. Erroneous perception is the cognition of something as what it is not. Non-attainment of any stage is the failure to attain the level of samādhi on account of some cause. Instability means the lack of footing of the mind even when that [stage] is attained. Therefore, if it is argued that the cessation of mental modifications does not deserve to be designated as yoga, do not speak thus: for even though the cessation of mental modifications in the triad of states—restless and the like—which are to be abandoned cannot be yoga, its cessation in the two acceptable states, the one-pointed and the restrained, can be yoga. A mind focused on one object is called one-pointed. A mind whose modifications are all restrained and in which only latent impressions remain is said to be restrained.

15.53

And that samādhi is twofold, according to the distinction between cognitive and ultra-cognitive. There, in a one-pointed mind, the cessation of mental modifications such as the means of valid cognition regarding external objects is cognitive samādhi; according to its etymology: “in this, the object of meditation is properly cognized as distinct from material nature.” It is of four kinds, according to the distinction of deliberative and the rest. Samādhi is contemplative cultivation; and that is the repeated placement of the object of contemplation in the mind to the exclusion of other objects. And the object of contemplation is twofold: the Lord and the principles. These too are twofold, according to the distinction between the insentient and the non-insentient. The insentient are the twenty-four [principles], beginning with material nature, the great principle, and ego-sense. The non-insentient is the conscious spirit. There, when contemplative cultivation proceeds taking gross objects such as earth as its content, by coordinating earlier and later, and with an admixture of word and object-concept, that samādhi is deliberative. When contemplative cultivation proceeds by relying on a subtle object characterized by the subtle elements and the inner organ, delimited by space and so forth, it is reflective. When the mind is contemplatively cultivated as infused with a trace of passion and darkness, then, due to the preponderance of lucidity consisting of joy and illumination, it is accompanied by joy. When contemplative cultivation proceeds taking as its support pure lucidity unoverwhelmed by any trace of passion and darkness, then in that [cultivation], due to the subordinacy of lucidity and the prominence of the power of consciousness, because only mere existence remains, it is samādhi accompanied by I-ness. Thus it was said by Patañjali: “Cognitive [samādhi] is accompanied by deliberation, reflection, joy, and I-ness.” But when all mental modifications are restrained, it is ultra-cognitive samādhi. Now, if it is said that yoga is the cessation of all mental modifications, it would not pervade cognitive [samādhi], because in that [state] the modification characterized by the discriminative discernment between lucidity and the conscious spirit, in which lucidity predominates, is not restrained. If this is urged, that is idle, because yoga is accepted as the cessation of mental modifications that are opposed to the resting-place of the fruitions of afflictions and actions.

15.54

The afflictions, moreover, are well known to be fivefold: “Nescience, I-ness, attachment, aversion, and clinging to life are the afflictions.”

15.55

Now, in this word 'nescience' (avidyā), what is relied upon? Is it the primacy of the prior member, as in the case of 'flyless' (amakṣikam)? Or the primacy of the subsequent member, as in 'king's man' (rājapuruṣaḥ)? Or the primacy of another member, as in 'a flyless place' (amakṣiko deśaḥ)? Among these, not the first: for if there were primacy of the prior member, an absolute negation would be established in nescience, and its being the cause of afflictions and the like would be untenable; and the unwanted consequence would follow that the word avidyā would lack the feminine gender. Nor the second: for knowledge qualified by the absence of something cannot be the seed of afflictions and the like, since it is opposed to afflictions and the like. Nor the third: for in accordance with the commentator’s rule, “A bahuvrīhi of the negative particle with words signifying existence, or the elision of the subsequent member,” if the compound's meaning were established as “the intellect whose knowledge does not exist is avidyā,” that nescience could not be the seed of afflictions and the like; and it would undesirably follow that [an intellect] endowed with the cessation of all modifications preceded by discriminative discernment would be such. And it has been stated that nescience is the root cause of afflictions such as I-ness: “Nescience is the field for the subsequent ones, whether dormant, attenuated, interrupted, or active.” There, dormancy is the non-manifestation [of an affliction] due to the absence of the cooperative cause of arousal. Attenuation is weakening through the contemplative cultivation of the opposite. Interruption is being overpowered by a stronger affliction. Activity is producing effects by virtue of the presence of cooperative causes. Thus it was said by Vācaspatimiśra in his commentary on Vyāsa's bhāṣya:

15.56

“Dormant [are the afflictions] of those merged in the principles, and in the attenuated state they belong to yogins;

15.57

and the afflictions exist in interrupted and active forms for those attached to sense-objects.”

15.58

Since, unlike in a dvandva compound, two independent word-meanings are not understood, the prominence of both word-meanings cannot even be suspected. Therefore, even among the three alternative views, the well-known status of avidyā as the root cause of the afflictions and the rest would be forfeited—if this is objected:

15.59

that too does not appear sound; for it is accepted by the elders that, relying on the power of exclusion (paryudāsa), by the word avidyā an erroneous cognition contradictory to knowledge is designated. Thus it has been said:

15.60

“When joined with the meaning of a noun or verbal root, the negative particle (nañ) is not purely prohibitive;

15.61

it expresses a non-brāhmaṇa or non-virtue, which are merely other [than them] or contrary [to them].”

15.62

“For with us, every word-meaning is to be understood from the usage of the elders;

15.63

therefore, in whatever sense a word has been used, it is not to be diverted from that.”

15.64

Vācaspatimiśra also has stated: “For the relation between a word and its meaning is determined by worldly usage; and in worldly usage, although the negative particle predominates in the meaning of the final member, it annuls what is denoted by the final member because it is perceived here and there as contrary to that; hence here too it applies to what is contrary to that.”

15.65

Having this very point in mind, it has been said: “Nescience is the apprehension of the permanent, pure, pleasurable, and the self in what is impermanent, impure, painful, and non-self.” What is stated is that it is erroneous cognition, the conception of something in what is not that. For example: the delusion of permanence in impermanent things such as a pot; the cognition of purity in the impure body and the like:

15.66

“From origin, seed, sustaining condition, secretion, and destruction,

15.67

as well as from the artificially applied cleanliness, the wise know the body to be impure.”

15.68

The superimposition of pleasure upon what is painful, such as flower garlands, sandalwood paste, and women, in accordance with the maxim: “To the discerning person, everything is indeed suffering on account of the sufferings of transformation, anguish, and latent impressions, and on account of the conflict of the operations of the guṇas”; and the cognition of the self in what is non-self, such as the body. Thus it has been said:

15.69

“The cognition of the self in what is non-self, such as the body, on the part of embodied beings

15.70

is nescience; bondage is caused by that; the destruction of that is called liberation.”

15.71

Thus this avidyā is fourfold. But, surely, some general definition encompassing these specific forms of avidyā must be stated; otherwise the particular cannot be established. And likewise it has been said by Bhaṭṭācārya:

15.72

“Apart from a general definition, a definition of the particular alone

15.73

cannot be stated in isolation; therefore, this too is not expressible.”

15.74

That too should not be said; for the answer has already been given by stating the general definition: “the conception of that in what is not that.”

15.75

Egoism (asmitā) is the delusion of oneness in the form ‘I am’ between the sattva and the puruṣa. That too has been stated: “Egoism is as if the identity of the capacity of the seer and the capacity of seeing.”

15.76

Attachment (rāga) is greed in the form of craving toward the means of pleasure, preceded by the recollection of pleasure, on the part of one who has experienced pleasure. Aversion (dveṣa) is withdrawal from the means of pain, preceded by the recollection of pain, on the part of one who has experienced pain. Thus it is said: “Attachment is that which dwells upon pleasure; aversion is that which dwells upon pain.”

15.77

Here, in the word anuśayin, is the affix ṇini in the sense of habitual disposition intended, or the possessive affix ini? Not the first: for in the rule ‘supy ajātau ṇinis tācchīlye’, since ‘supi’ is continuing, the repetition of the term ‘sup’ is intended to exclude prefixes; hence ṇini cannot be introduced after a verbal root preceded by a prefix. Even if that is conceded somehow, since vṛddhi would apply by ‘aco ñṇiti’, the word anuśāyin would inappropriately result, like the words atiśāyyin and the like. Nor the second:

15.78

“After a monosyllable, a primary derivative (kṛt), a generic class (jāti), and a locative, those two are not prescribed”

15.79

—on account of that prohibition; and here, because the word anuśaya ends with the affix ac, it ends with a kṛt affix. Therefore, if it is argued that the word anuśayin is difficult to justify—this is not sound, because the intention is not understood. This statement is of general (not absolute) scope. Hence it has been stated by the author of the Vṛtti: “The use of iti is intended to indicate the speaker’s intention, and it applies everywhere.” Thereby one occasionally gets kāryin, kāryika, taṇḍulin, taṇḍulika. Thus the prohibition after a kṛt-derivative and a generic class is merely general. It is established that the affix ini is justified since the word anuśaya is a kṛt-derivative.

15.80

The clinging to life (abhiniveśa), the fifth affliction, is a form of fear operating daily without an apparent cause, in the form ‘May there not be a separation of me from body, sense objects, and the like,’ arising in every living being whatsoever, from an insect down to a wise man, by the force of the latent impression of the experience of the pain of death experienced in previous births; for the prayer ‘May I not cease to be; may I exist!’ is established by personal experience in every self. Thus he states: “Flowing along by its own potency, rooted equally even in the wise man, is the clinging to life.”

15.81

And these five, beginning with avidyā, are known as afflictions (kleśāḥ) because they afflict the puruṣa by being the cause of bringing about various kinds of worldly sufferings.

15.82

Actions (karmāṇi) are prescribed and prohibited deeds, such as the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice and the killing of a brāhmaṇa. Ripenings (vipākāḥ) are the fruits of action: birth, lifespan, and experience. Latent deposits (āśayāḥ) are the impressions of virtue and non-virtue, because they lie in the field of the mind until the ripening of the fruit.

15.83

Yoga is the restraint of the mental fluctuations that oppose that. Restraint is not intended to be mere non-existence; for, being trivial, it cannot produce a positive direct realization. Rather, it is a specific state of the mind which is its substratum, designated as madhumatī, madhupratīkā, viśokā, and saṃskāraśeṣā; for the etymology ‘in this the mental fluctuations such as perception are restrained’ is fully tenable.

15.84

The restraint of mental fluctuations is through practice and dispassion. There, practice is the effort toward stability. Stability is a specific transformation of the mind devoid of fluctuations, abiding in its own nature, consisting in a tranquil flow. Practice is the effort having that as its purpose, the placing [of the mind] repeatedly in that state within the intellect. What is meant is that this locative is in the sense of purpose, like ‘he kills the leopard for its skin’ (carmaṇi dvīpinaṃ hanti). Dispassion is the consciousness of mastery belonging to one who is thirstless toward seen and heard objects. What is stated is that dispassion is the reflection: ‘Because of seeing faults in worldly and other-worldly objects, I am free from desire; these objects are subservient to me, I am not subservient to them.’

15.85

In order to attenuate the afflictions that obstruct concentration (samādhi) and to attain concentration, a yogin must first be intent upon the performance of kriyāyoga; for upon the accomplishment of kriyāyoga, practice and dispassion become possible. Thus it was said by the Lord:

15.86

“For the sage wishing to ascend to yoga, action is said to be the means;

15.87

for that very one when he has ascended to yoga, tranquility is said to be the means.”

15.88

And action-yoga (kriyāyoga) was taught by Patañjali: "Austerity, recitation of sacred texts, and dedication to God constitute action-yoga." The nature of austerity was defined by Yājñavalkya:

15.89

"By the method stated in ritual injunctions, through kṛcchra, cāndrāyaṇa, and other [penances],

15.90

the emaciation of the body is called the highest austerity among austerities." Thus.

15.91

Recitation (svādhyāya) is the repetition of mantras beginning with the Praṇava (Oṃ) and the Gāyatrī.

15.92

And those mantras are twofold: Vedic and Tantric. And the Vedic are twofold: chanted and unchanted. Among them, the chanted are the Sāman verses. And the unchanted are twofold: composed in metrical verse and distinct from that. Among these, the former are Ṛg verses, the latter are Yajus formulas. That was stated by Jaimini: "Among them, a Ṛg verse is where the division into metrical quarters is governed by meaning; the designation Sāman applies to chanted verses; to the rest, the term Yajus applies." Those which are described in the Tantras, in scriptures such as the Kāmika, Kāraṇa, and Prapañca[sāra], are Tantric. Those mantras again are threefold, by distinction of feminine, masculine, and neuter. Thus he says:

15.93

"By distinction into feminine, masculine, and neuter, the classes of mantras are threefold:

15.94

feminine mantras end with the wife of Agni (Svāhā); those ending with 'namaḥ' are neuter;

15.95

the remaining are masculine. Those are praised as perfected (siddha) in rites of subjugation and the like." Thus.

15.96

Being 'perfected' (siddhatva) means being the cause of accomplishment because of having all defects removed, even in the absence of consecrations such as birth (janana).

15.97

And that consecration is declared in the Śāradātilaka to be twofold times five (tenfold):

15.98

"Ten consecrations of mantras yielding accomplishment are declared;

15.99

properly consecrated, those mantras quickly attain defectlessness:

15.100

birth (janana) and enlivening (jīvana), striking (tāḍana) and awakening (bodhana),

15.101

then consecration by sprinkling (abhiṣeka), purification (vimalīkaraṇa) and invigorative replenishment (āpyāyana),

15.102

gratification (tarpaṇa), kindling (dīpana), and concealment (gupti)—these are the ten mantra-rites.

15.103

The extraction of mantras from the diagram of letters (mātṛkāyantra) is remembered as birth.

15.104

Interspersing the syllables of the mantra with the Praṇava, the wise practitioner should recite them

15.105

as many times as the number of syllables of the mantra; that indeed they call enlivening.

15.106

Writing down the syllables of the mantra, one should strike them with sandalwood water;

15.107

striking each one with the wind seed-syllable (vāyubīja) is declared as striking.

15.108

Having written down the syllables of the mantra, with oleander flowers

15.109

numbering the syllables of that mantra, one should strike it; that is considered awakening.

15.110

According to the procedure stated in its respective Tantra, the mantrin, [reciting] as many times as the syllables of the mantra,

15.111

should sprinkle the mantra with leaves of the sacred fig tree (aśvattha) for purification.

15.112

Contemplating the mantra with the mind, the mantrin should burn away the three impurities

15.113

in the mantra with the fire mantra (jyotirmantra); that indeed is purification.

15.114

The Jyotirmantra is declared to consist of the Praṇava, the ether [seed-syllable], and the fire seed-syllable (Oṃ Hsauṃ).

15.115

Sprinkling each syllable of the mantra with consecrated kuśa-grass water

15.116

by means of the water seed-syllable (vāribīja) according to rule—this is considered invigorative replenishment.

15.117

Offering libation to the mantra with water accompanied by the mantra is remembered as gratification.

15.118

The combination of the Praṇava, Māyā (Hrīṃ), and Ramā (Śrīṃ) is called the kindling of the mantra.

15.119

The concealment, however, is the non-disclosure of the mantra that is being recited.

15.120

These ten consecrations of mantras are kept secret in all the Tantras;

15.121

having performed them according to tradition, the mantrin attains the desired object.

15.122

And defects of mantras such as being blocked, pinned, broken, asleep, or cursed

15.123

are destroyed by these superior consecrations." Thus.

15.124

So enough of proclaiming the secrets of mantra scripture, which is like an unseasonable tāṇḍava dance!

15.125

Dedication to God (īśvarapraṇidhāna) means the surrender, without expectation of fruit, of all actions—both enjoined and not enjoined—to the Supreme Lord, the supreme guru. In this regard, it is said:

15.126

"Whatever I do, whether intentionally or unintentionally, good or evil,

15.127

all that is laid upon You; impelled by You, I act." Thus.

15.128

Renunciation of the fruits of action is itself dedication, which is another designation for a special kind of devotion, because actions are performed without aiming for their fruits. And so it is sung in the Gītā by the Blessed Lord:

15.129

"Your entitlement is to action alone, never to its fruits;

15.130

do not be motivated by the fruits of action, nor let your attachment be to inaction." Thus.

15.131

The destructive nature of desire for fruits has been declared by the venerable Nīlakaṇṭhabhāratī:

15.132

"Even austerity accomplished with great effort, if struck down by desire,

15.133

does not lead to the pleasure of the Great Lord, like milk-rice licked by a dog." Thus.

15.134

And that action consisting of austerity, recitation of sacred texts, and dedication to God is designated as "yoga" because it is an instrument of yoga, through recourse to the figurative function of pure superimposition (śuddhasāropā lakṣaṇā), just as "ghee is life."

15.135

Pure superimposition is a subdivision of secondary indication (lakṣaṇā). Indication is the conveying of another meaning by virtue of the sublation of the primary meaning and its relation to [the primary meaning]. It is twofold: rooted in conventional usage (rūḍhi) and rooted in a specific purpose (prayojana). That is stated in the Kāvyaprakāśa:

15.136

"When the primary meaning is sublated, through its connection [to the primary], based on conventional usage or a purpose,

15.137

that secondary operation by which another meaning is indicated is indication (lakṣaṇā)." Thus.

15.138

By the relative pronoun 'yat' (that which), mere indication, which is subordinate in the verb 'is indicated' (lakṣyate), is referred to. The feminine gender of the correlative pronoun 'sā' (that) is accounted for in view of the predicate noun 'lakṣaṇā' (indication). That was stated by Kaiyaṭa: "Pronouns bringing about the identity of the noun being referred to and the noun referring to it adopt the respective gender alternately." There, "skillful in work" (karmaṇi kuśalaḥ) and the like is an example of conventional indication. The word kuśala, which by etymology ("he who plucks kuśa grass") is an etymological derivative denoting an agent who gathers darbha grass, operates in the sense of 'expert' through similarity in discriminative discernment; operating in conformity with the continuous stream of beginningless usage of elders, it operates without regard to any purpose, just like primary denotation (abhidhā). Thus he says:

15.139

"Certain indications are conventional, [operating] by force of usage just like primary denotation." Thus.

15.140

Therefore, conventional indication has no need for a purpose. Even though the word employed first conveys the primary meaning, and by means of that meaning another meaning is indicated—so that this indication is a property of the meaning—nevertheless, being superimposed on the word conveying it, it is designated as an operation of the word. Having just this in mind, it was stated: "indication is a superimposed operation." Purposive indication, on the other hand, is sixfold: inclusive indication (upādānalakṣaṇā), indicative indication (lakṣaṇalakṣaṇā), qualitative superimposition (gauṇasāropā), qualitative identification (gauṇasādhyavasānā), pure superimposition (śuddhasāropā), and pure identification (śuddhasādhyavasānā). "The lances enter," "the platforms shout," "the Vāhīka is an ox," "this is an ox," "ghee is life," "this is life itself"—these are to be understood as the examples in respective order. That has been stated:

15.141

"The implication of another for the establishment of oneself; the surrender of oneself for the sake of another;

15.142

[The implication which is] the inclusive indication and the indicative indication, is declared to be purely twofold:

15.143

The superimposing [indication] (sāropā), however, is another [variety] where the subject of superimposition and the superimposed property are both stated;

15.144

when the other is absorbed within the subject of superimposition, it is introsusceptive (sādhyavasānikā).

15.145

And these two varieties, through similarity or through another relation,

15.146

are to be known as qualitative (gauṇa) and pure (śuddha); therefore, indication (lakṣaṇā) is sixfold." Thus it is said.

15.147

Therefore, enough of churning the secret core of poetics!

15.148

And that yoga is indicated as having eight limbs, according to the distinction of the restraints (yama) and the rest. Among them, the restraints begin with non-violence. So Patañjali says: "Non-violence, truthfulness, non-stealing, celibacy, and non-possessiveness are the restraints." The observances (niyama) begin with cleanliness. So he also says: "Cleanliness, contentment, asceticism, study of scripture, and dedication to God are the observances." And these restraints and observances are shown in the Viṣṇu Purāṇa:

15.149

"Celibacy and non-violence, truthfulness, non-stealing, and non-possessiveness—

15.150

these the desireless yogin should cultivate, bringing his mind to fitness;

15.151

Scriptural study, cleanliness, contentment, and ascetic penances, being self-restrained,

15.152

he should perform, and likewise direct his mind devotedly toward the supreme Brahman.

15.153

These restraints together with the observances are proclaimed to be five each;

15.154

they bestow distinguished fruits upon the desirous, and liberation upon the desireless." Thus.

15.155

Posture (āsana) is steady and comfortable; it is of ten kinds according to the divisions of Padmāsana, Bhadrāsana, Vīrāsana, Svastikāsana, Daṇḍakāsana, Sopāśraya, Paryaṅka, Krauñcaniṣadana, Uṣṭraniṣadana, and Samasaṃsthāna.

15.156

"One should grasp the two big toes with the two hands crossed,

15.157

having placed both soles of the feet upon the thighs, O best of Brahmins;

15.158

this shall be the Padmāsana, revered by all,"

15.159

and so forth—by this, Yājñavalkya determined the nature of Padmāsana and the rest. All that is to be understood from there itself.

15.160

When that stability of posture is achieved, breath control (prāṇāyāma) becomes established. And its nature is the interruption of the movement of inhalation and exhalation. There, 'inhalation' (śvāsa) means drawing the outer air inside. 'Exhalation' (praśvāsa), again, is the expulsion of the abdominal air outside. The absence of movement of both of them is breath control. If it is objected: "Surely this is not the general definition of breath control, because it cannot apply to its specific varieties—the modes of expulsion (recaka), inhalation (pūraka), and retention (kumbhaka)"—this is not a defect, because the interruption of the movement of inhalation and exhalation is possible everywhere. To explain: the outward expulsion of the abdominal air is the breath control called recaka, which was previously stated as exhalation; the inward holding of the outer air is pūraka, which is of the nature of inhalation; the retention-mode inside is kumbhaka, in which the wind called prāṇa is kept motionless, like water in a pot. Since there is indeed the interruption of the movement of both inhalation and exhalation everywhere in these, there is no room for doubt. Thus it has been said: "When that [posture] is present, breath control is the interruption of the movement of inhalation and exhalation."

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Translations (1)

The Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha, or Review of the Different Systems of Hindu Philosophy — Edward Byles Cowell & Archibald Edward Gough 1882, English

Linked texts (1)

Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha — Mādhava, Sanskrit