Sarvadarshanasangraha 16

English (machine translation) 16

Language: English

16.1

This theory of transformation deserves censure by those who rely on means of valid cognition. For insentient pradhāna does not act when not governed by a conscious being. Because when gold or the like is the material cause of a necklace or the like, governance by a conscious agent such as a goldsmith is observed, just like being produced is [incompatible with] establishing eternity. Because the reason—consisting in being co-present with pleasure, pain, and delusion—is contradictory, being pervaded by the opposite of the probandum; and because it is unestablished in its own nature. Indeed, these pleasure, pain, and delusion are internal, distinct from external sandalwood and the like which are experienced through different cognitions, and are directly observed. If these [external objects] were of the nature of pleasure and the like, then even in winter sandalwood would be pleasant. For sandalwood is never non-sandalwood. Likewise, even in summer smeared saffron paste would be pleasant. For that is never non-saffron paste. In the same way, a thorn would be pleasant to human beings and other living creatures, just as it is to a camel. For it is not a thorn only with respect to some. Therefore, particular things like sandalwood and saffron are causes of pleasure and the like only in relation to a particular time and the like, but they are not of the nature of pleasure and the like; this is the pleasing view. Therefore, it is established that the reason is unproven.

16.2

Nor is Śruti a means of valid cognition for the doctrine of pradhāna being the cause. For: "The red form of fire is the form of heat; the white is that of water; the black is that of food"—in the Chāndogya recension, the red, white, and black forms of nature consisting of heat, water, and food are handed down, and it is precisely these that are recognized here. There, owing to the strength of scriptural recognition and because the primary meaning of the words "red" and so forth is possible, nature, consisting of heat, water, and food, is determined to be the material cause of the aggregate of living beings belonging to the four classes: viviparous, oviparous, sweat-born, and plant-born. Although, because heat, water, and food are produced from nature, the quality of being unborn (ajā) is not established according to etymological derivative signification in the sense of "not being born," nevertheless the unborn status understood by conventional usage is assumed in the aforesaid nature for easy comprehension. Just as the state of being honey is attributed to the sun by the statement, "Verily, that sun is the honey of the gods," and so on, so nature, which consists of heat, water, and food, is alone [called] unborn (ajā). Hence, the Śruti beginning with "One unborn female..." also does not teach pradhāna.

16.3

As for the example stated by the opponent, that milk and the like, though insentient, act solely without being governed by a conscious being for the growth of the calf, this is not pleasing. For the Supreme Lord, who is endowed with particular intelligence, is accepted to be the governor even there. Nor, if one accepts that the Supreme Lord acts out of compassion, is there room for the previously mentioned dilemma. For even though living beings have no relation to suffering prior to creation, an action with the desire to destroy it is reasonable, because they can have a relation to the unseen merit and demerit which is its root cause. Moreover, it was said that the activity of pradhāna is prompted by the aim of human existence; that must be examined. Does pradhāna act solely for the sake of experience, or solely for the sake of liberation, or else for the sake of both? The first alternative does not hold. For a puruṣa, who is devoid of any adventitious excellence and immutable-eternal, cannot have real experience; and it would result in non-liberation. For by whatever purpose pradhāna was set in motion, it must accomplish that; and since it was set in motion by experience, it would accomplish only that, not liberation. Nor the second. Since the conscious principle is eternally pure, enlightened, and liberated by nature, impressions of karmic experience are impossible for it, and so, because it is liberated even prior to the activity of pradhāna, activity for that purpose is illogical; and because pradhāna did not act for the sake of experiencing sound and the like, it would result in not producing that. Nor the third, because it is not immune to the aforesaid faults, and because indifference is impossible for nature whose very essence is activity.

16.4

If it is objected: "The discriminative discernment between the pure sattva and the puruṣa is the aim of human existence; once that has arisen, [nature] ceases because its task has been accomplished"—

16.5

that is improper. For it is impossible for insentient nature to act having reflected. Just as it acts again for that purpose even when the apprehension of sound and the like has been accomplished, so here too it would act again, because its nature does not depart.

16.6

Moreover, is that nature destroyed through discriminative discernment, or not? If it is destroyed, mundane existence would immediately cease for everyone. If it is not destroyed, there would be liberation for no one.

16.7

If it is objected: "Even though pradhāna is non-different [for all], bondage and liberation would be explained as based on the presence and absence of nescience characterized by non-discriminative discernment belonging to the respective puruṣas"—

16.8

well then, away with nature! For that can be explained solely by the presence and absence of nescience.

16.9

If it is objected: "Would not this fault arise even in the doctrine of nescience?"—

16.10

This counter-objection is misplaced. For we do not declare nescience to be one across all individual selves like the Pradhāna, such that we would incur this fault. Rather, it is distinct in every individual self. Hence, nescience is destroyed only in that individual self in whom knowledge arises, not in another, because there is no opposition between the two when their loci are different. Therefore, the fault of the contingent destruction of all worldly existence does not apply. Consequently, transformation must be abandoned, and the doctrine of apparent transformation must be accepted.

16.11

If it is objected: “Did we not say before that because of the absence of resemblance between the individual self and insentient matter, the phenomenal world cannot be an apparent transformation of consciousness?”—

16.12

this is not sound. For there is no pervasion to the effect that all illusions are caused by resemblance, since illusory dreams are experienced, such as embracing a beloved woman, arising even from desire and the like which bear no resemblance [to them]. Moreover, resemblance is required in an occasional illusion, not in the phenomenal world whose cause is beginningless nescience. So said the venerable master Vācaspati:

16.13

“This phenomenal world, however, is an apparent transformation of the unchanging Brahman;

16.14

arisen from beginningless latent impressions, it does not require resemblance.”

16.15

All this is easily understood and coherent for those who have laboured in the Vedānta treatise.

16.16

And that Vedānta treatise consists of four chapters. Śaṅkarācārya established that the subject matter of the Vedānta treatise composed by the venerable Bādarāyaṇa is the identity of the inner self and Brahman. There, in the first chapter on harmony, all the Vedānta passages culminate primarily in Brahman. In the second chapter on non-contradiction, the contradiction with the reasoning of the Sāṅkhyas and others is refuted. In the third chapter on spiritual means, the means to the knowledge of Brahman are set forth. In the fourth chapter on the fruit, the fruit of knowledge [is set forth]. There, in each chapter, there are four quarters. There, in the first quarter of the first chapter, the group of texts bearing explicit marks of Brahman is examined. In the second, those bearing indistinct marks of Brahman concerning objects of meditation. In the third, such [texts] concerning the object of knowledge. In the fourth, the group of ambiguous words such as ‘unmanifest’ and ‘unborn’. In the first [quarter] of the second [chapter] on non-contradiction, the contradiction with the traditional texts of Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Kaṇāda, and others is removed. In the second, the flawed nature of the doctrines of Sāṅkhya and others [is shown]. In the third, the mutual contradiction among the Vedic texts concerning the five gross elements and the individual self is removed. In the fourth, the contradiction among the Vedic texts concerning the subtle body is removed.

16.17

In the first [quarter] of the third [chapter], dispassion is taught following the examination of the individual self's going to and returning from the other world. In the second, the clarification of the meanings of the words ‘that’ and ‘thou’ [is treated]. In the third, the combination of qualities in meditations on Brahman with qualities [is treated]. In the fourth, the collection of outer and inner means to the knowledge of Brahman without qualities—such as stages of life, sacrifice, and tranquility—[is treated]. In the first [quarter] of the fourth [chapter], liberation characterized by freedom from sin, merit, and afflictions while living through the direct realization of Brahman [is treated]. In the second, the manner of departure at death [is treated]. In the third, the northern path for the meditator on Brahman with qualities [is treated]. In the fourth, the states of bodiless isolation and the world of Brahman for the knower of Brahman without qualities and with qualities [are treated]. In this way, such is the summary of the topics of the chapters and quarters of the treatise on the inquiry into Brahman.

16.18

There, the first topical section, “Now, therefore, the inquiry into Brahman,” is devoted to justifying the commencement of the inquiry into Brahman. And a topical section is well known to consist of five limbs. Those five limbs—the subject matter and so forth—are now set forth: The text “The self, indeed, should be seen” is the subject matter. The doubt is: “Is Brahman to be inquired into, or not?” owing to the presence or absence of doubt and purpose, which are the pervaders of being an object of inquiry.

16.19

In that regard, of what is this status of being an object of inquiry understood? Of that which is cognized through the experience of ‘I’, or of that which is cognized through scripture?

16.20

Not the first. For through the universal experience of ‘I’, the self is clearly manifested as distinct from the body and so forth, which are the basis of ‘this’.

16.21

If it is objected: “Because of the experienced co-reference with the properties of the body, such as ‘I am stout’ and ‘I am lean’, this ego-consciousness has for its intentional object the body upon which the nature of the self is superimposed”—no, this is not so.

16.22

Because in the states of childhood and so on, recognition of the body would be impossible, since, having different sizes, [the bodies] are mutually distinct like a jujube and a myrobalan.

16.23

Now if it were said: “Just as according to the doctrine of baking in atoms or the doctrine of baking in the pot, difference produced by baking is appropriate in a single entity according to differences in time, so also in a single entity called ‘body’ there is a difference of size according to differences in time; therefore, ordinary people, apprehending the body as non-different from the self, recognize it as such”—

16.24

this is not sound. For the self, the distinct referent of ‘I’, which assumes various bodies like taking on dramatic roles by means of different devices such as gems, mantras, and herbs, appears as distinct from the body. For this very reason, it cannot even be suspected that the eye and other [senses] are the referent of ‘I’. By the maxim, “One does not remember what was seen by another,” recollection of color and so forth would be impossible when the eye or another [sense] is destroyed. Nor should it be maintained that the internal organ is the referent of ‘I’. By the maxim, “This alone is difference, or the cause of difference: namely, the superimposition of contradictory properties and difference of causes,” there can be no coalescence between the self and the internal organ, which are the agent and the instrument, just as between a carpenter and an adze. If non-difference is not accepted at all, then expressions such as ‘I am stout’, ‘I am lean’, and ‘I am dark’ would be completely invalidated.

16.25

They would not. For, seeing that words are used in both ways in worldly usage and in the scriptures, since literal sense is impossible, it is justified as metaphorical, just as in ‘the platforms cry out’ and the like.

16.26

Nor the second. For only that which is cognized through the experience of ‘I’ is cognized through scripture. For Brahman is understood from scriptural texts such as “Brahman is truth, knowledge, and infinite”; and the state of being Brahman is taught precisely of that which is cognized through the notion of ‘I’ in scriptural texts such as “I am Brahman, the self” and “Thou art that.” And so this inference was indicated: The subject in dispute is not to be inquired into, because it is free from doubt, like a myrobalan on the palm of one's hand.

16.27

Likewise, the fruit does not attain the nature of a fruit. In accordance with the etymology 'that which is desired by humans,' what is denoted by the word 'aim of human existence'—characterized by the complete cessation of all suffering and consisting exclusively of supreme bliss—is longed for by all foremost among men, but this collection of worldly pleasures is not so. For, whether mundane or otherworldly, it cannot be desired by discerning people, since it is marked by degrees of excellence and [attended with suffering]. What is opposed to it, namely the collection of suffering, is desired to be abandoned; and that is none other than saṃsāra, another synonym for nescience, because nescience brings about every misfortune such as agency and the like. The prefix sam- is used in the sense of unification, as observed in expressions like saṃbheda ('mingling'). And thus, that by which a person unifies the self with the body and wanders along the paths to heaven and hell is saṃsāra, which is the meaning of the word 'nescience.' The cessation of that is considered the fruit by those who possess a fruit. So it has been said:

16.28

"The setting of nescience is liberation, and it is declared to be bondage."

16.29

And that is like grasping at reeds and kuśa grass. For between saṃsāra, which exists simultaneously with the experience of the true nature of the self, [and that experience,] there is no relation of eliminator and eliminated, because there is no opposition between them, just as between color and taste.

16.30

If it is objected: Granted that an awareness that continues along with it does not sublate saṃsāra, but an awareness that occurs along with it will sublate it, just as light [sublates] darkness;

16.31

then this is an empty statement, because any knowledge of the self other than the 'I'-experience behaves like a mouse's horn [i.e., is entirely fictional].

16.32

Nor should it even be said: 'Let it be that this other experience does not belong to ordinary folk; it certainly does occur to critical investigators capable of examining the multitude of Vedāntic statements.' For the statements of Vedānta, being in conflict with uncontradicted experience, are just like statements such as 'the stones float.' For even a hundred scriptural texts cannot turn a pot into a cloth. Nor is there any disruption of the rule of study; for, according to the doctrine of the Guru (Prabhākara), the study of the established Vedāntic doctrine can occur because it is useful merely for recitation like mantras such as huṃ phaṭ, or, according to the doctrine of the Ācārya (Kumārila), because it is eulogistic like statements such as 'the sacrificer is the grass mat.'

16.33

And thus the syllogistic formulation is:

16.34

Brahman, the subject of dispute, is not a fit object of inquiry, because it is devoid of a fruit, like the teeth of a crow. Thus the teachers say:

16.35

"Because the self is established by the cognition 'I', and because that very [self] has the nature of Brahman;

16.36

and because there is no liberation from knowledge of it, an inquiry is not warranted."

16.37

Nor should it be supposed that the cessation of the body and the like superimpositionally identified through difference is the fruit, and thus the reason 'being devoid of a fruit' is unestablished. For the apprehension of difference—according to the maxim that the cessation of the pervader entails the cessation of the pervaded—presupposes a latent impression of difference that opposes the non-apprehension of difference; for one who has never perceived silver does not superimpose it on a piece of mother-of-pearl. And a latent impression requires a valid cognition, since no latent impression arises regarding what has not been experienced. Nor can it be asserted that an experience having the nature of an error is the instrument thereof; for since error is preceded by non-error, a valid cognition must necessarily be admitted somewhere. And the syllogistic formulation is: The self and non-self under dispute are cognized as different by a valid cognition, because they are incapable of non-difference, like darkness and light. Nor should it be suspected that the reason characterized as 'incapability of non-difference between self and non-self' is unestablished, because it cannot withstand logical alternatives. To explain: does the non-self remain as the self, or does the self remain as the non-self? On the first alternative, the visible world would disappear, just as in the state of liberation. On the second, the universe would become blind [i.e., completely inert and devoid of awareness]. Moreover, because their natures are mutually opposed like darkness and light, the incapability of non-difference between the seer and the seen, the self and the non-self, must be acknowledged. And consequently, since the superimposition of an object is impossible, the superimposition of cognition preceded by it is impossible, and therefore Brahman cannot be an object of inquiry; hence the Śārīrakamīmāṃsā consisting of inquiry in four chapters is not to be undertaken—such being the prima facie view, the established conclusion is stated:

16.38

One should not say that there is no true nature of the self other than what is cognized through the word 'I,' because the true nature of the self stripped of all extrinsic conditions is well known in the śruti and other texts. Nor do they have a figurative sense; for it is impossible for [texts] that convey reality through having the sixfold marks of textual intention, such as the introductory and concluding statements, to have a figurative sense. And the six marks have been shown by former teachers:

16.39

"The introductory and concluding statements, repetition, novelty, the fruit,

16.40

eulogistic passages, and intelligible reasoning are the marks in determining textual intention."

16.41

Therein, 'Being alone, dear boy, was this in the beginning' is the introductory statement. 'All this has this [Brahman] as its self; that is the truth; that is the self; you are that, Śvetaketu' is the concluding statement. Their uniformity of form in having Brahman as their object is one mark. The repeated assertion 'you are that' is repetition. Being uncognizable through other means of valid cognition is novelty. Knowledge of everything through the knowledge of the one is the fruit. The five accounts of creation, maintenance, dissolution, entrance, and control are the eulogistic passages. The analogies of clay and so forth are the intelligible reasonings. Therefore, through these marks, it must be determined that the Vedāntas have as their purport the self as Brahman whose nature is eternally pure, enlightened, and liberated. In this way, because the true nature of the self taught in the Upaniṣads does not appear in the 'I'-experience, it is established that that experience has for its object a superimposed self.

16.42

Since the self accepted by Kaṇabhakṣa (Kaṇāda), Akṣacaraṇa (Gautama), and others does not appear [in the 'I'-cognition], it must be admitted that the 'I'-experience has a superimposed self as its object. First of all, the 'I'-experience is not capable of making known the omnipresence of the self, because it grasps spatial limitation: 'I who know am here in this house.' And it must not be understood that this spatial limitation of the body is what appears, because the reference 'I' would not apply to it.

16.43

If it is objected: Just as there is a figurative expression regarding a servant who accomplishes every purpose of the king, 'Bhadrasena is my self,' so there is a figurative expression of the word 'I,' which denotes the self, with respect to the body;

16.44

do not speak thus. For the body and the like, whose selfhood is only figurative, cannot be a knower, just like a stone doll or the like having a human-like form.

16.45

Nor is knowership itself metaphorical, because in an utterance revealing the speaker's own awareness, it is impossible for knowership to be metaphorical. Now, if spatial limitation, which is an attribute of the body, were to be metaphorically transferred to the self, then there must be a difference between body and self. For whether in ad hoc metaphor—such as the word "lion" applied to a boy where the difference is well known—or in conventional metaphor—such as the word "oil" applied to mustard-seed liquid and the like where the difference is obscured—the determination of difference between the secondary and primary referents is invariable.

16.46

If you should think that it is metaphorical because an appearance of difference is possible in the expression "my body," that is incorrect. For the referent of the word "I" does not appear as distinguished from the body and so forth by possessing an uncommon attribute; otherwise, the Lokāyata doctrine would never have arisen. But the statement "my body" is metaphorical, like [the phrase] "the head of Rāhu." For even one who says "my body," when asked "who are you?", places his hand on his chest and specifically answers "this is I"; thus the cognition of the self as the body is established by all experience. Hence it is said:

16.47

Just as the cognition of the self as the body is assumed to be a means of valid cognition,

16.48

just so is this empirical means of valid cognition valid until the ascertainment of the self.

16.49

And so, since the pervasive factor—the appearance of difference—is absent, the pervaded factor—metaphorical status—is also absent; thus the argument is unblemished.

16.50

Now, granted that the establishment of difference might not occur by direct cognition, but will not its establishment occur through recognition in the form "I am that same person"? If you say this,

16.51

No, because it does not withstand analysis. Would this recognition belong to ordinary people or to critical investigators? Not the first, for a recognition apprehending the identity of a self distinct from the body does not arise [in them]. On the contrary, just as redness replaces blackness [in a baked pot], for those who experience without contradiction that even something small can attain great size due to a specific cause, such [recognition] is possible regarding that very body. Nor the second, because at the time of practical activity they do not surpass ordinary people, and because an immediate illusion cannot be destroyed by mediate knowledge. As the venerable commentator said: "because there is no distinction from animals and the rest." The author of the Bhāmatī also said: "Indeed, it is scholars of the scriptures who investigate thus, not ordinary perceivers." And so, that the nature of superimposition applies to the sphere of the self is firmly established.

16.52

Nor is it correct that according to the Jaina doctrine the self must be admitted to have the size of the body in order to validate the cognition of "I." For if it has an intermediate size, it would have parts and therefore be non-eternal like the body and so forth, entailing the loss of [the fruits of] what was done and the acquisition of [the fruits of] what was not done. Now, if to avoid this defect it were accepted that the self is an aggregate of parts, then one must ask: does consciousness belong to each of the parts or to the aggregate? Not the first. If many conscious beings, each experiencing preeminence in competitive rivalry, lacked unanimity and acted in conflicting directions at the same time, the body too would inevitably either break apart or become motionless. Even on the second [view], does the state of being an aggregate depend on the extrinsic condition of the body, is it natural, or is it accidental? Not the first; for if a single part were cut off, a part of the conscious self would also be cut off, entailing that it would become unconscious. Not the second, because no invariable rule of coexistence among manifold parts is observed. Not the third, because just as union is accidental, separation would also be accidental, entailing that those living comfortably would suddenly become unconscious.

16.53

Nor should the atomic size of the self be suspected, because the cognitions "I am stout" and "I am tall" would then be impossible.

16.54

Nor should it be considered that this defect does not apply to those who maintain that the self is consciousness on the grounds that it is devoid of physical parts. For if the reference to "I," which has a stable object in the cognition "I who slept am the very one who is awake," were to have a moment-destroying consciousness as its object, the false superimposition in the form of a cognition of that [self] in what is not that [self] would remain in the same state. Therefore, by this, the metaphorical nature asserted of familiar cognitions such as "I am thin" and "I am dark" by claiming their conformity with the mind has been refuted, because the impossibility of the appearance of difference, which pervades that, has already been explained in detail. And so there is the formal inference:

16.55

The scripture under discussion possesses a subject matter and a purpose,

16.56

because it dispels the bondage caused by nescience,

16.57

like the cognition of one who has awakened from sleep.

16.58

Just as the object of the cognition of one who has awakened from sleep, which removes the bondage caused by women and the like conjured by illusion in the dream state, is the body resting comfortably on the bed in the middle of the chamber—since it was not ascertained by dream awareness—and the purpose is the cessation of the calamity brought forth by the dream-illusion; so too, the object of the scripture, which negates calamities such as superimposed agency and enjoyership by means of mediate knowledge produced by reflection and the like, is Brahman, which is of the sole essence of being-consciousness-bliss and constitutes the inner self—since it is not ascertained by the experience of "I"—and the purpose is the cessation of superimposition. Thus, it is established that the reason "because it is devoid of fruit" is unproven. Hence it is said:

16.59

The truth of the self to be known through scripture is not apprehended by the cognition of "I";

16.60

just as desire [is imagined] in the sky through delusion, but not in the self where error is destroyed.

16.61

From this, it is also established that the reason "because it is free from doubt" is unproven.

16.62

Even though every living being cognizes the existence of the inner self, thinking, “I am”—for no one at all is confused, thinking, “I am not”—and the inner self alone is Brahman, because of the co-reference in “You are that,” and therefore the principle of the self is established as beyond doubt; nevertheless, following the principle that [thinkers] are in conflict regarding attributes, a grasp of particular [views] does arise. For instance, the Lokāyatas hold that the body characterized by consciousness is the self; others, that the senses are the self; still others, that the internal organ is the self; the Buddhists understand that the self is momentary, continuing consciousness; the Jain Jinists maintain that the self has the size of the body; the Naiyāyikas and others describe the individual self as characterized by agency and the like and different from the Supreme Lord; the teachers [of Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā] declare that the self has the nature of both substance and consciousness; the Sāṃkhyas assert that [the self] is purely an experiencer and not an agent; the followers of the Upaniṣads state that the inner self consists of consciousness, is devoid of agency and the like, and is non-different from the Supreme. Thus, when there is dispute regarding the specific attributes of a well-known subject, doubt regarding those specific attributes is reasonable. And thus, since doubt is possible, Brahman's being an object of inquiry is established. So, since the investigation of Brahman is possible in this way, it is appropriate that the Brahmamīmāṃsā treatise, which consists in the investigation of that [Brahman], should be commenced. Because the entire treatise beginning with “From which [arise] the birth and so forth of this” depends on this inquiry, this section belongs to the first chapter of the treatise.

16.63

Now, what is the means of valid cognition for Brahman of this nature: perception, inference, or scripture? Perception never operates with respect to it, because it transcends the senses. Nor does inference, because there is no pervaded inferential sign. Nor scripture, because knowability through scripture is negated by the scriptural text itself: “Wherefrom words turn back.” [Other means of valid cognition] such as comparison cannot even be suspected [to operate], because they have restricted domains. Therefore, if it is urged that no means of valid cognition is possible with respect to Brahman—

16.64

Do not say this! Even though perception and the others are impossible, scripture does exist.

16.65

If it is asked, “How can this be, since its being within the range of words is negated by ‘Wherefrom words turn back’?”—

16.66

Scripture itself negates, and scripture itself enjoins, that Brahman is to be known through Vedānta. For when an object taught by the Veda seems inappropriate, the intellect of Vedic thinkers does not falter; rather, it investigates only the way to reconcile it. Therefore, both [statements] are to be established. The statements negating its being an object are made with the intention to express the impossibility of the result characterized by the manifest shining forth brought about by a mental modification born of the sentence; but those teaching its being an object are made with the intention to express the possibility of the result characterized by the destruction of concealment brought about by a mental modification. As has been said by the Venerable [Author]:

16.67

“Brahman is not an object of scripture, because it has no result that can be produced [in it];

16.68

yet it may be an object of knowledge in valid cognition, through the presentation of its own form.”

16.69

“Brahman is not to be illuminated by a means of valid cognition; Brahman is self-luminous.

16.70

It is proclaimed to be an object of valid cognition because of the destruction of the concealment produced by that [means of valid cognition].”

16.71

Now, this wish might be fulfilled if the epistemic validity of the Veda regarding an already established entity were established; for [the comprehension of meaning] depends on apprehending the linguistic relation, and linguistic usage among elders in the world is restricted entirely to action. For it is impossible that words whose linguistic relation has been apprehended with respect to an action should express an already established entity, or have epistemic validity regarding it. Indeed, the word 'horse', whose relation has been apprehended with respect to horseness, does not express cowness, nor does it possess epistemic validity with respect to it. Therefore, words whose relation has been apprehended with respect to an action have epistemic validity only with respect to action.

16.72

If it is objected: Surely where the apprehension of a word's relation occurs through inferring the cause of joy, which is an already established entity, from an inferential sign such as a beaming face—as in [sentences like] “A son is born to you”—there epistemic validity of the word regarding an already established entity must certainly be admitted without any action at all—

16.73

We reply: No; because many causes of joy, such as the safe delivery of a beloved wife, present themselves just like the birth of a son, an ascertainment by elimination is impossible. And in usages directed toward an already established entity, such as “A son is born to you,” the usage is explained by supplying an action, as in “[Close/open] the door, the door!” Furthermore, based on their well-known status as a sacred treatise, the Vedāntas cannot have an already established entity as their purport; for only sentences directed toward activity or cessation from activity are well known to be a sacred treatise. As has been said by the Bhaṭṭa master:

16.74

“Activity or cessation from activity, whether by something eternal or created,

16.75

by which it is taught to men, that is called a sacred treatise.”

16.76

Nor is there any purpose in these [texts] being directed toward an entity's own form; for even in a person who has heard the meaning of Vedānta, worldly attributes do not cease. Therefore, it is established that, relying on syntactic unity with the injunction handed down in tradition that “The self is to be known,” a purport directed toward action must be adopted even for the Vedāntas. And consequently, the epistemic validity of the Vedāntas regarding Brahman, which is an entirely established entity, is not established—if this is urged:

16.77

To this, the reply is made: First of all, the apprehension of linguistic relation with respect to an established entity is not unestablished; because, according to the principle deduced earlier, the apprehension of linguistic relation is indeed established even from a sentence directed toward an established entity, such as “A son is born to you.” Nor should it be said that ascertainment by elimination is impossible because the safe delivery of a beloved wife and the like are also possible; for there is no indicator of the safe delivery of a beloved wife and the like, unlike the showing of a cloth marked with the word “son.” If you say that the birth of a son is itself that indicator, no:

16.78

because there is no reason to abandon the birth of a son, which was understood first; and because the birth of a son is itself the cause of greater joy,

16.79

since it is found [said]: / “Other than the birth and death of a son, there is nothing for joy and sorrow.”

16.80

And thus Citsukhācārya said:

16.81

“Because of the ascertainment by elimination on the part of one who arrived

16.82

with a messenger who saw the birth of Caitra's son, [carrying] a garment marked with that word.”

16.83

As for what was said—that in passages concerning an established fact there is supply of an action—that is incorrect; because, when usage is established even regarding an established fact as its primary meaning, supplying [an action] is untenable. And as for what was said—that because of its well-known character as a scripture it cannot refer to the essential nature [of Brahman]—that too is incorrect; because its character as a scripture is established even by instructing what is beneficial. Nor is there an absence of purpose; for, through the rise of knowledge by the repeated contemplation of the non-dual self-knowledge born from the Vedānta passages that have been heard and reflected upon, the supreme aim of human existence—characterized by the state of being Brahman-Self marked by the cessation of nescience, the root cause of saṃsāra—is achieved. Nor is an injunction possible here, since it cannot endure alternative possibilities. To explain: is verbal knowledge to be enjoined, or that which consists of contemplative cultivation, or that which is of the nature of direct realization? Not the first; for it arises from the verbal text itself, even without an injunction, for one who knows the relations of word meanings and has studied the principles of linguistic logic. Nor the second; for contemplative cultivation, being the cause of the excellence of knowledge, is established by positive and negative concomitance and, being already obtained, is not something to be enjoined; because only that which conveys what is not already obtained is accepted as an injunction. On the third [alternative]: is the direct realization the essential nature of Brahman, or is it a specific transformation of the internal organ? Not the first; for, being eternal, it cannot be enjoined. Nor the second; for, being of the nature of the direct realization of bliss, it is the result and thus cannot be enjoined. Therefore, since words such as 'must be known' are not injunctive, and since kṛtya-suffixes are prescribed in the sense of fitness by the rule 'and kṛtya and tṛc suffixes in the sense of fitness', only fitness is to be explained as their sense. And thus, since all Vedānta passages possess the sixfold marks of purport such as beginning and conclusion, it must be maintained that they refer to the Self which is Brahman, whose nature is eternally pure, enlightened, and free.

16.84

Since conjunction, which is held to reside in a part, is impossible to establish in a partless atom, and consequently the dyad dependent on it is unestablished, the theory of creation beginning with the dyad is impossible; and since the theory of the transformation of insentient primordial matter into the form of the intellect and the rest is also impossible; it is established, because otherwise cognition and sublation are inexplicable, that the phenomenal world is inexplicable and is an illusory manifestation of consciousness. An illusory manifestation is the assumption of another form without abandoning its own essential nature; it is an appearance designated as true-and-false. Appearance and superimposition are synonyms. And that superimposition is of two kinds: superimposition of an object and superimposition of a cognition. That has been stated:

16.85

"The being-the-self-of-another of one thing, arising from pramāṇa, defect, and mental impression,

16.86

and the cognition of that—this pair is indeed accepted as superimposition by the wise."

16.87

Superimposition is also twofold in another way: through the distinction between unconditioned and conditioned. That too has been stated:

16.88

"Arising from ignorance agitated by a defect or even by karma,

16.89

and opposed to the knowledge of reality—this error is unconditioned.

16.90

A manifestation of nescience whose agitation is caused by the proximity of an extrinsic condition,

16.91

and which is removed by the departure of the extrinsic condition, they declare to be a conditioned error."

16.92

Among these, the superimposition of the ego and the rest, imagined in its essential nature, is unconditioned. That too has been stated:

16.93

"Like blueness in the sky, this saṃsāra is [superimposed] upon Brahman through delusion;

16.94

like the ether in a pot, this experiencer is deluded by difference, not in its own nature."

16.95

For this very reason the author of the commentary cited two examples: 'mother-of-pearl appears like silver' and 'the single moon appears as if accompanied by a second'. The rest is clear in the scripture itself, so we cease for fear of prolixity. And thus, that there are only two categories—the seer and the seen—is the settled conclusion of the Vedāntins; so all is clear.

16.96

Here the Prabhākara [replies]: The example 'mother-of-pearl appears like silver' is not accepted; for it is untenable that the cognition of silver has mother-of-pearl as its objective support. To explain: in the cognition 'this is silver', is the status of mother-of-pearl as the objective support based merely on its presence in the space before [the observer], or as being the cause, or as being what appears? Not the first; for clods of earth and the like located in front would also reductively follow to be the objective support. Now, if you think that it is the objective support because it is the cause of the cognition of silver via being the cause of awakening the mental impression that is the instrument for knowing silver—that too does not hold; for eyes and the rest would also reductively turn out to be the object, because of being causes. Now, if it is accepted that it is the object by being what appears, that too is unsuited; for it is untenable that an appearance of silver has mother-of-pearl as its objective support. Whatever appears in a cognition, that is its objective support. And here, the experience of silver contradicts the supposition that mother-of-pearl is the objective support. And thus Śālikanātha declared in the Nyāyavīthī:

16.97

"On this point we say: only that object which shines in a cognition

16.98

is the cognizable object; for there is no other definition of cognizable and non-cognizable.

16.99

Here, in 'this is silver', it is silver that appears;

16.100

that alone should be the cognizable object by it, but not mother-of-pearl, because of its not being cognized.

16.101

Therefore, the appearance of one thing as another is refuted by perception itself;

16.102

for while one thing is appearing, another does not appear."

16.103

Furthermore, the causal complex for the production of a false cognition does not exist. Are the senses and so forth causes alone, or vitiated by defects? Not the first; because their capacity to produce correct knowledge is observed; otherwise, correct knowledge of silver would never arise. Not the second; because defects have the power merely to obstruct the natural capacity to produce an effect. Indeed, a defective kuṭaja seed cannot produce a banyan sprout; nor is a rice seed corrupted by oil able to produce a non-rice sprout; rather, it does not produce its own effect.

16.104

If it is objected that a reed seed burned by a forest fire has been seen to produce a plantain stem—

16.105

that is out of place; for, since what is burned is no longer a reed seed, it is not an example of defects producing a contrary effect. Nor must it be accepted that the gastric fire vitiated by the defect of morbid hunger is seen to have the capacity to digest an abundance of food; because the digestive fire has the capacity to transform food that is eaten, drunk, and so forth. That has been stated:

16.106

"There is no cause for the production of a non-veridical cognition;

16.107

if defects [are proposed], no, for defects merely destroy the power to produce an effect.

16.108

In morbid hunger and the like, [a condition] is a defect precisely because of the destruction of the effect;

16.109

for the production of chyle is the effect of the fire residing in the stomach."

16.110

Moreover, if the arising of cognition is admitted even in the absence of an object, then even in veridical cases, because of the possible sprouting of doubt concerning the deviation of cognitions from their objects, unhindered worldly activity would be destroyed. Thus he said:

16.111

"And if any cognition were to appear forsaking [its] object,

16.112

how could it be a cause of confidence when it deviates regarding its own object?"

16.113

[Objection:] If a single qualified cognition having silver as its object is not accepted, qualified practical activity would not be established; therefore, in order to establish that too, error must be accepted—if this is argued,

16.114

[Reply:] it is not so; because two cognitions, named apprehension and memory, of the form "this [is] silver", are accepted as the cause of practical activity. If [it be objected] that in this way, even from "this is a piece of mother-of-pearl, that is silver", qualified practical activity would result, that is not so. For in this case, the apprehension of merely the object present before oneself as "this" is a cognition of mere generality, not distinguished by mother-of-pearl-ness and the like because it is produced by an eye impaired by defects; whereas the cognition "silver", having an unproximate object, is not produced by sensory contact, inferential sign, and so forth, but arises solely from a latent impression awakened by similarity, and, being reduced by elimination to the state of memory, has the apprehended element of "that-ness" stolen away due to defect, thus being established as a mere apprehension. That too has been stated:

16.115

"Now, how could this semblance of silver occur here?

16.116

It is answered: a piece of mother-of-pearl is apprehended, devoid of distinction.

16.117

The specific features of mother-of-pearl which are the causes of distinction from silver—

16.118

those are not known due to occlusion; [only] the generic form is known.

16.119

And immediately thereafter, memory of silver arises, and by it as well,

16.120

due to a defect of the mind, stripped of the reference to the factor 'that',

16.121

having taken silver as its object, it is not distinguished from the mother-of-pearl at all.

16.122

Hence, through memory, the semblance of silver will be accounted for.

16.123

For silver that is not present cannot be [an object of] perception;

16.124

and, owing to the absence of an inferential sign and the like, it is not the object of any other means of valid cognition.

16.125

By elimination, the determination arises again that it is a memory."

16.126

[Objection:] Well, does each of these individually cause practical activity, or together? Not the first, for that would entail action directed toward different places. Not the last, because simultaneity of cognitions is negated by [the Nyāya Sūtra,] 'due to the non-simultaneity of efforts and non-simultaneity of cognitions', etc. Therefore, the statement that two cognitions are the cause is improper—if this is argued,

16.127

do not speak thus; for although the coexistence of two non-perishing [cognitions] is negated, the coexistence of a perishing [cognition] and a non-perishing [cognition] is not negated, and so that is established for two [cognitions] arising immediately one after the other.

16.128

[Objection:] Granted that one desiring silver might act toward silver from a cognition of silver; how could there be action toward an object situated in front?—if this is argued,

16.129

it is not so; because apprehension and memory, whose distinction is unapprehended both in intrinsic form and in object, through resemblance to a cognition having proximate silver as its object, can account for being the cause of the designation of co-reference proper to non-difference, even though in reality they are distinct from one another.

16.130

[Question:] How is there resemblance of apprehension and memory to a cognition of proximate silver?

16.131

[Reply:] Listen to how this is so: a cognition having proximate silver as its object does not grasp a non-relation between the "this"-part and the silver-part, because, since the two are connected, there is no non-relation at all; nor does it grasp any internal distinction within itself, because it is a single cognition. In the same way, apprehension and memory too, due to the influence of defects, do not grasp the non-relation—the distinction—between the "this"-part and the silver-part, even though it exists. Non-apprehension of distinction alone is the resemblance. That has been stated by the followers of the Guru's system:

16.132

"And these two, apprehension and memory, not illuminating distinction,

16.133

even though in reality distinct from a correct cognition of silver,

16.134

nevertheless do not appear distinct, due to the equality of the non-apprehension of distinction.

16.135

A correct cognition of silver, however, has a single object present to the senses;

16.136

and, not realizing these two—apprehension and memory—to be distinct from that,

16.137

people consider them solely in a common form.

16.138

Through an immediate appearance and the apprehension of an identical object,

16.139

an awareness of non-distinctness is thus presented.

16.140

Practical activity equal to that [for real silver] proceeds entirely from that."

16.141

Thus it is established that the pair of apprehension and memory, whose distinction is unapprehended and which has attained resemblance to the cognition of proximate silver, is the cause of incorrect practical activity.

16.142

[Objection:] If incorrect practical activity were thus produced by apprehension and memory, then it would not be established in cases like "the conch is yellow", because the two are absent there—if this is argued,

16.143

[Reply:] it is not so; because, when two apprehensions whose distinction is unapprehended have attained resemblance to a cognition of a valid connection, they can indeed bring about practical activity. The yellowness of the bilious substance present in the rays of the eye is apprehended, due to defects, devoid of its substance; the conch too is apprehended in its own form, its white quality ungrasped. Therefore, because of the resemblance consisting in the non-apprehension of the non-relation of these two—the quality and the possessor of the quality—which are capable of relation, practical activity is accounted for due to the lack of difference from the cognition of a yellow lump of gold. As it has been said:

16.144

"Indeed, in the cognition of a yellow conch, of the bile present in the sense organ,

16.145

the yellowness is apprehended, devoid of substance, due to defect in that way;

16.146

and the whiteness of the conch is not apprehended due to a defect of the sense organ;

16.147

rather, the mere substance alone appears, devoid of color.

16.148

When a quality dependent on a substance and a substance requiring a quality

16.149

are appearing, the cognition does not grasp the non-connection between the two.

16.150

These two cognitions appearing equal to the appearance of a real yellow [thing],

16.151

practical activity equal to that is fitting in this case as well." Thus.

16.152

[Objection:] If an erroneous cognition such as "this is silver" is not accepted, since there would be no application of silver, how does the negation "this is not silver" make known the absence of silver?—if this is argued,

16.153

this is not a fault; because there is conceptual parsimony in accepting the negation of the practical activity regarding silver in mother-of-pearl, which [activity] was occasioned by the non-apprehension of distinction. That has been stated in the Pañcikā section:

16.154

"Even the falsity [is accounted for] because it prompts practical activity equal to that [toward real silver],

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Linked texts (1)

Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha — Mādhava, Sanskrit