Sarvadarshanasangraha 3

English (machine translation) 3

Language: English

3.1

Now begins the Jaina philosophical system. //3

Now, thus unable to endure the doctrine of those whose girdles are loose (the Buddhists), the unclothed ones (the Digambara Jainas), positing permanence in some manner, reject the thesis of momentariness. If some enduring self were not accepted, then the accomplishment of the means to this-worldly and other-worldly results would be futile. For this cannot be possible: that one person acts and another enjoys [the fruit]. Therefore, because that enduring entity, extending through earlier and later times, is established by clear means of valid cognition as "I who performed the action before am the very one who now experiences its fruit," momentariness—characterized as remaining for a mere instant of time devoid of prior and posterior portions—is not fit to be accepted by investigating Jainas.

3.3

Now, you might think:

3.4

"Who can stop a stream that arrives possessed of epistemic validity?"

3.5

By this maxim, since momentariness is established by the means of valid cognition, namely, "whatever is existent is momentary" and so forth, in accordance with that, between those existing in the very same mental stream, the earlier cognition is the agent of action and the subsequent cognition is the experiencer of the fruit. And there is no over-extension, because the cause-and-effect relationship is the determinant. Just as mango seeds soaked in sweet juice, when sown in tilled soil, have sweetness invariably determined in the fruit through the succession of sprouts, stalks, trunks, branches, tender leaves, and so on; or just as cotton seeds and the like sprinkled with red lac juice have redness invariably determined in the cotton and so on through the succession of sprouts and so forth. As it is said:

3.6

"For in whichever continuum the latent impression of action is deposited,

3.7

it produces its fruit in that very one, just as redness [is produced] in cotton.

3.8

When lac or the like is sprinkled upon the blossom of a citron or the like,

3.9

a certain power is deposited there; do you not see that?"

3.10

That, too, is like clutching at reeds and grass, because it cannot endure alternative inquiry. In an example such as a cloud, is momentariness established by this means of valid cognition or by another means of valid cognition? Not the first: since momentariness as you intend it has never been observed anywhere, the example remains unestablished, and therefore this inference cannot even arise. Nor the second: for if momentariness were established everywhere by that very principle, it would follow that the inference from existence is futile. Moreover, if it is accepted that existence is the capacity for causal efficacy, it would follow that even the bite of an illusory snake has existence, because it possesses causal efficacy. For this very reason it is said: "The existent is that which is endowed with origination, destruction, and permanence." Now, if it is claimed that [momentariness] is established through the superposition of contradictory properties defined by capacity and incapacity, that is unsound: for since the doctrine of non-absolutism is accepted by the proponents of Syādvāda, contradiction is unestablished.

3.11

What was said regarding the example of cotton and the like is mere assertion, because no valid reasoning was stated, and because there, too, complete annihilation without residue is not accepted. Nor can a continuum attain the status of a means of valid cognition apart from the members of the continuum. As it is said:

3.12

"Homogeneous individuals, produced in succession

3.13

and closely contiguous to one another—among them there is a continuum, and that is called one."

3.14

Nor can the rule of the cause-and-effect relationship break the over-extension. For similarly, the cognition of a pupil might remember what was experienced by the cognition of the teacher, or might experience the fruit of the karma accumulated by him. And thus results the fallacy of the loss of what was done and the acquisition of what was not done. As said by the author of the commentary, Siddhasena:

3.15

"Ignoring the faults of the destruction of what was done, the fruition of actions not done,

3.16

the loss of liberation from worldly existence, and the destruction of memory, and wanting momentariness directly—ah, exceedingly rash is that adversary!"

3.17

Furthermore, on the thesis of momentariness, since the object of cognition does not exist at the time of cognition, and cognition does not exist at the time of the object of cognition, the relationship of object and grasper would be impossible, and all practical transactions in the world would cease. Nor should simultaneity be suspected; for, like the left and right horns [of a cow], cause-and-effect relationship is impossible, and what is not graspable cannot be an objective condition.

3.18

Now, [if you say that] even though it belongs to a different time, it is graspable because it imparts its form—

3.19

that too is inadequate: because it is difficult to state how a momentary cognition can be the locus of the imparting of form, thereby refuting the doctrine that cognition has forms.

3.20

Even on the doctrine that cognition is formless, the determination of each respective object is established by virtue of fitness. To explain: by perception, cognition is experienced by each person in competitive eagerness as grasping the pot and so forth entirely devoid of the form of the object, and not as possessed of a reflection like a mirror and so on. And if cognition were to bear the form of the object, an oblation of water would have to be offered to ordinary usage regarding the object as distant, near, and so forth.

3.21

Nor should this be accepted as a welcome consequence, because the linguistic usage, "The mountain is farther away; my arm is nearer," remains active and unimpeded. Nor should it be said that such usage is due to the fact that the imparter of the form possesses distance and the like,

3.22

for no such thing is observed in mirrors and the like. Furthermore, just as cognition arising from an object imitates its blue form, if it were likewise to imitate its insentience as well, then like the object it too would be insentient. And thus, desiring profit, you would lose even your principal; and so a great calamity would have occurred.

3.23

Now, if out of a desire to avoid this fault you say that cognition does not imitate insentience, alas, then there would be no apprehension of that [insentience]; and so the maxim applies: "Wishing to secure one thing, one loses the other."

3.24

[Objection:] 'Well, let insentience not be grasped! What is lost to us? Even when it is not grasped, if the form of blue is grasped, either there must be a difference between the two, or [their relationship] must be indeterminate. And if insentience is not grasped when the form of blue is grasped, how could it be its intrinsic nature? Otherwise, the three worlds too, though ungrasped, would be the nature of a grasped pillar!' This collection of objects of valid cognition has been elaborated by Prabhācandra and other followers of the Arhat's doctrine in works such as the Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa; hence it is not set forth [here] for fear of prolixity.

3.25

Therefore, men who desire the aims of human existence should not follow the Buddhist path; rather, only the Jaina [doctrine] is to be honoured.

3.26

And the essential nature of the Arhat was engraved by Hemacandrasūri in the Āptaniścayālaṃkāra:

3.27

"Omniscient, having conquered faults such as passion, worshipped by the three worlds,

3.28

and speaking of things as they truly are, the Arhat is the supreme lord [and] god." So [it is said].

3.29

[Objection:] Surely no particular person designated by the word 'omniscient' enters the path of the means of valid cognition, because the five means of valid cognition that could apprehend his existence are not found in his case. And so it has been stated by the followers of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa:

3.30

"To begin with, an omniscient person is not seen at present by people like us;

3.31

nor is there any part seen, or an inferential sign, that could lead to his inference. // 1

3.32

Nor is there any scriptural injunction that makes known an eternally omniscient being;

3.33

nor can it even be assumed that the explanatory statements have that as their purport. // 2

3.34

Nor is his existence enjoined by those [statements] whose primary concern is another meaning;

3.35

nor can he, not having been previously made known by others, be mentioned by way of restatement. // 3

3.36

Nor can a beginning-possessing omniscient being be the subject of a beginningless scripture;

3.37

and how could he be made known by an artificial and untrue [scripture]? // 4

3.38

Now, if the omniscient being is understood by the ignorant solely on the basis of his own word,

3.39

how could the establishment of those two, mutually dependent, be conceived? // 5

3.40

The statement is true because it was spoken by an omniscient being, and his existence is [proven] by that [statement]:

3.41

how could both of those be established without another established basis? // 6

3.42

From a statement composed by a non-omniscient person, however, devoid of an authoritative root,

3.43

why do those who cognize an omniscient being not know [him] from their own words? // 7

3.44

If we were to see someone similar to an omniscient person at present,

3.45

then we might know an omniscient being through comparison. // 8

3.46

[If it is urged that] the teaching of the Buddha, too, which has righteousness, unrighteousness, and so forth as its domain,

3.47

would otherwise not be explicable if omniscience did not exist, // 9

3.48

even so postulation is not applicable here as a means of valid cognition,

3.49

because the truth of the teaching is not observed by perception." // 10 // And so forth.

3.50

To this, the reply is stated: As for what was said—that the five means of valid cognition that could apprehend his existence are not found in his case—that is incorrect, because inference and the like, which make known his existence, do exist. To explain: A certain self directly realizes all entities, because, while possessing the nature of apprehending them, the causes obstructing [that cognition] have been eliminated; whatever possesses the nature of apprehending something and has the causes obstructing [that cognition] eliminated directly realizes that [thing], just as visual cognition whose obstructions such as cataract have been removed directly realizes visible form; and a certain self has the causes obstructing [its cognition] eliminated while possessing the nature of apprehending them; therefore, it directly realizes all entities. First of all, it is not unproven that the self possesses the nature of apprehending all objects: through the fact that the arising of knowledge of all objects would otherwise be inexplicable on the strength of Vedic injunction, and because knowledge of the pervasion arises that 'Everything is of a non-one-sided nature, because it exists'. For the masters of the sacrifice-Mīmāṃsā, who accept knowledge having all objects as its domain that is grounded in the investigation of injunctions and prohibitions—stating that 'The Vedic injunction makes known an object that is past, present, future, subtle, concealed, distant, and of such kinds'—have thereby conceded that the self possesses the nature of apprehending all objects. Nor is the destruction of the veil that obstructs all objects impossible, since a particular causal complex characterized by the triad of right vision and so forth, which is the cause of the destruction of the veil, is well recognized. By this same seal, minor objections are also to be dispersed.

3.51

[Objection:] If you say: "It was claimed that through the destruction of the veil there arises vivid, primary perception having all things as its object; that is incorrect, because that omniscient being is eternally liberated, and so a veil is simply impossible [for him]"—

3.52

that is not so, because his being eternally liberated is itself unproven. The omniscient being is not eternally liberated, because he is liberated, like other liberated beings. Moreover, the designation 'liberated' is used with reference to one who is bound; and in one devoid of that, this [designation] too would not exist, just like space.

3.53

[Objection:] Is not his existence established as the maker of the beginningless series of effects such as the earth? For example: 'The earth and the like have a maker, because they are effects, like a pot.'

3.54

That too is incorrect, because being an effect is itself unproved. Nor should it be asserted that this is proved through having parts, because this snare of conceptual alternatives arises: does having parts mean conjunction with parts, inherence in parts, being produced by parts, being a substance that is inhered in, or being an object of a cognition [cognizing something] as having parts? The first is not [valid], because of inconclusiveness with respect to ether and the like. The second is not [valid], because of deviation with respect to universals and the like. The third is not [valid], because it is undistinguished from the property to be proved. The fourth is not [valid], because its neck is seized by the bolt of a pair of alternatives: is 'being a substance that is inhered in' intended and made the inferential sign in the sense of being a substance possessing merely the relation of inherence, or being a substance inhering in another? In the first [case], there is deviation with respect to ether and the like, since for it too, being a substance and possessing the inherence of qualities and the like are possible. In the second [case], it is undistinguished from the property to be proved, since inherence must be proved in the parts which are the meaning of the word 'another' and which are the inherent causes. This has been said by way of concession; but in reality inherence does not exist at all, for lack of a means of valid cognition. Nor is the fifth [valid], because of inconclusiveness with respect to the self and the like, since even though it is the object of a cognition [cognizing it] as having parts, it lacks being an effect. Nor must it be accepted that, even though it is partless, its being the object of a cognition [cognizing it] as having parts through its connection with an object having parts is metaphorical; for if it were partless, there would be a contradiction with its all-pervasiveness, like an atom. Furthermore, is a single maker proved, or many? In the first [case], there is deviation with respect to palaces and the like, since the agency of many men such as architects is observed there. In the second [case], if many were the makers of the universe, because the possibility of mutual disagreement among them would be unavoidable, everything would end in disarray if each thing were fashioned in differing forms. And since the production of the entire world would be accomplished by one alone due to the equality of power among all, the others would be useless.

3.55

That has been stated in the Vītarāgastuti:

3.56

"There is some creator of the world, and he is one,

3.57

he is omnipresent, he is independent, he is eternal"—

3.58

these would be the mockeries of bad disputants,

3.59

[but] not of those whose instructor you are.

3.60

Elsewhere too:

3.61

No maker at all is seen here [acting] according to his wish,

3.62

otherwise that consequence would apply even in the making of a mat;

3.63

what need is there of an effect here by you and carpenters and others,

3.64

and does a person create the three worlds in one strike?

3.65

Therefore, through the power of the previously mentioned triad of causes, upon the destruction of the veils omniscience is logical. Nor should it be asserted that, due to the absence of another teacher, the triad of right vision and so on is impossible; for this knowledge of all things arises from scripture composed by a prior omniscient one. Nor is there the flaw of mutual dependence and the like, because the succession of scripture and omniscient beings is admitted to be beginningless like seed and sprout. Enough on this point.

3.66

The triad beginning with right vision, famous as designated by the term 'the three jewels,' has been expounded in the Paramāgamasāra, devoted to the compendium of the teachings of the Jina: 'Right vision, knowledge, and conduct are the path to liberation.' And it has been explained by Yogadeva: right vision is faith—a synonym for freedom from perverse convictions and the like—in the categories taught by the Arhat according to the nature in which the soul and other principles exist. And likewise the Tattvārthasūtra: 'Faith in the categories is right vision.' There is another [verse] too:

3.67

Taste for the principles spoken by the Jina is called right faith;

3.68

it arises by nature or through comprehension from a teacher.

3.69

Nature is the self's own intrinsic form, independent of instruction by another. Comprehension is knowledge produced by instruction by another in the form of explanation and the like.

3.70

Right knowledge is apprehension free of delusion and doubt, in accordance with that nature in which the categories such as the soul exist. As has been stated:

3.71

The comprehension, in brief or in detail,

3.72

of things as they actually exist, the wise call right knowledge here.

3.73

That knowledge is of five kinds, divided into perceptual, scriptural, clairvoyant, telepathic, and absolute. That has been stated: 'Perceptual, scriptural, clairvoyant, telepathic, and absolute [forms] constitute knowledge.' The meaning of this is: perceptual knowledge is that by which, when there is the destruction-and-suppression of the knowledge-obscuring [karma], being engaged by employing the sense organs and the mind, one cognizes an object as it is. Scriptural knowledge is clear knowledge produced by perceptual knowledge when there is the destruction-and-suppression of the knowledge-obscuring [karma]. Clairvoyant knowledge is knowledge whose object is limited, caused by the destruction-and-suppression produced by the virtues of right vision and the like. Telepathic knowledge is knowledge clearly discerning an object present in another's mind, when there is the destruction-and-suppression of the obstacle of jealousy and the knowledge-obscuring [karma]. Absolute knowledge is that knowledge which is unmixed with any other knowledge, for the sake of which ascetics practice specific ascetic acts. Among these, the first two are indirect, the others direct. That has been stated:

3.74

Cognition that illuminates itself and others, free from sublation, is a means of valid cognition;

3.75

and it is twofold, direct and indirect, by determining the knowable object.

3.76

The internal classification in detail, however, should be understood from that very scripture.

3.77

Right conduct is the cessation of activities that are causes of sinful rebirth, for one who is faithful, knowledgeable, and striving for the eradication of transmigratory karma. This has been stated in detail by the Arhat:

3.78

Renunciation of all blameworthy activities is called conduct;

3.79

that is declared to be fivefold through the division of vows such as non-violence:

3.80

non-violence, truthfulness, non-stealing, celibacy, and non-possession.

3.81

Not taking away the life of moving

3.82

and stationary beings through negligence is regarded as the vow of non-violence.

3.83

Pleasant, beneficial, and true speech is called the vow of truthfulness;

3.84

even what is true is not true if it is unpleasant and harmful.

3.85

Not taking what has not been given is proclaimed as the vow of non-stealing;

3.86

wealth is the external vital breath of men, and by seizing it, they are truly slain.

3.87

Renunciation of divine and earthly desires through deeds done, permitted, or caused,

3.88

by mind, speech, and body, is held to be eighteen-fold celibacy.

3.89

Non-possession is the renunciation of attachment toward all things,

3.90

since through attachment mental agitation arises even with respect to non-existent things.

3.91

Cultivated by five reflections each, in due order,

3.92

the great vows accomplish the imperishable state for humanity.

3.93

And the detailed explanation of the five reflections has been set forth:

3.94

Constantly, through the renunciation of laughter, greed, fear, and anger,

3.95

[and] one should cultivate the vow of truthful speech by constantly rejecting laughter, greed, fear, and anger, and also by speaking with deliberation'

3.96

and so forth. These three—right vision, [right] knowledge, and [right] conduct—are together the cause of liberation, not individually, just like a medicinal elixir. And likewise here, knowledge, faith, and conduct accomplish the fruit in combination, not individually.

3.97

Here, in brief, there are two principles called the soul and the non-soul. Among them, the soul is conscious in nature; the non-soul, on the other hand, is non-conscious in nature. That has been stated by Padmanandin:

3.98

'Conscious and non-conscious are the two supreme principles; discernment is the discrimination between them,

3.99

for one who accepts what is to be accepted and avoids what is to be avoided.

3.100

For what is to be avoided is agency, passion, and the like, whose effect is lack of discernment;

3.101

what is to be accepted is the supreme light, defined solely as attentive consciousness.'

3.102

Attentive consciousness consists of knowledge and vision when they take on the transformation of the innate nature of consciousness. Because of the bonding of spatial points by karma, it becomes the cause for apprehending the otherness of the self, which has become unified [with karma]. Consciousness, which is common to all souls, becomes the essential nature of the soul when one intends the soul's modification transformed, through the power of subsiding, destruction, and destruction-cum-subsidence, into states of subsidence, destruction, and destruction-cum-subsidence, and, through the rise of karma, into an impure other form. As the Master-Expounder stated: 'The states of subsidence, destruction, mixed, rising, and inherent are the soul's own essence.' The state of subsidence is that which arises in the soul when karma is in subsidence, which is of the nature of reaching non-arising. Just as, when mud produces turbidity, water becomes clear when [the mud] settles to the bottom due to contact with a kataka nut or the like. The state of destruction brings about purity through the washing away of the mud of passion and the like, by virtue of investigating the principle of the Arhat. The state of destruction is the state that arises when karma is destroyed, just like the clarity of water that has been separated from mud, is pure, and is kept in a crystal vessel or the like, as in liberation. The mixed state is of both natures, like the semi-clarity of water. The rising state is that which occurs when karma rises. The inherent state, such as having consciousness, is the innate state that does not depend on the subsidence or other [states] of karma. This, as applicable, is the essential nature of the worthy or unworthy soul: such is the meaning of the aphorism. That has been stated in the Svarūpasaṃbodhana:

3.103

'It is not distinct from knowledge, nor not distinct; somehow it is both distinct and non-distinct.

3.104

Knowledge serialized into prior and posterior states—this is declared to be the self.'

3.105

Now, if it is objected that, since difference and non-difference exist through mutual exclusion and only one of the two can be real, being of the nature of both is improper—

3.106

that is improper, because there is no means of valid cognition to sublate it. For the sublating means of valid cognition is non-perception; but that does not exist. And because, in the doctrine of the propounder of conditional assertion, all entities are well known to be non-absolutist in nature. Enough on this point.

3.107

Others, however, explain a further elaboration of the soul and the non-soul, through the division into the ontological extensions of the soul, space, the principle of motion, the principle of rest, and physical matter. In these five principles, the designation 'exists' is used with respect to endurance in relation to the three periods of time; the designation 'extension' is used like 'body' because they possess multiple spatial points. There, souls are of two kinds: transmigrating and liberated. Transmigrating souls are those that pass from one existence to another. And they are of two kinds: possessing a mind and lacking a mind. Among them, those endowed with rational awareness possess a mind. Rational awareness consists of grasping instruction, activity, and speech. Those lacking that, however, lack a mind. And those lacking a mind are of two kinds, through the division into mobile and immobile. Among them, the four kinds of mobile beings are those possessing two or more senses, such as conches and earthworms. Earth, water, fire, air, and plants are immobile. Among them, earth is the dust on the road; an earth-body is a brick or the like; an earth-bodied being is one that has taken earth as its body; an earth-soul is one that will take earth as its body. In this manner, the fourfold division should also be applied to water and the rest. Among them, those that have taken and will take earth and the rest as their body are understood to be the immobile beings, not earth and the rest, nor earth-bodies and the rest, because these are non-souls. And those immobile beings have only one sense: touch.

3.108

Liberated souls are free from passing to another existence.

3.109

The ontological extensions of the principle of motion, the principle of rest, and space possess oneness, are inactive, and are the causes of a substance's arrival at another location. Among them, the principles of motion and rest are well known. Their residence is everywhere in the sky delimited by the cosmos, which is known by the term 'cosmic space'. Assisting movement and rest is the function of the principles of motion and rest. Therefore, the ontological extension of motion is inferred from activity; the ontological extension of rest is inferred from rest. Pervasion is the entry of one entity into the spatial points of another entity; that is the function of space.

3.110

Physical matter possesses touch, taste, smell, and color. It is of two kinds: atoms and aggregates. Atoms cannot be experienced; aggregates are di-atoms and the like. There, an atom and so forth is produced from the division of an aggregate such as a di-atom. A di-atom and so forth is produced from the combination of an atom and so forth. In some cases, the production of an aggregate occurs through both division and combination. Therefore, physical matter is so called because it fills out and dissolves. Although time lacks the character of an ontological extension because it lacks multiple spatial points, it nonetheless possesses substantiality, because it possesses the definition of that. As it has been said: 'A substance is that which possesses qualities and modifications'; qualities reside in substances and lack qualities. For example, in the case of the soul, they are of the nature of properties such as knowledgehood; in the case of physical matter, they are universal natures such as possessing color; in the case of the principle of motion, the principle of rest, space, and time, their qualities are the universals of being the causes of movement, rest, accommodation, and continuation, respectively. A modification is that substance's existing in the manner described. Origination, its condition, transformation, and alteration—these are modifications. For example, in the case of the soul, there are cognitions of jars and the like, pleasure, affliction, and so on; in the case of physical matter, lumps of clay, jars, and the like; in the case of the principle of motion and the rest, their particular movements and so on. Therefore, it is well known that there are six substances.

3.111

Some describe [the reality] as seven principles. So it has been said: "The principles are soul, non-soul, influx, bondage, stoppage, wearing away, and liberation." Among these, soul and non-soul have been explained. Influx is now explained: Influx is the movement of the self by means of the movement of the physical body and so forth, known by the designation 'activity'. Just as an opening that lets in water is called an 'influx' because it is a cause for the flowing in of water and the like, so, because karma flows in through the conduit of activity, that activity is influx. Just as a damp cloth takes up the mass of dust brought by the wind from all sides, so the self, moistened by the water of the passions, takes in karma brought by activity with all its spatial units. Or just as a red-hot iron ball thrown into water absorbs water from all sides, so the soul, heated by the passions, takes in karma brought by activity from all sides. A passion is anger, pride, deceit, and greed, so called because it injures, harms the self by leading it to an unhappy state of existence. It is twofold through the division into auspicious and inauspicious. Here, non-violence and the like are auspicious bodily activity; truthful, measured, and wholesome speech and the like are auspicious vocal activity; devotion to the Five Supreme Lords named Arhat, Siddha, Ācārya, Upādhyāya, and Sādhu, delight in penance, reverence for sacred scripture, and so forth are auspicious mental activity. But the three kinds of activity opposite to these are inauspicious. All this variety of kinds and sub-kinds of influx has been proclaimed with earnestness through a series of aphorisms: "Activity is the action of body, speech, and mind. That is influx. The auspicious is [the influx] of merit; the inauspicious is of demerit," and so forth. Others, however, consider as follows: Influx is the engagement of the sense faculties toward sense objects, which causes the person to flow toward them; for through the sense faculties, the conscious light of the person, touching objects, transforms into the form of cognitions such as color and form.

3.112

Bondage is that reception and interpenetration which the self, under the influence of false view, non-abstinence, negligence, and passions, as well as under the influence of activity, effects with subtle material particles occupying the same space and possessing infinite spatial units, which are fit to become karma. So it has been said: "Because it possesses passions, the soul takes in material particles fit to become karma; that is bondage." In that statement, the mention of passions is meant to indicate all the causes of bondage. The venerable teacher Umāsvāti recited the causes of bondage: "False view, non-abstinence, negligence, passions, and activity are the causes of bondage."

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False view is twofold: one is natural, which is lack of faith in the principles without depending on instruction from another, due to the rise of deluding karma; the other arises from instruction by another. Non-abstinence is the injury of the six classes of beings, such as earth, and the lack of restraint of the six senses. Negligence is lack of zeal in the five regulations and the three controls. Passion is anger and the rest. There, the division is that those ending with the passions are the causes of the bondage of duration and fruition, while activity is the cause of the bondage of primary nature and spatial units. Bondage is said to be of four kinds: "Its varieties are nature, duration, fruition, and spatial units." Just as the nature of neem, molasses, and the like is bitterness, sweetness, and so forth, so the nature of the obscuring [karma] is obscuring knowledge and perception, like a cloud obscuring the radiance of the sun, and like a jar concealing the light of a lamp; the nature of the pleasant- and unpleasant-feeling [karma] is producing pleasure and pain, like licking honey from a sword's edge; the nature of deluding [karma] regarding view is causing lack of faith in the true meaning of the principles, like bad company; the nature of deluding [karma] regarding conduct is causing non-restraint, like intoxication from liquor; the nature of life-determining [karma] is binding to a body, like a trap; the nature of name-determining [karma] is causing various bodily forms, like a painter; the nature of status-determining [karma] is causing high and low status, like a potter; the nature of obstructive [karma] is being the cause of obstacles to giving and so forth, like a treasurer. This bondage of primary nature is of eight kinds, known as the root primary natures of the sub-divisions of material karma. Thus the venerable teacher Umāsvāti said: "The first are knowledge-obscuring, perception-obscuring, feeling-producing, deluding, life-determining, name-determining, status-determining, and obstructive karmas." And he summarized their divisions: "Their sub-divisions are respectively five, nine, two, twenty-eight, four, forty-two, two, and five." And because all of this has been elucidated by Vidyānanda and others, it is not set forth here for fear of prolixity. Just as the non-deviation from their sweet nature for such-and-such a time is the duration of the milks of goat, cow, buffalo, and so forth, so the non-deviation from their own nature for the time stated in such passages as "For the first three and for the obstructive karma, the maximum duration is thirty crore-crores of ocean-measured periods" is the duration of the root primary natures such as knowledge-obscuring karma, like a restive animal. Just as fruition is the specific capacity of the milks of goat, cow, buffalo, and so forth in producing their own effects in intense, mild, or other degrees, so fruition is the specific capacity of karmic particles in producing their own effects. The interpenetration into the spatial units of the self by the aggregates of material particles that have transformed into karma and possess infinitely infinite spatial units is the bondage of spatial units.

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Stoppage is the cessation of influx. Stoppage is the controls, regulations, and so forth by which karma entering into the self is prevented. Control is the guarding of the self due to the absence of causes of worldly movement. It is threefold through the division of restraint of body, speech, and mind. Regulation is proper conduct through the avoidance of harm to living beings. That is fivefold, through the division into movement, speech, and so forth. And it has been elaborated by the teacher Hemacandra:

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"On a road traversed by people and kissed by the sun's rays,

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movement made after looking carefully to protect living beings is considered by the virtuous to be the regulation of movement.

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Faultless, truthful, beneficial to all people, and measured speech,

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dear to those of restrained tongue, is called the regulation of speech.

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Whatever food a sage accepts that is constantly untainted

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by the forty-two faults of alms is considered the regulation of begging.

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Carefully inspecting and gently wiping seats and other objects,

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one should take them, set them down, and examine them; this is remembered as the regulation of receiving and placing.

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On ground devoid of living beings, what a virtuous ascetic discharges with care,

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such as phlegm, urine, and feces, is the regulation of disposal."

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Therefore:

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"Influx is the opening of the stream; stoppage is that which closes it" —

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thus they have stated. So it has been said by the learned:

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"Influx is the cause of worldly existence; stoppage is the cause of liberation.

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This is the teaching of the Arhats; everything else is an elaboration of it."

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The wearing away of acquired karma by means of ascetic austerities and the like is the principle named shedding (nirjarā). That which, by means of the body, wears down and destroys the collection of passions active over a long time, merit, and pleasure and pain—such as pulling out the hair—is called austerity. That shedding is of two kinds, due to the distinction between the timely (yathākāla) and the accelerated (aupakramika). Of these, the first is celebrated as arising from the maturation of desire and the like, being the shedding that occurs precisely at that time when a given karma is destined to yield its fruit, through the bestowal of its fruit. The accelerated shedding is that when, by the power of austerity, one causes karma to enter the stream of fruition according to one's own will and experiences it. As is said:

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Because of the wearing away here of karmas that are the seed of transmigratory existence,

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shedding is recognized as two-fold: intentional shedding and unintentional shedding.

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The intentional is traditionally taught as belonging to self-restrained ascetics, but the unintentional to other embodied beings.

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Liberation is the ultimate deliverance from karma, due to the absence of new karma when the causes of bondage such as false view are stopped, and due to the eradication of acquired karma through the presence of the causes of shedding. Thus it is said: 'Liberation is the total release from all karma through the absence of the causes of bondage and through shedding.' Immediately after that, [the soul] moves upward to the end of the world. Just as a potter's wheel propelled by the rotation of the hand, stick, and so forth spins until the exhaustion of the momentum even when that [propelling agent] has ceased, precisely by that force, so although for the liberated one there is an absence of that intense concentration which was repeatedly performed by the self while in transmigratory existence in order to attain release, upward motion up to the end of the world occurs due to previous momentum. Or just as a bottle-gourd burdened by a coating of mud sinks downward in water, but when freed from the binding mud rises upward again, so the self, free from karma, rises upward because of non-attachment. It rises also due to the cutting of bondage, like a castor seed, and due to its intrinsic nature of upward movement, like the flame of a fire. Bondage is the abiding without differentiation when there is mutual interpenetration of parts. Attachment is mere mutual contact. Thus it is said: 'Because of previous application, because of non-attachment, because of the cutting of bondage, and likewise because of the transformation of motion; like the spun potter's wheel, like the gourd freed from its coating, like the castor seed, and like the flame of a fire.' Therefore they recite:

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Having gone and gone, the moon, the sun, and the other planets return;

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those, however, who have reached the space beyond the world do not return even to this day.

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Others, however, have maintained that liberation is the self's abiding in the upper region, when all afflictions and their latent impressions are gone, when its knowledge is un-obscured, and when it is wholly absorbed in bliss. In this way, some have accepted nine categories together with merit and demerit, which are the means to pleasure and pain. Thus it is said in the authoritative doctrine: 'The soul and the non-soul along with merit and demerit, influx, stoppage, shedding, bondage, and liberation are the nine principles.' Engaged in a compendium, we desist [from further detail].

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Here, in all matters, the Jainas introduce the method called the seven-fold modal assertion (saptabhaṅgīnaya): conditionally it is; conditionally it is not; conditionally it is and is not; conditionally it is inexpressible; conditionally it is and is inexpressible; conditionally it is not and is inexpressible; conditionally it is, is not, and is inexpressible.

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Anantavīrya explained all this:

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When there is the intention to affirm it, the formulation 'conditionally it is' arises;

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when its negation is intended, the expression 'conditionally it is not' would be used.

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When both are desired successively, the expression partakes of both together;

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when there is the intention to express them simultaneously, it is conditionally inexpressible, owing to incapacity.

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When the first [assertion] and the inexpressible are intended, the fifth mode is accepted;

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when the final [assertion] and the inexpressible are intended, the arising of the sixth mode occurs;

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and combined with the conjunction, the seventh mode is stated.

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Indeed, this word syāt is a particle that resembles an inflected verb and indicates non-absolutism (anekānta).

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As has been said:

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Indicating non-absolutism in sentences, a qualifier with respect to what is understood,

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the particle syāt, because of its connection with meaning, resembles an inflected verb.

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If, on the contrary, this word syāt were an indicator of absolutism, then in the sentence 'conditionally it is' the word syāt would be meaningless. But when it indicates non-absolutism, since 'conditionally it is' means 'in some respect it is', this meaning 'in some respect' is obtained from the word syāt, and so it is not meaningless. Thus it is said:

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The doctrine of conditional predication (syādvāda), by abandoning absolutism in every way, establishes consciousness according to diverse modes;

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dependent on the method of the seven-fold modal assertion, it determines what is to be avoided and what is to be accepted.

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If an entity exists absolutely—in every way, always, everywhere, and entirely—no one would ever or anywhere engage in activity or desist through the desire to acquire or the desire to avoid, because what is already attained cannot be attained, and the abandonment of what cannot be abandoned is impossible. On the theory of non-absolutism, however, since an entity exists in a certain respect, in a certain place, and in a certain manner, abandonment and acquisition are intelligible for discerning persons. Furthermore, it should be asked: Is existence the nature of an entity, or is non-existence, and so forth? First, it cannot be that existence is the nature of an entity, because 'pot' and 'exists' would be synonyms and could not be used together, and because there would be a contradiction with the expression 'it does not exist'. The same should be applied elsewhere too. As has been said:

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One should not say 'the pot exists', for a pot is indeed existent;

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nor should one say 'it does not exist', because of the contradiction between existence and non-existence, and so forth.

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Therefore it must be stated thus: Opponents are of four kinds according to the distinction of the doctrines of the existent, the non-existent, both existent and non-existent, and the inexpressible. Again, they are of three kinds when the doctrines of the existent, non-existent, and so forth are combined with the theory of the inexpressible. When cross-examined with questions like 'Does the entity exist?' against them, since answers such as 'In a certain respect it exists' are possible, all those disputants become confounded and remain silent; thus, for the one who accepts the doctrine of conditional predication, which determines the complete meaning, victory is achieved everywhere; hence all is established. As the teacher said in the Syādvādamañjarī:

Translations (1)

The Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha, or Review of the Different Systems of Hindu Philosophy — Edward Byles Cowell & Archibald Edward Gough 1882, English

Linked texts (1)

Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha — Mādhava, Sanskrit