Karmanirnaya p9

p9

Nor is there anything devoid of distinctions, because the very statement of being devoid of distinctions is self-contradictory. If it is asked whether it is qualified by the state of being devoid of distinctions or not: if it is unqualified, then there is no refutation of distinctions; it simply possesses distinctions. If it is qualified by that, then that very [attribute] is a distinction.
Nor is there any means of valid cognition for being devoid of distinctions. And there would be contradiction with all statements about distinctions, with experience, and with reasoning. Nor does it possess unreal distinctions, due to contradiction. For when one says "unreal distinction", it is simply an nonexistent distinction; and so, the very defect stated regarding the position that it is qualified by distinctions applies. Nor does it possess an inexpressible distinction, because the inexpressible is unestablished. For there is no direct perception of it. The word "unreal", however, expresses only absence, since there is no means of valid cognition for anything other than that. Nor is there another means of valid cognition, because the thesis is self-contradictory. For nothing distinct from both the real and the unreal, possessing a nature different from real and unreal, is known. When one says "it is not unreal", the two negatives convey the primary meaning with excellence, and so it is simply real; or, if a specific distinction is intended, it is another unreal.
Moreover, is this distinctness difference, identity, or difference-and-identity? First, it cannot be difference, because it is not accepted [by you]. And a conventional difference could only be asserted if the inexpressible were established. And there is nothing conventional. Nor is there any means of valid cognition for the cessation of all conventional usage. Nor is conventionality a common property between the unreal and the real, like smokiness between smoke and vapor.
Nor is it identity, precisely because it is not accepted [by you]. The same applies to both. And in the case of identity, the terms "inexpressible" and "Brahman" would be synonyms. Nor is there non-synonymy anywhere merely by a difference in what is excluded. If the difference in what is excluded introduces a distinction in Brahman as excluded from it, then the meaning of the sentence would be qualified; if not, then another word should not be uttered for one who seeks knowledge of Brahman, because of irrelevance. And the non-establishment of an unreal distinction has already been stated. Therefore, there would be mutual dependence, infinite regress, or a vicious circle. What is distinct from difference-and-identity is also refuted in the very manner already explained.