Nyaya Ratnamala of Parthasarathi Misra 2.3.p17

2.3.p17

na ca pramāṇajñānānyadhikṛtya cinteyaṃ pramāṇānāṃ prāmāṇyaṃ svataḥ parato veti kintarhi yāni tāvat sthāṇurvā puruṣo veti parasparopamardakānekakoṭisaṃsparśijñānebhyaḥ smṛtijñānebhyaścātiriktāni ghaṭo'yaṃ paṭo'yamityevaṃrūpāṇi jñānāni tāni sarvāṇyadhikṛtya cinteyam|

Nor does this inquiry—whether the validity of means of valid cognition is intrinsic or extrinsic—concern [only] valid cognitions; rather, taking as its subject all cognitions other than those touching upon multiple mutually destructive alternatives (such as 'Is it a post or a man?') and other than recollective cognitions, having forms such as 'This is a pot' or 'This is a cloth', this inquiry proceeds.