Nyaya Ratnamala of Parthasarathi Misra 2.3

made known by the annulling cognition. It is not that the ascertainment of the absence of the object being otherwise is produced only by the annulling cognition; true, but that is not invalidity itself. For the ascertainment of the object being otherwise is not the invalidity of the prior cognition; rather, it is the object being otherwise in reality, or the determining of it being so when it is otherwise. Neither of these is produced by the annulling cognition, because the object being otherwise is intrinsic, and because the determination of it being so when the object is otherwise is intrinsically from an invalid cognition. And thus, invalidity also originates intrinsically. / Therefore, the validity that was obtained through its nature as a cognition / is sublated by cognitions of defects arising from causes of the object being otherwise. // This verse must also be explained by you in this way: the validity that arose intrinsically in the cognition is later sublated. And that is incorrect, because it was invalid at its very origination. Now, if it is held that validity is the property of determining, invalidity is its absence, and that is dispelled by an annulling cognition—that is incorrect. For the destruction of a determination is not brought about by an annulling cognition, since it is perishable on its own. Therefore, it must be stated thus: / A cognition's own validity is known intrinsically, / and invalidity [is known] extrinsically through the awareness of a defect or an annulling cognition.

Objection: Here too, would there not be a contradiction with the text and a contradiction with reason? For indeed, a cognition does not apprehend itself, much less its own validity, because it is exhausted in apprehending the object. And likewise, having raised the objection regarding the non-apprehension of validity—'Indeed, perception and so forth are not apprehended as "valid"; and if unapprehended in this way, everyday activity would not be possible'—he resolves the contingency of the objection precisely by admitting the non-apprehension of validity: 'Before being apprehended, a pramāṇa is established purely by its own nature; independent in its own operations, it is apprehended by other cognitions.' This would be contradicted if validity were apprehended by itself. Likewise, in the prima facie view, stating that 'Because it is an entity that produces certainty, validity is produced by qualities'—that the production of validity consisting of certainty, being of the nature of a real entity, is an ascertainment as an effect of a corroboration and the cognition of qualities in the cause—he states that qualities are causes only in the arising of validity; and thus he shows that in the established conclusion too, origination alone is intrinsic. Therefore, this position, that it appears intrinsically, is also untenable.

To this, it is replied: As for what was said—that a cognition does not apprehend itself because it illuminates an object, and when it is not apprehended in itself, its validity cannot be apprehended as connected with it—if we were to say that the cognition apprehends 'I am valid' and 'this is my invalidity', then we could be reproached in this manner. But this is not stated by us. That which is in reality the validity of a cognition, by virtue of which a cognition becomes valid—that which receives the designation 'validity' because it causes the notions and words 'valid cognition'—is said to be apprehended by that very cognition. But what is that? The fact of the object being so. For this alone is the validity of a cognition: that the object is in that state, because a cognition whose object is not so is invalid. And this alone is invalidity: that the object is otherwise. Therefore, its own validity, in the form of the object being so, is ascertained intrinsically from the cognition; it is not to be understood from the cognition of qualities, from a corroborating cognition, or from the cognition of practical efficacy. However, its own invalidity, in the form of the object being otherwise, is not known intrinsically; rather, it is known from the cognition of defects in the cause, or directly from the cognition 'this is not so'—this is what is propounded here. And he has said:

'This whole cognition is false'—indeed, this was not known by him;

for like a valid cognition, the object was determined by him as being just so.

Whence could its being otherwise come, unless another cognition is established?

And likewise:

Moreover, an invalid cognition is intrinsically like a valid one regarding its own object;

its falsity could not be apprehended without another pramāṇa.

For the state of the object not being so is not stated by the prior [cognition], as its being so is;

for if it is so, a subsequent valid cognition would be useless, since it is already apprehended.

However, since its being otherwise is not established, another pramāṇa has scope;

depending on another, it arrives at one indubitable alternative.

Saying this, he clearly states that the investigation itself into validity and invalidity considers whether they are intrinsic or extrinsic. As for the verse, 'That [knowledge] is not grasped in the form "I am valid", and thus perception and the rest are not grasped as "knowing a valid object"'—now, if validity were known at the time of the cognition's arising, whatever does not appear as valid upon arising could be determined to be invalid right at arising by elimination, even without a defect in the cause or a subverting cognition, so that invalidity too would become intrinsic! Do not say this; for the word 'self' (sva) here is not used in the sense of validity, as if validity shines from validity itself, nor as a means of valid cognition. For if it were so, then because validity does not appear in invalid [cognitions], invalidity would be established by elimination. Rather, the word 'self' refers to the cognition, meaning: validity shines from the cognition itself. And therefore, even from an invalid cognition, validity of itself—even though non-existent—is understood, so invalidity is not established by elimination; rather, invalidity is understood later in the form of an annulment of the apprehended validity, just as he said:

"Because intrinsic validity is established as the default rule everywhere,

it is set aside by the cognition of a subverting factor or defectiveness in the cause."

'Established' means attained, understood. 'Everywhere' means not only in valid cognitions, but in cognition as such. Likewise, [he says:] 'For even an invalid [cognition] is intrinsically like a valid cognition with respect to its own object.'

Nor does this inquiry—whether the validity of means of valid cognition is intrinsic or extrinsic—concern [only] valid cognitions; rather, taking as its subject all cognitions other than those touching upon multiple mutually destructive alternatives (such as 'Is it a post or a man?') and other than recollective cognitions, having forms such as 'This is a pot' or 'This is a cloth', this inquiry proceeds.

"Let this, which concerns all cognitions, first be examined"—

thus begins [the text]. If the inquiry were made taking only valid cognitions as its subject, then because the subject would be established for both disputants, the conclusion would merely establish that those which are well known to both as valid cognitions have intrinsic validity. And then, because the Veda's validity is not established for both disputants, it would not be a subject of inquiry, and its intrinsic validity would not be established. In that case, an inquiry not serving the validity of the Veda would be as useless as an examination of crow's teeth. But when intrinsic validity and extrinsic invalidity are established with respect to cognition as such, the validity of the Veda too, in the form of its object being as it is, would be understood intrinsically. [Objection:] The mere fact that an object is as it is cannot be validity, for that would entail that memory too has validity! [Reply:] True, it is not merely that; but in this section, it is investigated whether that alone is intrinsic or extrinsic. For the word 'pramāṇa' expresses that which ascertains an object as it actually is, not being apprehended as already known; its property is validity (prāmāṇya). And what is that property? Not being apprehended as already known by another means of valid cognition, the fact that the object is so, and the cognition's generation of certainty thereof—these three combined constitute the validity that is expressed by the words 'pramāṇa' and 'buddhi'. There, the fact that this object is not apprehended as already known is grasped by appropriate non-perception, and is not grasped from the nature of the cognition itself; for a cognition of a pot does not indicate the pot's not having been known from elsewhere. Nor is it apprehended by the cognition of excellences, etc. Therefore, with respect to that, there is no inquiry as to whether it is intrinsic or extrinsic. Rather, validity is established as intrinsic solely in the form of the object being as it is, in order to remove the invalidity defined as unfaithfulness to the object that was raised by [the objection] 'Now, it is not as it is'. And as for the passage, 'the generation of validity whose nature is certainty', that too is not contradictory. For what ascertains the reality of an object is itself that which generates certainty regarding that object; indeed, what is an indicator with respect to the knowable object is itself a generator with respect to the cognition. And certainty too is itself validity, since it is the cause of the application of the word 'pramāṇa'. Therefore, the passage stating, 'the generation of validity whose nature is certainty, however, being the nature of the thing, is easily determined as the effect of corroboration and the cognition of excellences', is not inconsistent for a proponent of the prima facie view who explains that validity characterized as the object being as it is is determined from the cognition of excellences. If, on the other hand, it were directly stated that validity consisting of certainty is generated intrinsically, then one would also have to say that invalidity is generated extrinsically; otherwise, there would be no opposition between the two, [if one were to say:] 'Validity is generated intrinsically, [but] invalidity is understood extrinsically.' Therefore, the meaning of this section is precisely that validity and invalidity are understood intrinsically and extrinsically. In this way, the reasoned argument and the text are consistent.

Therefore, this is the summary here of the prima facie view and the established conclusion: Since the cognition of a pot is seen [to arise] both from a pot and from a non-pot, a pot cannot be ascertained by that alone; therefore, only by the perception of pragmatic efficacy, preceded by an ascertainment of the pot that causes it, must the previous pot-cognition's arising from a pot be ascertained. The cognition of pragmatic efficacy, because of its invariable nature, possessing intrinsic validity, is able to ascertain the validity of the previous cognition by ascertaining the pragmatic efficacy. Likewise, agreement with another cognition also cannot occur in the absence of the object being as it is; hence from that too there is ascertainment that the object is as it is. Likewise, since a cognition produced by a cause endowed with excellence is certainly faithful to reality, the fact of the object being as it is can also be ascertained from the determination of an excellence in the cause. Therefore, the ascertainment of a cognition's validity is only extrinsic, not intrinsic; its validity characterized as the object being as it is cannot be ascertained [intrinsically] because it is not invariable. Moreover, the antecedent non-existence of certainty cannot be produced by the cognition of a defect, whereas certainty, being an existing thing, can be produced by the cognition of an excellence, etc. Therefore, validity in the form of the object being as it is is ascertained only extrinsically: this is the prima facie view.

The established conclusion, however, is this: cognition does not ascertain an object solely through invariable concomitance, but rather by itself alone. For if it could not ascertain [its object] by itself, in that case there would be an absolute non-existence of ascertainment, so that the entire universe would become completely blind. For an object not ascertained by itself cannot be ascertained through something else, since that other thing too would be equally powerless. To explain: just as the cognition of a pot is seen even when the pot does not exist and therefore [allegedly] does not ascertain [it], so too the cognition of practical efficacy is seen in the dream state even when practical efficacy does not exist; therefore practical efficacy too cannot be ascertained by that [cognition], and even less so could the pot be ascertained through it. Hence total blindness of the entire universe would result. Now, if it is said: "By the word 'practical efficacy' fetching water and so forth is not meant; rather, cognition itself, consisting of pleasure, is meant; and every cognition of pleasure is intrinsically a means of valid knowledge with regard to itself, because of non-deviation"—if that is said, then let the practical efficacy be ascertained; nonetheless, the correctness of the prior cognition cannot be known through it, because pleasure arises even from what is not real, such as anointing with sandalwood paste in a dream. Furthermore, the ascertainment of the object of the prior cognition through practical efficacy whose invariable concomitance is grasped—this is indeed an inference of an effect referring to its cause; and a relation cannot possibly be grasped when a relatum is not grasped. Therefore, at the time of grasping the relation, the ascertainment of the pot must necessarily be accepted from the cognition of the pot alone. The same must be stated with regard to the cognition of excellence and the cognition of corroboration as well. For even an excellence cannot be ascertained from the cognition of an excellence, how much less the validity of the prior cognition! Corroboration is likewise: corroboration means that what was not ascertained by the prior cognition is ascertained by this one. Although ascertainment is produced because it is a real entity, it is produced by cognition alone, not by anything else. Therefore, validity is intrinsic alone, and invalidity is extrinsic, to be ascertained from the cognition of a defect or from a sublation cognition. [Objection:] Surely, invalidity, because it is not a real entity, is not produced by a defect; and what is not produced by that cannot be determined from it. We reply: we do not say that invalidity in the form of the prior non-existence of ascertainment is cognised by defects, but rather [invalidity] in the form of the object being otherwise. For that can indeed be ascertained by the cognition of a defect, because incorrectness has defects as its cause, since incorrectness is seen when causes are defective. In the Veda too, validity is intrinsic first of all, and it stands unsublated because of the absence of defects. [Objection:] How is it known that incorrectness has defects as its cause, and not the absence of excellences? For everywhere, incorrectness is known when causes are devoid of excellences and defective; in that case, whence comes this distinction that a defect alone is the cause, not the absence of excellence? Therefore, although invalidity is indicated extrinsically alone, since its indication is possible from the absence of excellence alone, and since the excellence of being composed by a trustworthy person cannot belong to the Veda, invalidity would befall the Veda—even though its validity is obtained by its own nature—extrinsically, through the absence of excellence alone. To this it is stated: a postulation must follow what is observed, not contradict what is observed. Therefore, if it is possible to postulate in such a way that the validity obtained intrinsically for the Veda is not contradicted, then it is not proper to postulate what contradicts it. Therefore, although the absence of excellences and defects are observed in well-known incorrect cognitions, nevertheless, because validity is observed in the Veda even when excellences are absent, the incorrectness of cognitions such as of mother-of-pearl as silver is postulated to have defects as its cause, lest that [validity] be sublated. For otherwise, incorrectness would be postulated to have the status of cognition as its condition, because the status of cognition is seen in all invalid cognitions; yet because the status of cognition is seen in correct [cognitions] such as perception as well, incorrectness does not have that as its cause; likewise, the absence of excellence, because it is seen in the Veda which is correct, is not the condition of incorrectness. If it is said, "Its correctness is unproven"—then whence is that of perception and so forth proven? If it is said, "intrinsically"—that is the same for the Veda too, except for adherence to materialism. Therefore, validity does not have that as its condition. Moreover, in the cognition of mother-of-pearl as silver, even in the absence of excellence, because forms such as whiteness and brightness are seen just as they really are, correctness