Nyaya Ratnamala of Parthasarathi Misra 2.3.p2

2.3.p2

atrābhidhīyate| yattāvaduktaṃ na jñānamātmānaṃ na jñānamātmānaṃ gṛhṇāti viṣayaprakāśakatvāt na cātmanyagṛhyamāṇe tatsaṃbandhitayā prāmāṇyaṃ śakyate grahitumiti1| yadi vayaṃ jñānam ahaṃ pramāṇamityevaṃ madīyaṃ cāprāmāṇyamityevaṃ gṛhṇātīti vadema tadaivamupālabhyemahi na tvevamasmābhirūcyate yadvastuto jñānasya prāmāṇyaṃ yadvaśāj jñānaṃ pramāṇaṃ bhavati tatpramāṇabuddhiśabdayobhārvakatayā labdhaprāmāṇyapadābhidhānīyakamātmanaiva jñānena gṛhyata ityucyate| kiṃ pustat arthatathātvamidameva hi jñānasya prāmāṇyaṃ yadarthasya tathābhūtatvam atathābhūtaviṣayasya jñānasyāprāmāṇyāt| idameva cāprāmāṇyaṃ yadarthasyānyathātvam| tena svata eva jñānādarthatathātvarūpamātmīyaṃ prāmāṇyaṃ niścīyate na tu guṇajñānāt saṃvādajñānādarthakriyājñānādvā tadavagantavyam| aprāmāṇyaṃ tvātmīmarthānyathātvarūpaṃ svato nāvagamyate na tu kāraṇadoṣajñānātsākṣādeva vā naitadevamiti jñānādavagamyate ityetadatra pratipādyate | āha ca |

To this, it is replied: As for what was said—that a cognition does not apprehend itself because it illuminates an object, and when it is not apprehended in itself, its validity cannot be apprehended as connected with it—if we were to say that the cognition apprehends 'I am valid' and 'this is my invalidity', then we could be reproached in this manner. But this is not stated by us. That which is in reality the validity of a cognition, by virtue of which a cognition becomes valid—that which receives the designation 'validity' because it causes the notions and words 'valid cognition'—is said to be apprehended by that very cognition. But what is that? The fact of the object being so. For this alone is the validity of a cognition: that the object is in that state, because a cognition whose object is not so is invalid. And this alone is invalidity: that the object is otherwise. Therefore, its own validity, in the form of the object being so, is ascertained intrinsically from the cognition; it is not to be understood from the cognition of qualities, from a corroborating cognition, or from the cognition of practical efficacy. However, its own invalidity, in the form of the object being otherwise, is not known intrinsically; rather, it is known from the cognition of defects in the cause, or directly from the cognition 'this is not so'—this is what is propounded here. And he has said: