Nyaya Ratnamala of Parthasarathi Misra 2.3.p21

2.3.p21

siddhāntastu na jñānamavyabhicāramukhenaivārthaṃ niścāyayati kintu svata eva| yadi hi svato niścotuṃ na śukrayāttathā sati niścayātyantābhāva eva syādityāndhyamevāśeṣasya jagato bhavet| na hi svato'niścito'rthaḥ parato niścetuṃ śakyate| parasyāpi tadvadevāsāmarthyāt| yathā hi ghaṭajñānamasatyamapi ghaṭe dṛṣṭamityaniścāyakaṃ tathā'rthakriyājñānamapyasatyāmevārthakriyāyāṃ svapnāvastāyāṃ dṛṣṭamiti na tenāpi sā niścetuṃ śakyā natarāṃ tayā ghaṭaniścaya ityāyātamāndhyamaśeṣasya jagataḥ| athārthakakriyāśabdena nodakāharaṇādikamucyate kintu jñānameva sukhātmakaṃ sarvacca sukhajñānaṃ svātmani svata eva pramāṇamavyabhicāradityucyate tathā sati bhavatu nāmārthakriyāniścayaḥ tathāpi tu na tayā pūrvajñānasya śakyaṃ yāthārthyaṃ vijñātum| ayathārthādapi svapne candanalepādinā sukhotpatteḥ| api ca gṛhītāvinābhāvayā'rthakriyayā pūrvajñānaviṣayasya niścayaḥ anumānaṃ hyetatkāryātkāraṇagocaram, na cāgṛhīte sambandhini sambandhagrahaṇasambhavaḥ| tena sambandhagrahaṇasamaye'vaśyaṃ ghaṭajñānādeva ghaṭaniścayo'ṅgikartavyaḥ| evaṃ guṇajñānasaṃvādajñānayorapi vācyam| na hi guṇājñānādguṇo'pi niścetuṃ śakyate kiṃ punaḥ pūrvajñānaprāmāṇyam tathā saṃvādo'pi| saṃvādo nāma pūrvajñānāniścitamanena niścīyate| yadyapi vastutvājjanyo niścayaḥ tathāpi jñānenaiva janyate nānyena| tasmātsvata eva prāmāṇyaṃ parataścāprāmāṇyaṃ doṣajñānadbādhakajñānādvā niśceyam| nvavastutvānana doṣajanyamaprāmāṇyaṃ bhavati atajjanyaṃ ca na tato'vadhārayituṃ śakyam| ucyate na tāvanniścayaprāgabhāvarūpaprāmāṇyaṃ doṣairgamyataiti brūmaḥ kintvarthānyathātvarūpam| taddhi śakyaṃ doṣajñānena niścetuṃ doṣanimittakatāvādayathārthatvasya duṣṭeṣu kāraṇeṣvayathārtharśanāt| vede'pi svatastāvatprāmāṇyaṃ doṣābhāvādanapoditaṃ sthitam| kathaṃ puravagamyate doṣanimittamayathārthatvaṃ na guṇābhāvanimittamiti sarvatra hi guṇavidhureṣu duṣṭeṣu ca kāraṇeṣu ayathārthatvaṃ jñāyate tatra kuto'yaṃ vivekaḥ doṣa eva nimittaṃ na guṇavaidhuryamiti1| tasmādyadyapi parata evāprāmāṇyopalakṣaṇaṃ tathāpi guṇābhāvādevopalakṣaṇasaṃbhavādvede cāptapraṇītatvaguṇāyogātsvarasaprāptaprāmāṇyasyāpi vedasya parata eva guṇābhāvādaprāmāṇyamāpadyataiti| tadabhidhīyate dṛṣṭanusāriṇī hi kalpanā bhavati na dṛṣṭavaiparītyena| tena vedasya svata eva prāptaṃ prāmāṇyaṃ yathā na virūddhayate tathā cetatkavalpayituṃ śakyate tato virūddhaṃ na kalpayituṃ yuktam| tena yadyapi prasiddheṣvayathārthajñāneṣu guṇābhāvo doṣāśca dṛṣṭāḥ2 tathāpi vede guṇābhāve'pi prāmāṇyadarśanāttanmā bādhīti doṣanimittamevāyathārthatvaṃ śuktirajatādijñānānāṃ kalpyate| anyathā hi jñānatvanibandhanamapyayathārthatvaṃ kalpyeta sarveṣvapramāṇeṣu jñānatvadarśanāt tatra yathārtheṣavapi pratyakṣādiṣu jñānatvadarśanānna tannimittamayathārthatvam evaṃ guṇābhāvo'pi yathārtho vede dṛṣṭatvānnāyathārthatvasya nibandhanam| asiddhaṃ tasya yathārthatvamiti cet pratyakṣādīnāṃ vā kutaḥ siddham| svata iti cettadvede'pi samānamanyatra nāstikyābhinipaveśāt| tasmānna tannibandhanaṃ prāmāṇyam| api ca śuktikārajatādijñāne guṇābhāve'pi śuklasvaratvādirūpāṇāṃ tathābhūtānāmeva darśanānna guṇāyattaṃ

The established conclusion, however, is this: cognition does not ascertain an object solely through invariable concomitance, but rather by itself alone. For if it could not ascertain [its object] by itself, in that case there would be an absolute non-existence of ascertainment, so that the entire universe would become completely blind. For an object not ascertained by itself cannot be ascertained through something else, since that other thing too would be equally powerless. To explain: just as the cognition of a pot is seen even when the pot does not exist and therefore [allegedly] does not ascertain [it], so too the cognition of practical efficacy is seen in the dream state even when practical efficacy does not exist; therefore practical efficacy too cannot be ascertained by that [cognition], and even less so could the pot be ascertained through it. Hence total blindness of the entire universe would result. Now, if it is said: "By the word 'practical efficacy' fetching water and so forth is not meant; rather, cognition itself, consisting of pleasure, is meant; and every cognition of pleasure is intrinsically a means of valid knowledge with regard to itself, because of non-deviation"—if that is said, then let the practical efficacy be ascertained; nonetheless, the correctness of the prior cognition cannot be known through it, because pleasure arises even from what is not real, such as anointing with sandalwood paste in a dream. Furthermore, the ascertainment of the object of the prior cognition through practical efficacy whose invariable concomitance is grasped—this is indeed an inference of an effect referring to its cause; and a relation cannot possibly be grasped when a relatum is not grasped. Therefore, at the time of grasping the relation, the ascertainment of the pot must necessarily be accepted from the cognition of the pot alone. The same must be stated with regard to the cognition of excellence and the cognition of corroboration as well. For even an excellence cannot be ascertained from the cognition of an excellence, how much less the validity of the prior cognition! Corroboration is likewise: corroboration means that what was not ascertained by the prior cognition is ascertained by this one. Although ascertainment is produced because it is a real entity, it is produced by cognition alone, not by anything else. Therefore, validity is intrinsic alone, and invalidity is extrinsic, to be ascertained from the cognition of a defect or from a sublation cognition. [Objection:] Surely, invalidity, because it is not a real entity, is not produced by a defect; and what is not produced by that cannot be determined from it. We reply: we do not say that invalidity in the form of the prior non-existence of ascertainment is cognised by defects, but rather [invalidity] in the form of the object being otherwise. For that can indeed be ascertained by the cognition of a defect, because incorrectness has defects as its cause, since incorrectness is seen when causes are defective. In the Veda too, validity is intrinsic first of all, and it stands unsublated because of the absence of defects. [Objection:] How is it known that incorrectness has defects as its cause, and not the absence of excellences? For everywhere, incorrectness is known when causes are devoid of excellences and defective; in that case, whence comes this distinction that a defect alone is the cause, not the absence of excellence? Therefore, although invalidity is indicated extrinsically alone, since its indication is possible from the absence of excellence alone, and since the excellence of being composed by a trustworthy person cannot belong to the Veda, invalidity would befall the Veda—even though its validity is obtained by its own nature—extrinsically, through the absence of excellence alone. To this it is stated: a postulation must follow what is observed, not contradict what is observed. Therefore, if it is possible to postulate in such a way that the validity obtained intrinsically for the Veda is not contradicted, then it is not proper to postulate what contradicts it. Therefore, although the absence of excellences and defects are observed in well-known incorrect cognitions, nevertheless, because validity is observed in the Veda even when excellences are absent, the incorrectness of cognitions such as of mother-of-pearl as silver is postulated to have defects as its cause, lest that [validity] be sublated. For otherwise, incorrectness would be postulated to have the status of cognition as its condition, because the status of cognition is seen in all invalid cognitions; yet because the status of cognition is seen in correct [cognitions] such as perception as well, incorrectness does not have that as its cause; likewise, the absence of excellence, because it is seen in the Veda which is correct, is not the condition of incorrectness. If it is said, "Its correctness is unproven"—then whence is that of perception and so forth proven? If it is said, "intrinsically"—that is the same for the Veda too, except for adherence to materialism. Therefore, validity does not have that as its condition. Moreover, in the cognition of mother-of-pearl as silver, even in the absence of excellence, because forms such as whiteness and brightness are seen just as they really are, correctness