Nyaya Ratnamala of Parthasarathi Misra 4.2.p8.5

4.2.p8.5

Is momentariness now grasped by perception alone and later sublated by recognition? For this is not your accepted view. And even granting this—that sublation of previously understood momentariness belongs to that whose connection with another time is understood by perception—yet how could the momentary state of fire, which was understood by perception, be sublated by inference, and its connection with another time be understood? Moreover, if a connection with another time—which contradicts the restriction to that specific time understood by perception and is completely unknown—were apprehended by inference, then the idea that inference grasps what has already been grasped would be thoroughly discarded. Furthermore, because a connection with time is seen to deviate even when unconditioned, persons doubting whether the connection with fire also might deviate or not could not reach an end to that [doubt] even in a thousand human lifetimes. Even if a deviation was diligently sought in observed places and times and not seen, still who indeed could dispel the doubt that deviation might occur somewhere, at some time? Perception is not capable of dispelling it, since its operation is restricted solely to the proximate place and time. Nor is inference [capable], because it is dependent on ascertaining the invariant relation; and if the invariant relation were dependent on that [inference], there would result the defect of mutual dependence. If it is said that there is no deviation because [the relation] is natural, no; for there is no means of valid cognition for it being natural. Being natural is just being free of adjuncts, and it has been said that the absence of an adjunct is not established merely through non-cognition of an adjunct. Moreover, what is the means of valid cognition for the claim that what is natural does not deviate? It is neither perception, nor inference, nor anything else. And deviation is observed even of the unconditioned connection with time; so it could be for the connection with fire as well. Furthermore, the relation was understood between two other instances of fire and smoke in an exemplar subject, while this smoke located on the mountain is different, and its connection with fire is not understood; so how could it be an inferential sign? If it is said that the universal is the inferential sign, no, because its relation is not understood.