Nyaya Ratnamala of Parthasarathi Misra 4.2.p8.6

4.2.p8.6

The substance alone is qualified by all [these]—by place and time, by relation, and by the universal—and there is no syntactic connection between the relation and the universal with one another, because the universal too, like conjunction, is a qualifier of the substance. If it is said that there is a relation between the two universals through the medium of the substance, even so, just as the relation of fire with smoke has wet fuel and the like as an adjunct, in the absence of that, at another time, when that substance is absent, the relation mediated by it would also not exist. But a relation with another time mediated by another substance was not known beforehand; so how could it be an auxiliary to inference? Nor can the relation be understood between the two universals by a single observation to the exclusion of the particulars. Moreover, conjunction too is delimited by place and time through the medium of the substance, so there is no lack of delimitation. And just as the relation mediated by substance is natural to the universal, so too the delimitation of the relation with fire to that time, even if mediated by substance, would be natural; thus, by relinquishing that time, the relation would not endure at another time, so that, by the reasoning stated by you, one would have to ascertain the complete absence of relation between fire and smoke at another time, and there would not even be a suspicion of a relation with fire for smoke at another time; hence enough with excessive insistence. Another view [is as follows]: From seeing smoke with fire hundreds of times, and from not seeing it where there is no fire, the cognition 'this is invariably accompanied by fire' arises even in animals. Nor is this non-valid cognition, because it always arises with confirmation for everyone. Therefore, this is indeed a means of valid cognition. And it is subsumed under the sixfold [means of valid cognition]. There, it cannot be inference, because that is dependent on ascertaining the invariant relation. Nor is it verbal testimony, because it is not produced by words. It is not analogy, because its object is not similarity. It is not presumption, because nothing is seen that would be inexplicable without the invariant relation. Absence, however, is thoroughly discarded with regard to an invariant relation that is positive in nature. If it is objected: 'This is just an absence in the form of exclusion from the counter-instances'; no, the invariant relation is not mere exclusion, because of the absurd consequence that the horn of a hare and the like, being excluded from all counter-instances, would have an invariant relation to all things.