Mimamsashastrasarvasva 4.30

4.30

svarūpaniyamo'paraḥ | tatrādye tāvat pratyakṣādīnāṃ na mūlatvaṃ, teṣāṃ
dharmādharmayorapravṛtteḥ | nāpi vedavākyāni mūlaṃ, gavādiṣu pratipadamanantavākyapāṭhāsambhavāt | apaṭhitānāṃ ca mūlatvānupapatteḥ | na ca
sādhūneva prayuñjīta iti ekenaiva lakṣaṇena sarvasaṅgrahaḥ | sādhutvasya
durvacatvāt | vācakatvameva taditi cet-prayogapratyayānupapattyā
gāvyādiṣvapi tatsiddheḥ | anāditvaṃ taditi cet-gāvyādiṣvapi
sambandhakartturasmaraṇena tatsiddheḥ | adṛṣṭasādhanatvaṃ taditi cet-tasya
pratyakṣādyaviṣayatvāt | sādhubhirbhāṣitèti vedādeva tatpramitāvātmāśrayāpatteḥ | etena dvitīyaniyamo'pyapāstaḥ | tasmānmūlābhāvādapramāṇaṃ vyākaraṇam
kiñca sūtrakāro hi “samarthaḥ padavidhi”rityādi1 sūtrāṇi
praṇayati | bhāṣyakāraśca pratyācaṣṭa iti parasparavigānam | api ca
uktarītyā nirmūlatvādeva niṣphalatvam | api ca ‘dṛṣṭaṃ sāme’tyadhikṛtya ‘kalerḍhak’, ‘vāmadevāḍḍyaḍḍhyā’vityuktam | vede tu
‘yadakālayattatkāle yasya kāleyatvaṃ tato vasu vāmaṃ samabhava’dityapanyasya ‘vāmaṃ vā idaṃ devebhyo'jani tasmādvāmadevya’miti | tathā ca
vedabādhaḥ | api ca“brāhmaṇārtho yathā nāsti kaścidbrāhmaṇakambale
devadattādayo vākye tathaiva syuranarthakāḥ2”
ityabhyupagamādarthavatprātipadikaṃ kriyāvācako dhāturiti cābhyupagamāt pūrvāparavirodhaḥ | tasmādapramāṇaṃ vyākaraṇam | tataśca
gāvyādayopi gavādivadeva prayoktavyā iti
tad brūmaḥ—
"yadyeva1 tulyapākyādirūpatvādvarṇasaṅkaram
vadataḥ smṛtibādhaḥ syāt tathā vācakasaṅkaram2"
yattu smṛtirnirmūleti tanna | prayoganiyame manvādivat vedamūlatvāt | pratyakṣameva ca vājasaneyādiṣu vacanam—'tasmāt brāhmaṇena
na mlecchitavai' iti | dvābhyāmeva ca vākyābhyāṃ sādhūn prayuñjīta
nāsādhūniti samastaśabdāpaśabdavidhipratiṣedhasiddhernānantavākyakalpanāpattiḥ | anāditvaṃ vācakatvaṃ anapabhraṣṭatva vyākaraṇaabhyāsajanitasaṃskāravyaṅgyo jātiviśeṣo vā sādhutvam | tadabhāvaścāsādhutvam
na ca gāvyādīnāmaśaktatve'bodhakatāpattiḥ | sādhuśabdasmṛtidvārā
prabalataraśaktibhrāntibalādvā tadupapatteḥ | evañca—
"yathā ratnaparīkṣāyāṃ sādhvasādhulakṣaṇam
tathā vyākaraṇāt siddhaṃ sādhuśabdanirūpaṇam3"
evañca svarūpaniyame'pi udāttādivibhāga iva pratyakṣaṃ mūlam
tasmādekasyaiva vācakatve itaratra tacchaktijñāḥ iti nāṣṭadoṣaduṣṭavikalpāpattiḥ
"yā tu hastaḥ karaḥ pāṇirityatrānekaśabdatā
ananyagatikatvena sā dṛḍhasmaraṇena ca4"
yadapi vigītatvāditi tanna | sūtrapratyākhyānāderavedamūlatve kena
upāyamātratayā upeyāṃśe avigānāt | samūlatvādeva ca vaiphalyamapi
nirastam
yadapi vedabādhanā diti tadapi na
‘‘dharmasādhanatāṃśe hi vigānaṃ naiva vidyate
anvākhyānavigānaṃ tu lakṣyabhedānna duṣyati1 ’’
yadapi pūrvāparavirodhā diti tadapi na | prakṛtipratyayavibhāgasya
kalpitatvena niravayavasphoṭavyutpādana eva tātparyyamiti vaiyākaraṇasiddhānte tātparyyaviṣayībhūtāṃśe avirodhāt | āpātapratītivirodhastu
arthavādeṣviva na doṣamāvahati | tasmāt vyākaraṇaṃ pramāṇamiti
siddham
10 ākṛtiśaktyadhikaraṇam
prayogacodanābhāvādarthaikatvamavirodhāt2

Another [restriction] is the restriction of their intrinsic form. There, first of all, perception and the like are not the basis, because they do not operate regarding dharma and adharma. Nor are Vedic sentences the basis, because it is impossible to recite an endless number of sentences word by word for “cow” and the like, and because unrecited sentences cannot serve as a basis. Nor is there an inclusion of everything through a single definition such as “One should use only correct words,” because correctness is difficult to state.
If it is said that it is simply expressiveness, that is established even in corrupt forms like *gāvī* due to the impossibility of usage and comprehension [without it]. If it is said that it is beginninglessness, that is established even in corrupt forms like *gāvī* because no author of the relation is remembered. If it is said that it is being a means to unseen spiritual result, that is not an object of perception and the like. If it is because it is spoken by cultured people, then establishing that from the Veda itself would entail self-dependence. By this, the second restriction is also refuted. Therefore, grammar is unauthoritative because it lacks a basis.
Furthermore, the author of the sūtras composes sūtras such as “A rule concerning words applies to words with semantic connection,” and the author of the commentary rejects them, so there is mutual disagreement. Moreover, in the manner stated, it is fruitless precisely because it lacks a basis. Moreover, under the heading “A Sāman that has been seen,” it is stated: “The affix *ḍhak* follows *kali*,” and “*ḍya* and *ḍhya* follow *vāmadeva*.” In the Veda, however, after citing “What he drove out (*akālayat*), that was in Kali (*kāle*); because it was his in Kali, thence the treasure Vāma came into being,” it says: “This was born dear (*vāma*) to the gods, therefore it is the Vāmadevya.” And so there is sublation of the Veda. Furthermore:
“Just as there is no meaning 'brahmin' whatsoever in the word *brāhmaṇa-kambala* ('a brahmin's blanket'),
even so [individual words like] Devadatta and others would be meaningless in a sentence.” (2)
Because this is accepted, and because it is accepted that a nominal stem possesses meaning and a verbal root expresses an action, there is a contradiction between earlier and later positions. Therefore, grammar is unauthoritative; and consequently corrupt forms like *gāvī* should also be used just like *go* and the like.
To this we say:
“If one should thus claim a confusion of phonemes due to identity of form in cooking and the like,
there would be sublation of Smṛti, and likewise a confusion of expressive words.” (2)
As for the claim that Smṛti is baseless, that is not so, because in the restriction of usage, like Manu and others, it has the Veda as its basis. And there is an explicit statement in the Vājasaneyi and other texts: “Therefore, a brahmin should not speak barbarously.” And through just two statements—“One should use correct words,” “One should not use incorrect words”—the injunction and prohibition of all correct words and corrupt words are established, so there is no entailment of having to assume infinite statements. Correctness is beginninglessness, expressiveness, non-corruptedness, or a particular universal manifested by the impression generated by the repeated study of grammar; and incorrectness is its absence.
Nor does the lack of expressive power in *gāvī* and the like entail an inability to cause cognition, because that is explained through the recollection of the correct word or through the force of an erroneous cognition of a stronger expressive power. And thus:
“Just as the distinction between genuine and counterfeit is established in the examination of gems,
so the ascertainment of correct words is established from grammar.” (3)
And thus, even with regard to the restriction of intrinsic form, just like the distinction of the acute accent and the like, perception is the basis.
Therefore, when only one is expressive, in the other case [the hearers] are cognizers of that power, so there is no entailment of an option burdened with eight defects.
“As for the plurality of words in the case of *hasta*, *kara*, and *pāṇi*,
that is because there is no other recourse and because of firmly established remembrance.” (4)
As for the claim that it is discordant, that is not so: even if the rejection of sūtras and the like lacks a Vedic basis, there is no discord with respect to the goal, since they are merely means. And precisely because it has a basis, fruitlessness is also refuted.
As for the claim that there is sublation of the Veda, that too is not so:
“For in the part concerning being a means to dharma, there is no disagreement at all;
whereas disagreement in grammatical explanation is not a defect, because of the difference of target forms.” (1)
As for the claim that there is a contradiction between earlier and later positions, that too is not so: because the distinction of base and suffix is fictitious, the import lies solely in explaining the partless *sphoṭa*; in the Grammarians' doctrine, there is no contradiction in the portion that is the object of the import. An apparent contradiction, on the other hand, carries no defect, just as in the case of explanatory passages. Therefore, it is established that grammar is authoritative.
10. The topic of the expressive capacity of the archetype:
“Because there is no injunction of application, the meaning is one, due to non-contradiction.” (2)