Mimamsashastrasarvasva 5.2

5.2

gavādayo vācakā na tu gāvyādaya iti nirṇīte vācakaprasaṅgādvācyaviśeṣaścintyiṣyate—kimākṛtiruta vyaktiriti
tadupodghātatvenedaṃ cintyate—kiṃ lokavedayoḥ śabdārthau bhinnāvutābhinnāviti
tathā hi—bhedapakṣe lokavyavahārānanupātināṃ vaidikaśabdānāṃ
śaktireva durgrahā | upāyābhāvāt | ato nārambhaṇīyamākṛtyadhikaraṇam
abhedapakṣe tu loke vṛddhavyavahārānusāreṇa kṛtaḥ śabdārthanirṇayo
vede phaliṣyati | tenākṛtyadhikaraṇasyāyamupodghātaḥ | tatra satyapi
katipayavarṇabhede svaracchāndasavarṇāgamalopavikāraviparyyayādidharmabhedena
lokavedayoḥ padānāṃ bhedaḥ | svarūpādi‘śabdasāhacaryyācca | tathā
‘uttānā vai devagavā vahantī’tyādidarśanādayo'pyanya iti prāpte
brūmaḥ“pratyakṣapratyabhijñānādvarṇaikatvaṃ pratiṣṭhitam
varṇātmakaṃ padaṃ tacca tadabhedānna bhidyate1 ”
evaṃ sthite vicāryate-kimākṛtiḥ śabdārtha uta vyaktiriti
“dvau ca pakṣāvupandhastau bhāṣyakāreṇa yadyapi
vyākhyātārastathāpyatra brūyuḥ pakṣāntarāṇyapi
niyogena vikalpena dve vā saha samuccite
sambandhaḥ samudāyo vā viśiṣṭā vakyetarā
ete pakṣāḥ punaryojyā vyatikīrṇāḥ parasparam
liṅgakārakasaṃkhyābhiḥ saṃhatāsaṃhatātmabhiḥ
punarjātyādipañcāṇāṃ tādṛgbhyevātra yojanā
evaṃ śabdasvarūpasya punarjātyādibhiḥ saha1 "
gośabdārthaḥ kimākṛtireva, atha vyaktireva, utākṛtirvā vyaktirvā
athākṛtiśca vyaktiśca | kiṃ vobhayoḥ sambandhaḥ | uta samudāyaḥ
kimākṛtiviśiṣṭā vyaktiḥ, uta vyaktiviśiṣṭā ākṛtiriti2 | eṣaiva
cāṣṭapakṣau liṅgādibhirvyastasamastairyojyā | evañca yadyapyanekapakṣasambhavet tathāpyākṛtireveti dṛḍhaḥ pakṣo'yamekataḥ | ityanyataḥ sarve
vyaktipakṣānupātinaḥ | tasmāt" darśiteṣvapi sarveṣu vicāraḥ kriyate dvayoḥ
kā śabdenākṛtivyaktyorucyate kā'nugamyate3 "
tatra" prayogacodanābhāvādyakterevābhidheyatā
na hyākṛtiramūrttatvādvyavahāropayoginī4 "
na hi ākṛtāvavahananālambhanādīni sambhavanti | na cākṣipravyaktau
tadanvayaḥ | ākṣepo hi anumānamarthāpattirvā | tathā cāśabdārthatvādvyakteḥ padārthāntarānvayo na syāt | uktaṃ hi tadgatādhikaraṇegamyamānasya cārthasya naiva dṛṣṭaṃ viśeṣaṇam
śabdāntarairvibhaktyā vā dhūmo'yaṃ jvalatīti vat || iti
atha lakṣaṇayaivākṣepaḥ tathāpi tasyāḥ śakyānvayānupapattijñānādhīnatayā prathamaṃ sāmānyabodhasyānubhavaviruddhasyāpātāt | tasmāvyaktirevārthaḥ | kathaṃ tarhi vyaktyantare prayogaḥ | yā evamākṛtikā
sā gauriti sāmānyamupalakṣaṇīkṛtya śaktigrahādityavehi | yaḥ
śuklavāsāḥ sa devadatta itivat | yathā copalakṣaṇabhūtaṃ vāso na
śakyakoṭiniviṣṭaṃ tatheha jātirapi | astu vā jātiviśiṣṭavyaktireva vācyeti pūrvaḥ pakṣaḥ
siddhāntastuviśeṣyaṃ nābhidhā gacchet kṣīṇaśaktirviśeṣaṇe
vyaktāvākṣepalabhyāyāmavaghātādisambhavaḥ
yattūktamanupapattijñānādhīnā lakṣaṇeti tanna | nirūḍhalakṣaṇāyā
anyathātvāt
vastutastu jātivyaktyorabhedādeva lakṣaṇāpyanāvaśyakau
āha ca“ tena talakṣitavyakteḥ kriyāsambandhacodanā
jātivyaktyorabhedo vā vākyārtheṣu vivakṣitaḥ1 ” || iti
asmiṃśca pakṣe yadyapi vyaktayaḥ sāmānyātmanā vācyā eva tathāpi
viśeṣarūpeṇa vācyatvaṃ nāstīti pratipādayitumidamadhikaraṇam
atra ca nāmākhyātayoreva vicāryatā | na tu nipātopasargayoḥ
taduktam“ caturvidhe pade cātra dvividhasyārthanirṇayaḥ
kriyate saṃśayotpatternopasarganipātayoḥ
tayorarthābhidhāne hi vyāpāro naiva vidyate
yadarthadyotakau tau tu vācakaḥ savicāryate2 ” || iti
nāmnāmapi madhye jātiśabda evodāharaṇam | na tu guṇakriyādravyayadṛcchāsarvanāmaśabdāḥ | prayojanantu pūrvapakṣe sāmānyaviśeṣaśabdayorekaviṣayatayā sāmānyaśiṣṭasya viśeṣaśiṣṭenābādhaḥ | siddhānte
tu bādha iti
prathamādhyāye caturthaḥ pādaḥ
1 udbhidādiśabdānāṃ yāganāmatayā
prāmāṇyādhikaraṇam
uktaṃ samāmnāyaidamarthyaṃ tasmāt sarvaṃ tadarthaṃ syāt
2 udbhidādiśabdānāṃ yāganāmadheyatādhikaraṇam
api vā nāmadheyaṃ syādyadutpattāvapūrvamavidhāyakatvāt

Once it has been determined that words like “cow” (go) are expressive, but not corrupt forms like gāvī, the particular meaning to be expressed is to be considered on this occasion of discussing expressiveness: Is it the archetype or the individual?
As an introductory discussion to that, this is considered: Are the word and the meaning different or non-different in the world and in the Veda?
For, on the view that they are different, the expressive power of Vedic words—which do not follow worldly usage—would be difficult to grasp at all, because there would be no means [to grasp it]. Therefore, the section on the archetype would not be worth undertaking.
On the view of non-difference, however, the determination of the meaning of words made in the world according to the usage of experienced elders will bear fruit in the Veda. For that reason, this is an introductory discussion to the section on the archetype. There, although there is a difference in a few phonemes, there is a difference between words of the world and of the Veda due to differences in properties such as accent, Vedic insertion of phonemes, elision, modification, inversion, and the like, as well as due to association with expressions such as "intrinsic form" and the like. Likewise, on the prima facie view that the meaning too is different, because of observations such as “The divine cows carry, lying on their backs” and the like,
we say:
“Because of perceptual recognition, the oneness of the phoneme is established;
a word consists of phonemes, and that does not differ, because there is no difference in them.”
This being established, it is investigated: Is the meaning of a word the archetype or the individual?
“Although two positions were put forward by the author of the commentary,
commentators may nevertheless state other positions here as well:
by necessity, by option, or the two conjoined together;
a relation, or an aggregate, or one qualified by the other.
These positions are again to be combined, intermingled with one another
with gender, case-relation, and number, taken singly or together;
again, the application here is just the same for the five [categories] beginning with universal;
likewise, for the intrinsic form of the word, together with those beginning with universal.”
Is the meaning of the word “cow” just the archetype? Or just the individual? Or the archetype or the individual? Or both the archetype and the individual? Or is it the relation of the two? Or the aggregate? Is it the individual qualified by the archetype, or the archetype qualified by the individual? And this eightfold position is to be combined with gender and so forth, singly or collectively. And thus, although many positions are possible, this position—namely, that it is the archetype alone—is firm on one side. On the other side, all [the others] fall into the individual-position. Therefore:
“Even though all have been shown, the investigation is conducted between two:
Which of the two, the archetype or the individual, is stated by the word, and which is subsequently understood?”
There:
“Because of the absence of injunction of performance [otherwise], the denotable is the individual alone;
for the archetype, being incorporeal, is not suitable for everyday practice.”
For pounding, immolating, and so forth are not possible regarding an archetype. Nor is its syntactic connection [made] with an individual obtained by implication. For implication is inference or presumption. And thus, because the individual is not the meaning of the word, there could be no syntactic connection with another word-meaning. For it has been said in the Tadgata section:
“And a qualification of an understood meaning is not seen at all
by other words or by a case-ending, as in ‘This smoke burns.’”
If [it is claimed that] the implication is by metaphorical transfer alone, even so, since that depends on the cognition of the incompatibility of the syntactic connection of the primary meaning, an initial cognition of the universal—which contradicts experience—would result. Therefore, the individual alone is the meaning. How then is there application to another individual? Understand that the grasp of expressive power is made by using the universal as an indicative mark: “That which has such an archetype is a cow”—just like “The one who has white clothes is Devadatta.” And just as the garment serving as an indicative mark is not included within the scope of the primary meaning, so too here is the universal. Or let it be that the individual qualified by the universal is the expressed meaning. This is the prima facie view.

But the established conclusion is:
Primary denotation cannot go to the qualified entity, its power being exhausted on the qualifier;
when the individual is obtained by implication, pounding and the like are possible.
As for what was said—that metaphorical transfer depends on the cognition of incompatibility—that is not so, because an established metaphorical transfer is otherwise.
In reality, even metaphorical transfer is unnecessary, simply because of the non-difference between universal and individual.
And he says:
“Therefore, the injunction of connection with an action is for the individual indicated by that [universal],
or the non-difference of universal and individual is intended in sentence-meanings.”
And on this view, although individuals are indeed expressed in their general form, nevertheless this section is meant to establish that there is no expressiveness in their particular form.
And here, only nouns and verbs are to be investigated, not particles and prefixes.
As it has been said:
“And here, among the four kinds of words, the determination of the meaning of two kinds
is made, because doubt arises; not of prefixes and particles.
For they have no operation in expressing a meaning;
rather, that expressive word whose meaning they reveal is investigated.”
Even among nouns, only a universal-word is an example, not words for qualities, actions, substances, proper names, or pronouns. But the purpose is: on the prima facie view, because a general word and a particular word have the same referent, that which is taught by the general is not sublated by that which is taught by the particular; on the established conclusion, however, there is sublation.

First Chapter, Fourth Section
1. Section on the Authoritativeness of Words such as “Udbhid” as Names of Sacrifices
“The collection of texts has been declared to have that purpose; therefore, everything would have that purpose.”
2. Section on the Nomenclature of Sacrifices for Words such as “Udbhid”
“Or rather, it must be a name, because it does not enjoin anything new at the origination [of the sacrifice].”