Tattvopaplavasimha p81559

p81559

4.252 athāvyabhicāribhūtenopādānajñānena janyate, tad upādānakāraṇam anukurvad vopajāyate 'nanukurvad vā / tad yady upādānakāraṇānukāreṇotpādyate, tadā kim āpnoti? avyabhicārisvarūpānukāreṇotpādyate / katham? avyabhicārasya jñānatādātmyena vyavasthiteḥ / na caikadeśānukāritvam asty upādānakāraṇasya niravayavatvāt / evaṃ sarvaṃ vijñānam avyabhicāri prasaktam, apohyajñānānupapattiḥ / na ca vyabhicārāvyabhicārau jñānād vyatiriktau staḥ / yathā rasākāro rūpākāro vā jñānākārād bhinno, na tathā vyabhicārāvyabhicārau jñānād vyatiriktau / tataś ca vyabhicārākāro 'tra nirākriyate kim uktaṃ bhavati? jñānākāro 'tra nirākriyate / tataś cājñānātmakaṃ pratyakṣaṃ prasaktaṃ saugatānām /

Now, if it is produced by a material cause cognition that is non-deviating, does it arise imitating that material cause, or not imitating it? In that case, if it is produced imitating the material cause, then what follows? It is produced imitating the essential nature of the non-deviating [cause]. Why? Because non-deviation is established as identical with cognition. And there is no imitating only a part, because the material cause is partless. Thus it follows that every cognition is non-deviating, [and] a cognition to be excluded is impossible. Nor are deviation and non-deviation distinct from cognition. Just as the form of taste or the form of visible matter is different from the cognitive form, deviation and non-deviation are not distinct from cognition in that way. And consequently, when the form of deviation is negated here, what has been said? The cognitive form is negated here. And consequently, perception for the Buddhists would absurdly consist of non-cognition.