Nyāya Sūtras 288
Nyāyabhāṣya 288
- Language
- Sanskrit
288.2
upapannam anityā buddhir iti/ idaṃ tu cintyate kasyeyaṃ buddhir ātmeindriyamano 'rthānāṃ guṇa iti/ prasiddho 'pi khalv ayam arthaḥ parīkaṣāśeṣaṃ pravarttayāmīti prakriyate/ so 'yaṃ buddhau sannikarṣotpatteḥ saṃśayaḥ viśeṣasyāgrahaṇād iti/ tatrāyaṃ viśeṣaḥ
It has been established that cognition is impermanent. But this is examined: of which of the self, sense organ, mind, and objects is this cognition a quality? Even though this matter is well established, it is undertaken with the intention: 'I shall carry out the remainder of the examination.' This doubt regarding cognition arises from contact, because a specific difference is not grasped. Here is the specific difference:
288.3
nendriyārthayos tadvināśe 'pi jñānāvasthānāt ||
[It is] not of the sense organ and object, because cognition remains even when they are destroyed.
288.4
nendriyāṇām vā guṇo jñānaṃ teṣāṃ vināśo 'pi jñānasya bhāvāt/ bhavati khalv idam indriye 'rthe ca vinaṣṭe jñānam adrākṣam iti/ na ca jñātari vinaṣthe jñānaṃ bhavitum arhati/ anyat khalu vai tad indriyārthasannikarṣajaṃ jñānaṃ yad indriyārthavināśe na bhavati/
Knowledge is not a quality of the sense organs, because knowledge exists even when they are destroyed. Indeed, this knowledge—'I saw'—occurs when the sense organ and the object have been destroyed. And knowledge cannot occur when the knower has been destroyed. That knowledge born of the contact of sense organ and object, which does not exist when the sense organ and object are destroyed, is surely different.
288.5
idam anyad ātmamanaḥsannikarṣajam, tasya yukto bhāva iti/smṛtiḥ khalv iyam adrākṣam iti pūrvadṛṣṭaviṣayā/ na ca vijñātari naṣṭe pūrvopalabdheḥ smaraṇaṃ yuktam, na cānyadṛṣṭam anyaḥ smarati/ na ca manasi jñātary abhyupagamyamāne śakyam indriyārthayor jñātṛtvaṃ pratipādayitum//18//
This other [knowledge] is born of the contact of the self and the mind; its existence is proper. Indeed, this recollection, 'I saw', has as its object what was seen before. And when the knower has perished, recollection of what was previously apprehended is not plausible, nor does one remember what was seen by another. And if the mind is admitted to be the knower, it is not possible to establish that the sense organ and the object are the knower. //18
Translations (1)
- English (machine translation) — English, machine translation
Commentaries (2)
- Nyāyavārtikatātparyaṭīkā — Vācaspati Miśra, Sanskrit
- Nyāyavārttika — Uddyotakara, Sanskrit
Linked texts (1)
- Nyāyasūtra — Akṣapāda Gautama, Sanskrit