Nyāya Sūtras 64.4

64.4

na vipratipattimātrād avyavasthāmātrād vā saṃśayaḥ/ kiṃ tarhi? vipratipattim upalabhamānasya saṃśayaḥ/ evam avyavasthāyām apīti/ atha vāsty ātmety eke nāsty ātmety apare manyanta ity upalabdheḥ kathaṃ saṃśayaḥ syād iti/ tathopalabdhir avyavasthitā anupalabdhiś cāvyavasthiteti vibhāgenādhyavasite saṃśayo nopapadyata iti//

Doubt does not arise from mere conflicting opinions or mere irregularity. What then? Doubt belongs to one who apprehends conflicting opinions. It is the same regarding irregularity as well. Alternatively: how could there be doubt from the apprehension that "some think the self exists, others think the self does not exist"? Likewise, when it is determined analytically that apprehension is irregular and non-apprehension is irregular, doubt is untenable.