Nyāya Sūtras 68

A brief refutation of this elaborate set of objections is as follows:

NyS 2.1.6: Since doubt arises only from the determination as previously stated, depending upon [remembering] the specific [property] without [perceiving] its distinction, there is neither absence of doubt nor endless doubt.

Neither the non-arising of doubt nor the non-elimination of doubt follows. How so? First, as for the point that the cause of doubt is the determination of a common property, not the common property alone—that is indeed so. Why was it not stated in this way? Because it is established from the statement 'depending upon the specific [property]': 'dependence upon the specific' means an expectation, and that is effective when the specific property is not apprehended, whereas it was not said 'depending upon the common property.' And how could there not be an expectation regarding the common property if it were not perceived? Through this implication, it is known that it arises from the determination of the common property.
Or, [it is established] from the word 'presence' (upapatti): it is stated 'from the presence of a common property,' and there is no other presence of a common property apart from the cognition of its real existence. For a common property whose real existence is not apprehended is like something non-existent.
Or, the word for the object denotes the cognition having that object; just as when it is said in ordinary life 'fire is inferred by smoke,' it is understood that fire is inferred by the perception of smoke. How so? For, having seen smoke, one then infers fire, not without having seen it; and the word 'perception' is not heard in the sentence, yet one acknowledges that the sentence conveys its meaning. Therefore, we think that a knower acknowledges that a word for an object denotes the cognition having that object. In the same way, here too, by the word 'common property,' he meant 'the determination of a common property.'

As for the claim that, having reasoned 'I apprehend a property common to these two,' there is an absence of doubt when the property and the possessor of the property are apprehended—this pertains to things previously seen. 'Regarding the two objects that I saw previously, I apprehend a common property and do not apprehend a specific property; how then might I see a specific property by which I could determine one or the other?' And this [doubt] does not cease merely upon the apprehension of the property and the possessor of the property when a common property is apprehended.
And as for what was said, that there is no doubt elsewhere from the determination of a different object—one who assumed that the mere determination of a different object is the cause of doubt should be addressed in that way.
Then as for the claim that this is so 'because there is an absence of similarity between cause and effect': the presence and absence of the effect corresponding to the presence and absence of the cause constitutes the similarity between cause and effect.

From whose arising that which arises, and from whose non-arising that which does not arise—that is the cause, and the other is the effect; this is the similarity, and this exists between the cause of doubt and doubt. By this, the objection 'because of the determination of multiple properties' is also answered.
Then as for what was said, that 'there is no doubt from the determination of conflicting opinions and unsteadiness': 'I apprehend conflicting meanings in two distinct assertions and I do not know, nor do I apprehend, a specific property by which I could determine one or the other;'

'therefore, what specific property could there be here by which I could determine one or the other?'—this doubt produced by conflicting opinions cannot be removed merely by the agreement on the conflicting opinions. Thus it is to be understood in the case of doubt caused by the unsteadiness of apprehension and non-apprehension.
Then as for the claim 'because there is agreement regarding the conflicting opinions': the meaning of the word 'conflicting opinion' is [two contrary assertions], and the determination of that, depending upon a specific property, is the cause of doubt, and it does not cease by means of a different name. Two assertions with conflicting meanings regarding a common subject are the meaning of the word 'conflicting opinion', and the determination of that, depending upon a specific property, is the cause of doubt. Nor does its being the cause of doubt cease when another name, the word 'agreement', is applied to it. This [objection] is merely bewildering to uncultivated minds.
Then as for the claim 'and because unsteadiness is steady in its own nature': since the object that is the cause of doubt is not refuted and unsteadiness is admitted, the positing of a different word on a different pretext is useless. Indeed, the unsteadiness posited by a different word does not become a non-unsteadiness merely because it is steady in its own nature.

It is not denied that these two—apprehension and non-apprehension—being directed to the existent and the non-existent, depending upon a specific property, are the cause of doubt; and in so far as unsteadiness is steady in its own nature, it does not for that reason abandon its nature, for to that extent unsteadiness is admitted. Thus, this positing of a different word, even when made, establishes no different meaning.
Then as for the claim 'likewise, there would be endless doubt, because that property is constantly present': this doubt does not arise from the common property and the like alone. From what then? From the determination of that object accompanied by the recollection of the specific property; hence there is no endless doubt.
As for the claim that there is no doubt from the determination of a property of either one: that is incorrect, because it was stated that doubt is an unsettled consideration depending upon a specific property. And the specific property is a property belonging to either one; while that is being determined, dependence upon a specific property cannot occur.