Nyayasutra 68.4

68.4

na saṃśayānutpattiḥ saṃśayānucchedaś ca prasajyate/ katham? yat tāvat samānadharmādhyavasāyaḥ saṃśayahetuḥ na samānadharmamātram iti, evam etat/ kasmād evaṃ nocyata iti? viśeṣāpekṣa iti vacanāt tatsiddheḥ --- viśeṣasyāpekṣā ākaṅkṣā, sā cānupalabhyamāne viśeṣe samarthā, na coktaṃ samānadharmāpekṣa iti/ samāne ca dharme katham ākaṅkṣā na bhaved yady ayaṃ pratyakṣaḥ syāt/ etena sāmarthyena vijñāyate samānadharmādhyavasāyād iti/
upapattivacanād vā --- samānadharmopapatter ity ucyate na cānyā sadbhāvasaṃvedanād ṛte samānadharmopapattir asti/ anupalabhyamānasadbhāvo hi samāno dharmo 'vidyamānavad bhavatīti/
viṣayaśabdena vā viṣayiṇaḥ pratyayasyābhidhānam --- yathā loke dhūmenāgnir anumīyate ity ukte dhūmadarśanenāgnir anumīyata iti jñāyate/ katham? dṛṣṭvā hi dhūmam athāgnim anuminoti nādṛṣṭveti; na ca vākye darśanaśabdaḥ śrūyate, anujānāti ca vākyasyārthapratyāyakatvam; tena manyāmahe viṣayaśabdena viṣayiṇaḥ pratyayasyābhidhānaṃ boddhānujānāti/ evam ihāpi samānadharmaśabdena samānadharmādhyvasāyam āheti/

Neither the non-arising of doubt nor the non-elimination of doubt follows. How so? First, as for the point that the cause of doubt is the determination of a common property, not the common property alone—that is indeed so. Why was it not stated in this way? Because it is established from the statement 'depending upon the specific [property]': 'dependence upon the specific' means an expectation, and that is effective when the specific property is not apprehended, whereas it was not said 'depending upon the common property.' And how could there not be an expectation regarding the common property if it were not perceived? Through this implication, it is known that it arises from the determination of the common property.
Or, [it is established] from the word 'presence' (upapatti): it is stated 'from the presence of a common property,' and there is no other presence of a common property apart from the cognition of its real existence. For a common property whose real existence is not apprehended is like something non-existent.
Or, the word for the object denotes the cognition having that object; just as when it is said in ordinary life 'fire is inferred by smoke,' it is understood that fire is inferred by the perception of smoke. How so? For, having seen smoke, one then infers fire, not without having seen it; and the word 'perception' is not heard in the sentence, yet one acknowledges that the sentence conveys its meaning. Therefore, we think that a knower acknowledges that a word for an object denotes the cognition having that object. In the same way, here too, by the word 'common property,' he meant 'the determination of a common property.'