Nyāya Sūtras 97
Nyāyabhāṣya 97
- Language
- Sanskrit
97.3
dhāraṇākarṣaṇopapatteś ca ||
And because holding and pulling are possible.
97.4
avayavy arthāntarabhūta iti/
saṅgrahakārite vai dhāraṇākarṣaṇe/ saṃgraho nāma saṃyogasahacaritaṃ guṇāntaraṃ snehadravatvakāritam, apāṃ saṃyogād āme kumbhe, agnisaṃyogāt pakve/ yadi tv avayavikārite abhaviṣyatāṃ pāṃśurāśiprabhṛtiśv apy ajñāsyetām/ dravyāntarānutpattau ca tṛṇopalakāṣṭhādiṣu jatusaṃgṛhīteṣv api nābhāviṣyatām iti/
[The composite whole] is a distinct entity. [Opponent:] Holding and pulling are indeed produced by adhesion. Adhesion is another quality accompanying contact, produced by viscidity and liquidity—due to contact with water in an unbaked jar, and due to contact with fire in a baked one. If, however, they were produced by a composite whole, they would be perceived even in a heap of dust and the like; and if no distinct substance were produced, they would not occur even in grass, stones, wood, and the like, held together by lac.
97.5
athāvayavinaṃ pratyācakṣāṇako mā bhūt pratyakṣalopa ity aṇusañcayaṃ darśanaviṣayaṃ pratijānānaḥ kim anuyoktavya iti/ ekam idaṃ dravyam ity ekavuddher viṣayaṃ paryanuyojyaḥ --- kim ekabuddhir abhinnārthaviṣayeti āhosvit bhinnārthaviṣayeti/ abhinnārthaviṣayeti cet ---
% p.499
Now, if someone rejecting the composite whole asserts that an aggregate of atoms is the object of sight, so that there is no loss of perception, what should he be asked? He should be cross-examined regarding the object of the cognition of unity, [namely,] 'This is one substance': 'Is the cognition of unity directed toward a non-different object, or is it directed toward different objects?' If [he says] it is directed toward a non-different object—
97.6
arthāntarānujñānād avayavavisiddhiḥ/ nānārthaviṣayeti cet --- bhinneṣv ekadarśanānupapattiḥ anekasminn eka iti vyāhatā buddhir na dṛśyata iti//35//
% cet ---] p.500
—then, because a distinct entity is admitted, the composite whole is established. If [he says] it is directed toward manifold objects—then a cognition of unity is impossible with respect to different [things]; a contradictory cognition [such as] 'one' with respect to many is not observed. //35
Translations (1)
- English (machine translation) — English, machine translation
Commentaries (2)
- Nyāyavārtikatātparyaṭīkā — Vācaspati Miśra, Sanskrit
- Nyāyavārttika — Uddyotakara, Sanskrit
Linked texts (1)
- Nyāyasūtra — Akṣapāda Gautama, Sanskrit